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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the oftentimes complicated nature of preventive care utilization 
decisions to help inform preventive health policy. The first paper examines how patient 
experiences with two seemingly disparate types of preventive care—mammography and 
medication adherence—can significantly affect each other. Using Marketscan Medicaid and 
commercial claims data and a difference-in-difference approach, I show that a false-positive 
mammogram leads to improved cholesterol medication adherence for the Medicaid insured 
population, with suggestive evidence showing  that the improvement may be due to increased 
interaction with the health care system for a population with access problems. However, I find 
reduced adherence for the commercially insured, possibly resulting from reduced trust in the 
health care system following the negative experience of a false-positive. The second paper 
provides evidence that a false-positive mammogram can lead to significant increases in the 
probability of initiating depression or anxiety medication utilization compared to women who 
have a true-negative mammogram for both the Medicaid and commercially insured populations. 
In terms of magnitude the effect is 4 to 6 times smaller than for women diagnosed with breast 
cancer (true-positives). I also find several factors that appear to increase the risk of initiating 
depression or anxiety medication for women experiencing a false-positive mammogram—the 
first experienced false-positive for women with Medicaid; and invasiveness of the test and 
greater time to resolution for the commercially insured. The final paper analyzes how anticipated 
unemployment and uninsurance affect preventive health utilization using MEPS data. To find 
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more exogenous sources of variation in unemployment and uninsurance, my primary analyses 
restrict analysis to individuals in the 75th percentile or greater of predicted unemployment or 
uninsurance and separate unemployment into layoffs and non-layoffs. Across both methods, I 
find evidence of significant stocking up for a variety of preventive care services in anticipation 
of future unemployment but evidence of significant delaying for individuals who anticipate 
becoming uninsured. Particularly strong delays for cancer screenings, suggest the delays may 
result from lower expected net benefits of screening for people who anticipate becoming 
uninsured and therefore facing high out-of-pocket costs for any treatments.
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Chapter 1. 
Introduction 
 
There is strong evidence that preventive health care including vaccinations, screenings, 
and medication adherence can help improve health (Masiosek et al., 2006; Cutler and Everett, 
2010) and in the case of certain vaccinations and medication adherence can even potentially lead 
to health care cost savings (Cohen, Neumann, and Weinstein, 2008; Roebuck et al., 2011). 
Despite this evidence, many preventive services are under-utilized (McGlynn et al., 2003). For 
example, nearly 1/3 of eligible women have not had a mammogram within the past two years 
(Centers for Disease Control, 2015); and nearly 40 percent of individuals are not adequately 
adherent to cardiovascular and antidiabetic medications (Cramer et al., 2007). 
 In an effort to increase the utilization rates of select preventive services, the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) includes provisions that require all health insurance plans to cover 15 
preventive services without cost sharing for all adults as well as an additional 22 preventive 
services for women (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2015). However, by just 
focusing on patient cost-sharing, the ACA may miss important nuances about individual level 
preventive care decision-making that may be important to ensuring optimal levels of preventive 
care utilization.  This dissertation examines the oftentimes complicated nature of preventive care 
utilization decisions to help better inform preventive health care policy. 
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 One type of important preventive care not explicitly targeted by the ACA is chronic 
disease medication adherence. Despite numerous studies on the importance of medication 
adherence and factors that may affect it, none have examined how an individual’s experience 
with seemingly unrelated types of preventive care may have important effects on medication 
adherence. In the second chapter, I demonstrate that the interaction of disparate types of 
preventive care is important to understanding the complicated issue of medication adherence. I 
show that the experience of a false-positive mammogram can have significant spillover effects 
onto medication adherence. On one hand following a false-positive, the increased interaction 
with the health care system during the follow-up visits may improve adherence, while on the 
other hand the negative experience may lower an individual’s trust in the health care system 
thereby lowering adherence. Using Marketscan Medicaid and commercial claims data and a 
difference-in-difference approach, this paper shows that a false-positive mammogram leads to 
improved cholesterol medication adherence for the Medicaid insured population but reduced 
adherence for the commercially insured. I then provide suggestive evidence that the improved 
adherence within the Medicaid population is likely due to this population with poor access 
having increased interaction with the health care system following a false-positive. 
 The third chapter examines the related topic of how a false-positive mammogram can 
lead to significant increases in the probability of initiating depression or anxiety medication 
utilization. Again using Marketscan Medicaid and commercial claims data, I compare rates of 
depression or anxiety medication initiation for women who undergo a screening mammogram 
and receive either a false-positive, a true-positive, or a true-negative result. I find significant 
increases in depression or anxiety medication initiation for women who experience a false-
positive mammogram compared to women who have a negative result for both those with 
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Medicaid and with commercial health insurance. I also find a significant increase for women 
who have a true-positive mammogram result, with the magnitude nearly 4 to 6 times larger than 
that for women who experience a false-positive. I also find several factors that appear to increase 
the risk of initiating depression or anxiety medication for women experience a false-positive 
mammogram—the first experienced false-positive for women with Medicaid insurance; as well 
as invasiveness of the test and greater time to resolution for the commercially insured. Finally, I 
find a significant but modestly sized increase in the number of fills and amount spent on 
depression and anxiety medication for women experiencing a false-positive mammogram who 
have been previously taking those medications.   
 The fourth chapter analyzes how anticipated future unemployment and uninsurance 
affects preventive health utilization. Using 2000-2012 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
(MEPS) data, I estimate how future unemployment and uninsurance affects current preventive 
care utilization among a population that is both employed and insured. With concerns about the 
endogeneity of utilization and unemployment or uninsurance, I implement two methods to 
attempt to find more exogenous sources of variation in unemployment and uninsurance—
restricting the analysis to individuals in the 75th percentile or greater of predicted unemployment 
or uninsurance and separating unemployment into layoffs and non-layoffs. Across both methods, 
I find evidence of significant stocking up for a variety of types of preventive care services in 
anticipation of future unemployment but not uninsurance. Conversely and with more consistent 
evidence across methods, I find evidence of significant delaying for individuals who anticipate 
becoming uninsured. With the results particularly strong for cancer screenings, I hypothesize that 
preventive care, especially screenings, may be more limited in terms of net benefits to 
individuals who anticipate becoming uninsured because they are more likely to face high out-of-
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pocket costs for any treatments. This suggests that preventive health care policy during economic 
downturns may be best targeted at individuals likely to become uninsured, in particular trying to 
ensure that these individuals continue to have access to affordable coverage for both preventive 
as well as curative care. 
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 Chapter 2.  
Heterogeneous spillover effects of false-positive mammograms on medication 
adherence
 
2.1 Introduction and Background  
 Medication adherence is an important component of public health efforts to improve 
health outcomes for individuals with chronic diseases (Osterberg et al., 2005; Cutler and Everett, 
2010). In particular, for conditions such as dyslipidemia and diabetes, improved medication 
adherence has been shown to prevent serious health complications and lower overall medical 
costs (Sokol et al., 2005; Roebuck et al., 2011). Despite these benefits, medication adherence for 
dyslipidemia and diabetes remains suboptimal, with patients often missing or delaying their 
prescriptions (Cramer, 2004; Ellis et al., 2004). 
 As such a central issue in pharmacoeconomics and health policy, there have been 
thousands of studies on the topic of anti-hyperlipidemia (i.e. cholesterol) and anti-diabetic (i.e. 
diabetes) medication adherence. As summarized by three systematic reviews (Balkrishnan, 2005; 
Odegard and Capoccia, 2007; Pedan et al., 2007; and Williams, Manias, and Walker (2008)), the 
existing studies have focused on three main factors that may affect medication adherence: 
individual-level characteristics (e.g. demographics, expected health benefits, health literacy, 
health beliefs or knowledge, and cognitive or psychological ability to follow a medication 
regimen), medication-level characteristics (e.g. cost, side effects, and complexity of the 
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regimen), and provider-level characteristics (e.g. relationship with the patient, adequate follow-
up resources, and adequate patient support). However, an important area that has not received 
attention is how experience with other unrelated types of preventive care may have significant 
spillover effects onto medication adherence. 
 The emerging importance of these types of spillover effects has been described by Cutler 
and Glaeser (2005) in their study showing typical observables explain only a small portion of the 
large variation in preventive health behaviors and care utilization such mammography and 
medication utilization. The authors find that genetics are one important explanation but that 
“randomly encountered situation differences” have potentially the largest effect. Despite citing it 
as a “high priority for future research”, the situational factors have yet to receive much attention 
in the literature. 
 This study provides the first evidence of how a seemingly unrelated type of care, namely 
mammography, can have significant spillover effects on cholesterol and diabetes medication. 
While several studies have examined medication adherence and other types of preventive 
behaviors such as mammography utilization, these studies have only focused on the positive 
correlation between preventive care utilization and medication adherence to demonstrate the 
“healthy adherer problem” (Brookhart et al., 2007; Dormuth et al., 2009). This problem 
highlights the selection problem—women who are more likely to get a mammogram may also be 
more likely to adhere to medication—that makes it difficult to make causal inferences about how 
mammography might affect medication adherence. 
 I ameliorate this problem empirically, by exploiting the random nature of a false-positive 
mammogram. I argue that conditional on receiving a mammogram, a false-positive is plausibly 
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exogenous to patients’ other preventive health care use because it is generally a function of 
technical error or radiologist judgment (Elmore et al., 2001). I choose to focus on false-positive 
mammograms because they are common—over 10 years of screening an estimated 1/3 to 1/2 of 
all women will experience a false-positive (Elmore et al., 1998; Hubbard et al., 2011)—and, as 
the emerging literature has shown, appear to have potentially significant effects on health beliefs 
and behavior (Bond et al., 2013; Brewer et al., 2007; Brett et al., 2005), making them a good 
candidate for having spillover effects onto other types of care such as medication adherence. 
 To better understand the possible factors affecting medication adherence, in the 
theoretical framework section, I use a model of adherence developed by Egan and Philipson 
(2014) to highlight three important factors from the standard theory of medication adherence—
price, expected effectiveness of the medication, and immediateness of the feedback regarding the 
effectiveness of the medication. I then explain how a false-positive may affect the first two, 
leading to spillover effects on medication adherence. Specifically, a false-positive requires 
follow-up tests that may effectively lower the non-monetary costs of adherence by providing 
patients with additional opportunities to be reminded and encouraged to take their medications or 
even possibly to have a refill written during these additional visits. This would lead to improved 
medication adherence. Conversely, the negative experience surrounding a false-positive may 
lower the patient’s trust in medical care, including the effectiveness of medication, thereby 
lowering adherence. 
Empirically, using longitudinal data on patients before and after screening mammograms, 
I estimate a difference-in-difference model that compares changes in medication adherence 
before and after mammograms between women who receive a false-positive (treatment group) 
and women who receive a true-negative (control group) using a validated claims-based 
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algorithm. The estimates show that a false-positive mammogram significantly reduces the 
number of days with no cholesterol medication (improves adherence) for the Medicaid insured 
but significantly increases the number of days with no cholesterol medication (lowers adherence) 
for the commercially insured. I find no statistically significant effect on diabetes medication 
adherence. Auxiliary analyses suggest that increased interaction with the health care system, as a 
result of the follow-up tests, may help to explain the cholesterol medication adherence 
improvement in the Medicaid population.  
The significance of the connection between these two seemingly unrelated types of care 
is that future health policy may need to think more critically about how experience with one type 
of care may have important spillover effects onto other types of care. More specifically, this 
suggests preventive health care policy as well as communication between clinicians and patients 
may need to account for varying experiences with different types of preventive care. For 
example, women experiencing a false-positive may need increased support to not only deal with 
the anxiety surrounding a false-positive but to also ensure that they continue to utilize all 
necessary preventive care. In addition, the results showing that increased contact with the health 
care system, even for a seemingly unrelated type of care, improves mediation adherence for the 
Medicaid population suggests an important role for physicians or other health care providers to 
help improve preventive health behaviors even when that may not be the specific reason for the 
medical visit. Especially for patients who may otherwise have difficulty accessing the health care 
system, policies to encourage physicians to ask all patients about their medication adherence, 
remind them to continue to take their medication, or to write a refill prescription may be 
important. 
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This study makes contributions to two sets of literature. First, this study adds to the large 
literature on medication adherence. While most studies focus on how individual characteristics 
or drug-specific attributes, including prices or side effects, affect medication adherence, this 
study highlights that a more global perspective of an individual’s health experience may be 
necessary. I show there may be important spillover effects from experiences with different types 
of preventive care, and also demonstrate that these spillover effects may vary by insurance status. 
For example, a false-positive mammogram may improve medication adherence for the Medicaid 
population as it increases contact with the medical care system, which they may have had 
previous difficulty navigating, while for the privately insured population the negative effects 
may feature more prominently as they already have adequate access to the health care system. 
Second, this study makes an important contribution to the growing literature on the 
effects of false-positive mammograms. Although there have been many studies, including three 
large meta-analyses, to suggest that anxiety may increase1 following a false-positive and may 
even persist for up to 3 years and mixed results on whether women return for subsequent 
screening (Bond et al., 2013; Brewer et al., 2007; Brett et al., 2005)2, this is the first study to 
show that the effects may extend to other types of preventive care such as medication adherence 
highlighting the complex effects of a false-positive mammogram result. This has important 
health policy implications suggesting the need to find the best ways to help women manage care 
following a false-positive mammogram. 
                                                 
1 In the following chapter, I provide the first evidence that a false-positive mammogram has an effect on anxiety 
rising to the level of clinical significance by showing a significant increase in depression or anxiety medication 
initiation. 
2 Most of the existing studies on false-positives mammograms tend to be somewhat limited by sample size, length of 
follow-up, or generalizability to the overall population. 
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2.2 Theoretical Framework 
 In this section I provide a theoretical framework for how a false-positive mammogram 
can affect medication adherence by relying on a model described by Egan and Philipson (2014). 
The model builds on the Grossman health capital model (1972) and several existing models of 
medication switching (Crawford and Shum, 2005; Ching, 2010; and Dickstein, 2014) to provide 
theoretical predictions about why individuals may switch cholesterol medications, although it 
could be applied to any type of medication. 
In the Egan and Philipson model, the medication adherence decision can be thought of as 
an iterative process. An individual decides to initiate medication use, then, based upon her 
experience taking the medication, she decides whether to continue taking the medication in full 
or in part using a Bayesian learning process. Similar to the Grossman model, an individual’s 
utility is a function of health and other consumption, where health may or may not be improved 
by utilization of a prescription drug. Within each period t, an individual’s utility is a function of 
the net health benefits of the medication (h) and the price of the medication (p), with the 
parameter γ showing the health consumption tradeoff. 3 The net health benefits include positive 
health benefits of the medication less any side effects, while the price includes both monetary 
and non-monetary costs of medication utilization.4 Non-monetary costs may include time costs, 
effort, and, importantly for this study, access to care difficulties. This leads to the following 
indirect utility function : 
U(ht, p) = ht – γp 
                                                 
3 Gamma can be thought of as demonstrating the tradeoff between health spending and outside consumption (i.e. any 
dollar spent on health production could have been spent on consumption). 
4 For empirical examples of the effect of monetary and non-monetary costs on medication adherence, see 
Balkrishnan, 1998; Goldman et al., 2007; Jin et al., 2008.  
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 While an individual does not initially know the true effectiveness of the medication, she 
does have an initial prior about what she believes to be her individual net health benefits from 
taking the medication. In each ensuing period, depending on her experience, an individual 
updates her belief about the personal effectiveness of the medication using a Bayesian learning 
process5. Over time, as an individual learns the true individual-level effectiveness of the 
medication she weights her experience more heavily than her initial prior. Ultimately, an 
individual decides to continue to adhere to a medication if the expected net health benefits 
outweigh the total costs. Applying the model to partial adherence, an individual chooses the level 
of adherence that provides the highest expected utility weighing both the expected net health 
benefits and costs for each level of adherence from none to partial to full. 
 From the model, the authors provide six conclusions about how different factors may 
affect medication adherence. 
1) As would be expected from standard economic theory, the price of the medication, 
including both monetary and non-monetary costs negatively affects adherence. 
2) The higher the expected effectiveness of the medication, the higher the adherence. 
3) The more immediate the feedback from taking the medication, the more quickly an 
individual determines the true effectiveness of the medication for her. For example, if 
non-adherence quickly leads to adverse health consequences, an individual will more 
quickly choose a higher adherence level. Conversely, if the medication is not appropriate 
for the individual and serious side effects appear quickly an individual is more likely to 
non-adhere. 
                                                 
5 The model mentions the possibility of suboptimal non-adherence, i.e. some individuals stop treatment even though 
they would benefit from it. But the study provides little discussion about this process or what might drive this under-
adherence. The study actually focuses more on over-adherence (i.e. those who should stop taking the medication but 
do not).  
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4) The higher the quality of the outside treatment option, the lower the adherence to the 
medication. For example, if a new, more effective treatment is developed then an 
individual will become more non-adherent or stop taking the medication entirely. 
5) Similarly, the less expensive the outside treatment option, the lower the adherence to the 
medication. The negative cross-price elasticity is not surprising given that the outside 
treatment option is a substitute for the medication. 
For this paper I focus on the first three conclusions as the ones that may potentially be affected 
by the experience of a false-positive mammogram. More generally, the theoretical framework in 
this paper shifts strongly from the Egan and Philipson model but relaxing some of the 
assumptions about optimality since most of the effects of a false-positive I discuss are behavioral 
in nature and therefore tend to involve reactions to the experience that would not be predicted 
under the usual assumptions about optimality in a health economic framework. In the following 
section I describe how a false-positive mammogram fits into this framework and provide some 
predictions about the effect of a false-positive mammogram on medication adherence.  
 Spillover effect of a false-positive mammogram on medication adherence 
Because most existing studies have focused on medication switching they have 
exclusively focused on how experience with the specific medication itself affects continued use6 
of this medication. But I demonstrate how the experience with a seemingly unrelated type of 
care, namely a false-positive mammogram, may actually have a significant spillover effect on 
medication adherence. I use the specific case of a false-positive mammogram for several reasons. 
                                                 
6 Egan and Philipson (2014) talk a little about the issue of spillover effects, noting that comorbidities may raise the 
signal noise as individuals take multiple drugs and that taking multiple drugs may be more taxing than taking a 
single drug raising the effective price of taking all of the drugs. However, they do not discuss non-medication types 
of care nor do they discuss how a change in the experience with an alternative type of care may change the 
adherence decision. 
13 
 
First, multiple studies have shown that a false-positive mammogram can have significant effects 
on health beliefs and behaviors (Bond et al., 2013; Brewer et al., 2007; Brett et al., 2005), the 
types of factors described in the theoretical framework that may affect medication adherence. 
Second, the false-positive result is plausibly exogenous to medication adherence in the sense that 
that conditional on receipt of a mammogram, whether the result is a true-negative or a false-
positive is unrelated to medication adherence. Third, false-positive mammograms are relatively 
common (Elmore et al., 1998; Hubbard et al., 2011) and have become increasingly important 
part of the health policy discussion surrounding preventive care (Biller-Andorno and Juni, 2014; 
Welch and Passow, 2014). However, one difficulty with predicting the effect of a false-positive 
mammogram on medication adherence is that from theoretical perspective it can have both a 
positive and a negative effect. 
 The main positive effect on adherence (reducing the number of days with no drugs) that I 
examine in this study is the reduction of the non-monetary costs (included in p) of medication 
adherence7. This comes about as a result of the increased interaction with the medical care 
system during the follow-up visits to rule out breast cancer. The increased interaction reduces the 
non-monetary costs both by allowing the patient additional opportunities to have a physician 
write a refill prescription but more importantly by increasing interaction with health care 
professionals who can remind and encourage the individual to continue taking her medications. 
This is similar to the evidence showing that individuals increase medication adherence 
surrounding a physician visit (see Feldman et al., 2007; Brookhart et al., 2007). Two important 
corollaries to this anticipated effect is that it is likely concentrated in the population who begin 
                                                 
7 One other possible positive effect is that a false-positive mammogram could put an individual above her deductible 
and therefore reduce the monetary costs of adherence. I do not focus on this effect in this paper because most of the 
positive effects I find are in the Medicaid population for which there is no deductible, although this issue could be 
examined in more depth in subsequent work. 
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with high non-monetary costs of medication adherence (i.e. those with health care access 
problems such as the Medicaid insured) and the effect is expected to be higher for those with 
more follow-up visits to rule out breast cancer. 
A second possible effect of a false-positive is the potential negative effect on adherence 
that may result from a false-positive lowering an individual’s belief in the overall treatment 
effectiveness of medical care. In effect, a false-positive may be an example of the medical care 
system providing the patient with a negative experience by initially providing an incorrect 
diagnosis suggesting the fallibility of medical care. Although the false-positive test result is 
ultimately resolved, a lot of evidence suggests that the negative affect surrounding the event may 
continue (Bond et al., 2013; Brewer et al., 2007; Brett et al., 2005). Therefore the effect of a 
false-positive mammogram might be to lower the prior of the effectiveness for all treatments 
generally, including medication adherence.8  
This negative effect represents a modification of the model described in Egan and 
Philipson (2014) and requires a bit of a behavioral economics explanation because the individual 
is not necessarily receiving precise information that treatments are lower quality. In fact, from a 
traditional economic perspective a false-positive provides no additional information compared to 
a true-negative (i.e. the individual does not have breast cancer). However, the experience itself 
may be very different, including making the fallibility of medical care more salient (Kahneman, 
2003; Frank, 2004). In addition, the effect may be the opposite of the effect of optimism on 
decision making described by Brunnermeier and Parker (2005). They describe how individuals 
                                                 
8 Although we might expect the effect to be largest for mammograms themselves, a key point of this study is that it 
is important to think about some of the possible spillover effects of an experience such as a false-positive 
mammogram on other types care such as medication adherence. Rather than think about each treatment in a vacuum, 
I suggest thinking about them as interconnected experience with the medical care system that can potentially affect 
decisions about all types of care. 
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may have overly optimistic beliefs about the future that lead to suboptimal behaviors but that the 
optimism may increase current utility. Similarly, overly pessimistic beliefs may help individuals 
avoid future unpleasant medical interactions. Here overly pessimistic beliefs about treatment 
may lead to suboptimal adherence behavior. Finally, the negative effect through a lower prior of 
treatment effectiveness could be a result of an individual feeling less control over her care 
similar to the effect described in Sloan et al. (2009). I do not distinguish between the different 
possible pathways, instead focusing only on whether or not the negative effect appears to exist 
empirically. 
A final possible effect is that a false-positive mammogram may act as a “wake-up call” 
for an individual to improve her health thereby leading to improved medication adherence. This 
involves a change in the utility function or more specifically a change in 𝛾𝛾 (i.e. how an 
individual values health). However, this does not follow the Bayesian learning process described 
by Egan and Philipson (2014), but again involves a more behavioral economics explanation—for 
example, the importance of health may become more salient following a false-positive 
mammogram (Kahneman, 2003; Frank, 2004). However, I will not focus on this effect, 
primarily, because it cannot be clearly distinguished empirically. There are no obvious factors 
that would be associated with a particular group being more likely to experience a false-positive 
as a “wake-up call” unlike the factors that I describe above for why I expect the Medicaid 
population to be more likely to experience the improved access effect of a false-positive 
mammogram. Ultimately, this effect may operate in the background and be a part of the overall 
effect. While I am able to tease out the effect that is due to increased interaction with the health 
care system using information on the number of follow-up visits, empirically the “wake-up call” 
effect is likely to attenuate the negative effect of reduced trust in the health care system. 
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 An important final note is that the Egan and Philipson (2014) model focuses exclusively 
on medication adherence as the treatment. However, this model could easily be extended to other 
types of repeated preventive care such as mammography screening or annual flu shot receipt. 
While the main dependent variables of interest in this study are still related to medication 
adherence, an important point of this study is to understand how experience with different types 
of preventive care may be intertwined. Due to data limitations this study focuses on the spillover 
effects of a false-positive on medication adherence but future work will look at how the 
experience of a false-positive may affect future mammogram screening.9 
2.3 Hypotheses 
To help motivate the empirical analyses, the theoretical framework leads to several 
testable hypotheses. The first set of hypotheses concern the relative effects of a false-positive 
mammogram on diabetes and cholesterol medication adherence, while the second set concern the 
relative effect for the Medicaid insured compared to the commercially insured. 
Hypothesis 1a—the pre-mammogram medication adherence will be higher for diabetes 
medication than for cholesterol medication. 
This is because as described by Egan and Philipson (2014), the more immediate the benefit of a 
medication is, the higher the adherence. Because an individual is likely to see adverse health 
effects begin to develop more quickly when not adhering to diabetes medication than cholesterol 
medication, the benefits of the diabetes medication are likely to be clearer leading to higher 
baseline medication adherence.  
                                                 
9 Because the data are limited to 5 years of Medicaid claims and 2 years of commercial claims it is difficult to 
perform a difference-in-difference analysis of mammogram screening. I would likely need 8-10 years’ worth of 
claims in order to fully estimate both the pre- and post-period patterns of mammogram screening. 
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Hypothesis 1b— the effect of a false-positive will be smaller in magnitude for diabetes 
medication than for cholesterol medications. 
Relatedly, there is unlikely to be a significant effect of a false-positive mammogram on diabetes 
medication adherence. The negative effect is likely small because if an individual decides to stop 
taking diabetes medication, the negative health consequences are likely to appear more quickly 
than for cholesterol medication. The positive effect is likely small for a similar reason—as 
mentioned non-adherence in the pre-period is less likely so improvement is also less likely.  
Hypothesis 2a—the baseline adherence level is expected to be lower for the Medicaid population 
than for the privately insured population. 
This is because of the higher non-monetary costs, which can be defined as access to care 
difficulties, associated with the Medicaid population. This is supported by numerous studies that 
have shown that the Medicaid insured population has worse health care access than the privately 
insured (see e.g. Berk and Schur, 1998 ; Kellerman and Weinick, 2012). 
Hypothesis 2b—the difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of a false-positive 
mammogram on medication adherence is expected to be more positive (i.e. improve adherence 
more) for the Medicaid population than for the privately insured population 
This is a result of the fact that the price effect can be thought of as a reduction in the non-
monetary costs of adherence that comes about through increased interaction with the health care 
system related to the false-positive follow-up tests. We would only expect a significant price 
effect for a population that has poor enough baseline access to have the increased interaction 
surrounding the false-positive mammogram visits lead to a significant effect on medication 
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adherence. As mentioned above, the issue of poor health care access is more relevant to the 
Medicaid insured population than the commercially insured population. 
Hypothesis 2c— a greater number of visits involved in the resolution of the false-positive should 
lead to a greater price effect and a greater difference-in-difference effect on medication 
adherence for the Medicaid population. 
This is because, if as hypothesized, the positive medication adherence effect of a false-positive 
comes about through increased interaction with the health care system, then we would expect 
those who experience greater interaction with the medical care system to see the greatest 
improvement in medication adherence.  
2.4 Methods 
 The analytic approach follows a difference-in-difference framework, where Figure 1 
gives a broad overview of the approach. To identify the treatment group (i.e. false-positive 
mammogram) and control group (i.e. true-negative mammogram), I implement a three step 
claims-based algorithm. First, I identify all screening mammograms, which are defined as a 
claim with CPT code 76092 or ICD-9 procedure code V76.12 for a screening mammogram and 
no mammogram in the previous 12 months. The latter restriction is to eliminate any diagnostic 
mammograms that may have been coded as screening mammograms. Because none of the 
screening guidelines recommend screening more often than 12 months and Medicare does not 
reimburse for screening mammograms more often than every 12 months (US Preventive Services 
Task Force, 2009; National Cancer Institute, 2014), any mammogram within a year of a prior 
one is unlikely to be a screening mammogram. 
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Second, I determine whether the woman received additional follow-up testing in the 3 
months following the screening mammogram to identify women who had an initial positive 
result. Follow-up testing is defined as having at least one claim for a subsequent mammogram 
(screening or diagnostic), a breast biopsy, a breast ultrasound, or other radiological testing of the 
breast (see Table A-2-6 for codes based upon Cooper et al, 1999; Warren et al., 1999; Freeman 
et al., 2000; Randolph et al., 2002; Tan et al., 2006; Fenton et al., 2014). Although I do not have 
data on the actual screening mammogram results, it is unlikely a woman would receive any of 
these follow-up tests unless the initial mammogram came back as “positive” or at least 
“abnormal”. This is supported by a study by Hubbard et al. (2014). Using actual mammogram 
test results linked to Medicare claims data the authors show that 99.4 percent of women with a 
follow-up test did indeed have an initial abnormal mammogram. And finally, I restrict the 
sample to only those women who never have a claim for breast cancer treatment, thus 
eliminating the true-positive and false-negative claims.  
 After defining the treatment and control groups, I define a series of dependent variables 
related to cholesterol and diabetes medication adherence. The primary dependent variable of 
interest is the number of days without the drug class of choice, measured in both the pre-period 
(time before the screening mammogram) and the post-period (time following the screening 
mammogram). This is calculated as the total days of drug supply in the period subtracted from 
the total number of days in the period, similar to the inverse of the commonly used medication 
possession ratio (Balkrishnan et al., 2003). I choose days with no drugs as the primary dependent 
variable for several reasons. First, while there are methodological debates about the best 
approach to measure medication adherence (see e.g. Balkrishnan. 2005), not having the 
medication in one’s possession unequivocally implies non-adherence. Second, the continuous 
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nature of the variable allows for some insight into the magnitude of the effect. For the Medicaid 
analyses, the pre- and post-periods are each 12 months to allow for adequate identification of 
baseline levels of adherence and to observe longer term follow-up adherence. Due to the data 
limitation of only having two years of commercially insured data I have to limit the pre- and 
post-period to 9 months for the commercially insured population.  
In addition, I also define adherence as an indicator variable for having access to the drug 
class for at least 80% of the days in the period, a commonly used cut-off of clinically significant 
adherence (see e.g. Rozenfeld et al., 2008).10 Finally, I consider the most extreme version of 
non-adherence—complete discontinuation of the medication, defined as having no further 
medication claims beginning at least three months from the end of the post period. The purpose 
of the three month cut-off is to ensure that the lack of further medication claims is not an artifact 
of reaching the end of the available data. Ultimately, I do not focus on this dependent variable 
because I find no evidence that a false-positive mammogram has any effect on medication 
discontinuation. However, given the extreme nature of this measure and restricting the analysis 
sample to individuals who are not just initiating the medication, this is not surprising. 
2.5 Econometric Model 
The primary set of analyses relies on a difference-in-difference framework. Generally, 
the analyses are of the form:  
Yi,t = β0 + β1Xi,t + β2Posti + β3FPi + β4FPi x Posti + εi,t 
Here Yi,t  is the medication adherence outcome of interest for person i in time period t and 
Xi,t is a vector of demographics and other variables to control for observable characteristics. The 
                                                 
10 Another possible dependent variable was to just look at the number of refills in the period. However, nearly all of 
claims were for a 30 day supply so it did not offer any additional information over the preferred variable definition. 
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X vector includes variables such as age, race/ethnicity (which is only available in the Medicaid 
data), time since first prescription fill (to control for variability in adherence behavior over time), 
number of comorbidities based on the Charlson comorbidity index(CCI)11, and year fixed 
effects. FP is an indicator variable that equals one for women who have a false-positive 
mammogram and zero for women whose mammogram result is a true-negative. The indicator 
variable Post refers to the period after the screening mammogram. The pre- and post-periods are 
each, respectively, aggregated into a single observation as is usually done with medication 
adherence for ease of interpretation, but which also has the additional benefit of helping to 
control for issues related to serial correlation (Bertrand, Duflo, Mullainathan, 2004). Since each 
individual has multiple observations in the data, I cluster the standard errors at the individual 
level. 
One complication is that in a difference-in-difference analysis, the control group typically 
is not exposed to any treatment. The control group in this study receives a mammogram but no 
information that the mammogram may have been abnormal nor any follow-up testing. Therefore, 
the treatment is not the screening mammogram itself but the false-positive, which includes some 
unobservable level of communication to the patient that the initial mammogram was abnormal12, 
then follow-up testing with varying intensity and invasiveness, and then ultimately being told 
that breast cancer is not present.13 
                                                 
11 See Quan et al. (2005) for diagnosis codes. 
12 Because this is not observable it is possible the patient is never told anything except to return for follow-up 
testing. Other than possibly attenuating the observed effect of a false-positive, this does not affect the analysis, 
except that the false-positive “treatment” should be thought of as including some distribution of varying levels of 
communication rather than a single type of communication. 
13 This is identified as a lack of ever receiving any breast cancer treatment. Although it is possible that a woman 
could be diagnosed with breast cancer but never receive any treatment, this should be rare. Even within the National 
Breast and Cervical Cancer Early Detection Program for low income and under insured women, average time to 
treatment is about 60-70 days (Lantz and Soliman, 2009), which should be captured within the post-period. 
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For all analyses, β4, the difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of a false-positive 
mammogram on medication adherence is the primary variable of interest. However, the models 
for each hypothesis vary slightly and require slightly different interpretations of the difference-
in-difference estimate. For hypothesis 1b, the difference-in-difference estimate is predicted to be 
smaller in magnitude, regardless of sign, for a model where diabetes medication adherence is the 
dependent variable compared to when cholesterol medication adherence is the dependent 
variable. Therefore, for both the Medicaid insured and commercially insured samples, I compare 
the β4’s in the diabetes medication adherence regression to the cholesterol medication adherence 
regression. In addition I present the full triple difference-in-difference estimate. I use a similar 
approach for hypothesis 2b, where the difference-in-difference estimate is predicted to lower the 
days with no drugs (improve adherence) more in the Medicaid insured population than the 
commercially insured population. For each medication, I compare the β4’s for the Medicaid 
insured regression to the commercially insured regression as well as provide an estimate of the 
triple difference-in-difference. 
In addition to these baseline regressions, I run two sets of robustness checks. First, I re-
estimate all regressions for the Medicaid population using a 9 month pre- and post-period to 
match the commercially insured regressions. Second, to deal with possible differences between 
the false-positive and control groups, I re-estimate the regressions using propensity score 
matching, specifically kernel matching, to further ensure close matching of the control group to 
the false-positive group (Smith and Todd, 2005). I match based on age, race/ethnicity, 
comorbidities, days to first medication refill claim in the data, baseline depression/anxiety 
medication utilization, and baseline days with no drugs. For each set of regressions, I then 
bootstrap standard errors using 1000 iterations. I specifically choose kernel matching because the 
23 
 
matching procedure includes all individuals in the matching process, weighting each individual 
in the control group by how similar they are to the false-positive group. The advantage of this is 
that is unlikely to suffer from the bootstrap problems associated with nearest neighbor matching 
(Abadie and Imbens, 2008). 
2.6 Data  
 All analyses are based on two sets of claims data—the 2003-2007 Truven Health 
MarketScan Medicaid Multistate Database and the 2003-2004 Truven Health MarketScan 
Commercial Claims and Encounters Database. The Medicaid database includes administrative 
claims data for approximately 7 million Medicaid recipients from 8 geographically diverse, but 
not identifiable states. While the states are meant to be representative, the idiosyncrasies of each 
state’s Medicaid program may somewhat limit the representativeness of these 8 states. The 
commercial claims database includes claims and enrollment data from over 13 million 
commercially insured beneficiaries and their dependents collected from employer and health 
plan data from a variety of types of health plans including fee-for-service, preferred provider 
organizations, health maintenance organizations, and others (Adamson, Chang, and Hansen, 
2006). The plans primarily come from self-insured, medium, and large employers. Comparing 
the Marketscan commercial enrollees to the nationally representative sample in the Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey with employer sponsored health insurance, Aizcorbe et al. (2012) find 
the Marketscan sample to be generally similar demographically except for being over-
representative of the southern region. Both sets of claims data include inpatient, outpatient, and 
prescription drug claims in addition to enrollment and plan characteristic data as well as a limited 
number of demographic variables (Adamson, Chang, and Hansen, 2006). The primary advantage 
of the Marketscan claims data for these analyses is they are the only data set with both a large, 
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representative population and information on all types of medical care utilization.14 Given the 
research design, a large claims database is necessary because the analysis sample includes many 
restrictions leading to a significant reduction in sample size from the full data set. 
 To get to the final analysis sample, the sample is first restricted to the female population 
between the ages of 40 and 64. Although males can get breast cancer it is rare (less than 1% of 
all cases worldwide) so they are not routinely screened and are therefore excluded from the 
analyses (Korde et al., 2010). Women under age 40 are not included because current guidelines 
do not recommend screening for this population (US Preventive Services Task Force, 2009; 
National Cancer Institute, 2014), while women ages 65 and older are not included due to their 
eligibility for Medicare and therefore the high possibility of having incomplete claims data for 
them. The sample is further restricted to women who have a screening mammogram, defined as a 
screening mammogram and no claim for a prior mammogram within the past 12 months, and 
have at least one claim for a cholesterol medication or a diabetes medication in the pre-period.15 
To avoid the complication of women initiating the medication partially through the pre-period, 
the sample excludes women whose first ever observed fill for the cholesterol or diabetes 
medication is in the pre-period.  
Finally, to ensure that no claims are missed in the pre- or post-period, the sample is 
further restricted to women who are continuously enrolled in Medicaid for 12 months before and 
after the screening mammogram or in commercial insurance for 9 months before and after the 
                                                 
14 Although Medicare claims would offer similar advantages, the rate of mammography false-positive declines 
significantly with age (Elmore et al., 1998). 
15 The sample does not require that women have at least one fill in the post-period to allow for the possibility that a 
women completely discontinues medication following a false-positive mammogram. One possible issue is that this 
means a woman may discontinue medication before the screening mammogram. However, this issue is mitigated by 
two factors. First, given the difference-in-difference set up this is only an issue if false-positive or control group 
disproportionately discontinue medication, which is not the case empirically. And second, I find complete 
discontinuation beginning in the pre-period is rare. 
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screening mammogram. The reason for the difference in sample periods is due to a data 
limitation—with only two years of commercial claims, no women have 12 months of continuous 
enrollment before and after the screening mammogram. After all of these sample restrictions, the 
final analysis sample ranges from 9,598 to 14,520 observations for the Medicaid insured diabetes 
and cholesterol medication population, respectively and 8,866 to 27,936 observations for the 
commercially insured diabetes and cholesterol medication population, respectively. 
  
2.7 Results 
Table 2-1 shows baseline means for the Medicaid and commercially insured false-
positive and control groups for both diabetes and cholesterol drugs. Overall demographics such 
as age and race/ethnicity, where available, are similar between treatment and control groups. The 
control group tends to have slightly more screening mammograms16 than the false-positive group 
with the exception of the Medicaid diabetes population. Within the Medicaid population, for 
both therapeutic classes the false-positive group appears to have slightly more comorbidities 
based on the CCI (although not clearly higher for any given comorbidity) and somewhat higher 
medical costs. However, for the commercially insured population, costs and comorbidities 
appear similar between treatment and control.  
Table 2-2 shows pre- and post-period means for the number of days with no drugs and 
percent adherent defined as having medication for at least 80% of days in the observation period. 
The first thing to note is that across the board, adherence declines over time (days with no drugs 
                                                 
16 Number of screening mammograms is somewhat complicated by the fact that it includes both frequency of 
screening and time in the data. However, it is the best estimate of how recently a woman received a screening 
mammogram. The slightly higher rates for the false-positive group are not necessarily unexpected as not having a 
previous screening mammogram to refer or going a long time between mammograms may increase the likelihood of 
a false-positive (Christiansen et al., 2000). 
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increase), which is typical of medication adherence (Chapman et al., 2005).  Second, for all but 
the diabetes drugs in the Medicaid insured population, adherence in the pre-period tends to be 
better for the control group. While the difference-in-difference identifying assumption of parallel 
trends is not necessarily violated with these baseline differences, as a robustness check I also run 
propensity score weighted models where the control group is matched to the false-positive group 
on the baseline variables age, race/ethnicity, comorbidities, days to first fill in data, baseline 
depression/anxiety medication utilization, and baseline days with no drugs to try to mitigate 
some of the differences between the two groups. I present these results following the main 
results. As predicted in hypothesis 1a, baseline adherence is higher (fewer days without drugs) 
for diabetes medication than for cholesterol medications for both the Medicaid and commercially 
insured. Since adverse health outcomes present more quickly for diabetes medications than for 
cholesterol medications, the consequences of partial adherence to diabetes medication appear 
more quickly leading to better adherence beginning in the pre-period. The baseline adherence 
means also support hypothesis 2a that the Medicaid insured likely have lower baseline adherence 
for both diabetes and cholesterol medications due to greater non-monetary costs as a result of 
greater access problems. As Table 2-2 shows for each medication, baseline medication adherence 
is lower for the Medicaid insured than the commercially insured. 
Table 2-3 shows the difference-in-difference estimates for each of the insurance group 
and drug class combinations (see Table A-2-2 for all coefficients). For ease of interpretation I 
present OLS results for the days with no drugs and adherence regressions. However, the non-
linear models (i.e. negative binomial regression for the days with no drugs regressions and 
logistic regression for the adherence regressions) yield substantively similar results. As predicted 
by hypothesis 1b in the theoretical framework, there is a smaller (and not statistically significant) 
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spillover effect of a false-positive mammogram for the diabetes medications. Although the triple 
difference-in-difference estimate in Table A-2-3 indicates that the difference is not statistically 
significant, in all regressions the magnitude of the difference-in-difference estimate is larger for 
the cholesterol medications than for the diabetes medications. 
In addition, Table 2-3 shows that as predicted by hypothesis 2b, the false-positive 
mammogram only improves adherence (lowers the number of days with no drugs) for cholesterol 
medication in the Medicaid population—significantly decreasing the number of days with no 
cholesterol drugs by 7.25 days for the Medicaid population (an approximate 8.4% improvement 
in adherence off of the baseline adherence for the false-positive group). To better understand this 
improvement, as Table 2-2 and Table 2-3 indicate, adherence is actually declining over time for 
both the false-positive and control groups.  Therefore, the cholesterol medication adherence 
improvement seen for the false-positive group is a result of a reduced rate of decline for the 
false-positive group compared to the control group. However, as Table 2-2 shows this 
improvement has practical significance as the false-positive group actually goes from worse pre-
period adherence (85.9 days with no cholesterol drugs vs. 81.6 days for the control group) to 
better post-period adherence (97.7 days with no cholesterol drugs vs. 100.6 days for the control 
group). 
Results from Table 2-3 also confirm hypothesis 2b from the theoretical framework—the 
positive effect of a false-positive mammogram on medication adherence only occurs for the 
Medicaid insured population, likely due to worse baseline access to the health care system. For 
the commercially insured, while the model does not predict a strong price effect, the overall sign 
of the difference-in-difference term is not clear because it represents an average effect over both 
the negative effect (lower trust in the medical care system) and the positive effect, which are 
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difficult to empirically disentangle. Therefore for the commercially insured, I can only report this 
overall effect with little additional evidence to suggest the mechanism driving it. For the 
commercially insured, I find a false-positive leads to a significant 4.05 day increase in the days 
with no cholesterol drugs (an approximate 7.7% worsening of adherence compared to baseline 
baseline) and non-statistically significant increase of 3.12 days with no diabetes drugs. Again 
while both the false-positive and control groups see increasing days with no drugs over time, the 
increase is even greater for the false-positive group compared to the control group. 
In addition to the days with no drug regression, Table 2-3 also shows results for the linear 
probability model for being adherent, defined as having medications for at least 80% of days. 
Although not statistically significant, all results are same-signed17 as the days with no drugs 
results. For cholesterol medications, adherence improves by just under 3 percentage points for 
the Medicaid population, while adherence declines by 2 percentage points for the commercially 
insured population. Although these estimates may not seem large they represent potentially 
clinically meaningful effects. 
The remaining supplemental results all seek to support a better understanding of the 
mechanism underlying the improvement in cholesterol medication adherence following a false-
positive mammogram for the Medicaid insured population. The theoretical framework predicts 
that for the Medicaid insured one possible mechanism for this improvement is increased 
interaction with the health care system, which is characterized in the theoretical framework as a 
reduction in non-monetary costs. To demonstrate that improved access is the likely mechanism 
by which cholesterol medication adherence improves following a false-positive mammogram for 
                                                 
17 Same signed in the sense of improved adherence for cholesterol medication for the Medicaid insured and 
worsening adherence for the commercially insured. However, greater days with no drugs is really worse adherence 
so the estimates are expected to have opposite signs. 
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the Medicaid insured population, I redefine the treatment variable to be the number of unique 
visits for one of the false-positive follow-up tests. This is necessarily set to zero for the control 
group.  If improved interaction with the medical care system is the likely mechanism by which 
cholesterol medication adherence improves then the greater the number of follow-up visits the 
lower the non-monetary costs of adherence (hypothesis 2c). Again, this reduction in non-
monetary costs operates either through increased opportunity for a refill prescription to be 
written or more likely through encouragement to maintain medication adherence. As Table 2-4 
shows, the greater the number of follow-up visits, the larger the improvement in cholesterol 
medication adherence (i.e. fewer days with no drugs). For cholesterol medications, each 
additional follow-up visit leads to a 5.28 decrease in the number of days with no drugs with a 
mean of 1.17 follow-up visits. 
The clinical importance of the baseline results is further demonstrated by dividing the 
sample into those who were adherent (at least 80 percent of days with the drug) and those who 
were not in the pre-period. As Table 2-5 shows, the significant false-positive effects are largely 
concentrated in the group most likely to be targeted by medication adherence improvement 
efforts (i.e. those who are not adherent in the pre-period and therefore most at risk for 
detrimental clinical outcomes arising from suboptimal medication adherence). On the positive 
side, this population is most likely to improve medication adherence with improved access 
among the Medicaid insured. However, on the downside, this already potentially vulnerable 
population is the one seeing the negative effect of a false-positive mammogram on medication 
adherence among the commercially insured. 
In addition to the main results I run a series of robustness checks. The first sensitivity 
analysis is to re-run the Medicaid regressions using a 9 month pre- and post-period to more 
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closely match the commercially insured analyses. The results do not qualitatively change as 
Table 2-6 shows. This means despite being restricted to using 9 month pre- and post-periods for 
the commercially insured analyses, the differences in results for the two populations is unlikely 
to be due to this limitation. Although one point to note is that the 9 month effect is slightly 
smaller than the 12 month effect. Since this means the effect increases even after the follow-up 
visits have been completed, this suggests that at least part of the improvement in cholesterol 
medication is likely due to the “wake-up call” effect. 
For the second set of sensitivity analyses, one concern is that the false-positive group 
would not have looked like the control group absent the false-positive due to baseline differences 
shown in Table 2-1 and Table 2-2. I therefore run a series of propensity score matching 
regressions using kernel matching. Table 2-6 shows these results, which appear very similar to 
the primary results. Although the standard errors are higher, the point estimates are very similar. 
The cholesterol medication adherence improvement seen in the Medicaid population is even 
slightly higher. These results suggest the issues resulting from the differences in baseline 
observed value may not be too serious and are unlikely to be driving the observed effects.  
The final set of sensitivity analyses attempt to determine whether the effects on 
medication adherence vary by the experience of the false-positive itself. The first set of results 
shown in Table A-2-4 examine how the length of time it takes to resolve the false-positive (i.e. 
the number of days from the first follow-up test to the final follow-up test) affect medication 
adherence. Not surprisingly the length variable main effect is small and not statistically 
significant, since this just demonstrates that the length of follow-up is not related to baseline 
adherence levels. The results for the Medicaid population are further suggestive of increased 
interaction with health care system in part explaining the adherence improvement following a 
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false-positive. For the Medicaid, population the longer the time to resolve the false-positive, the 
greater the adherence improvement (i.e. fewer days with no drugs), although the results are only 
statistically significant for diabetes medications. The results are more mixed for the 
commercially insured population, including a significant increase in days with no diabetes 
medications with each additional day it takes to resolve the false-positive. This suggests the 
effect of length of follow-up is likely different for the Medicaid and commercially insured 
populations. Although given data and sample size limitations it is difficult to further tease out 
exactly what might be driving these differences. 
The second of results examine how the effects vary by whether the invasiveness of the 
false-positive, namely whether the woman receives a breast biopsy or not. However, as Table A-
2-5 shows I find no significant effect on the biopsy, post-period interaction terms, although the 
small sample sizes of women undergoing a breast biopsy likely contribute to the lack of a 
finding. Interestingly, for the Medicaid population taking cholesterol medications, the sample 
undergoing a breast biopsy seems to have significantly better baseline medication adherence. A 
possible explanation is that these women are generally more likely to follow physician care 
directives or more likely to seek out or advocate for all possible care. 
2.8 Discussion 
 Despite numerous studies examining factors affecting medication adherence, I find some 
of the first evidence that suggests experience with a seemingly unrelated type of care such as 
mammography can significantly affect medication adherence. Using a plausibly exogenous 
shock to the mammogram care experience, I find a significant decline in cholesterol  medication 
adherence for the commercially insured but a significant improvement in adherence for the 
Medicaid insured. I then provide evidence that suggests the improvement for the Medicaid 
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population is a result of increased interaction with the health care system. The results suggest 
that medication adherence needs to be thought of more globally in terms of care received by the 
patient—negative care experiences can have significant spillover effects onto medication 
adherence and even unrelated interactions with the health care system afford an opportunity to 
ensure that patients, especially those with limited access, adhere to their medications. Further, 
the opposite effects for the Medicaid and commercially insured populations suggest that these 
spillover effects may be further complicated by individual level characteristics such as insurance 
status.  
The negative effect on cholesterol medication adherence for the commercially insured 
population suggests that follow-up care for women experiencing a false-positive may be essential 
not just to appropriately handle increased depression and anxiety but also to help minimize 
potential negative spillover effects onto other types of preventive health care. One note, though, 
is that although I do not find a negative effect on adherence for the Medicaid population, this 
does not mean there is no negative effect for this population. It could be a result of the price 
effect (due to improved access) outweighing the potential negative effect arising from decreased 
trust in the medical system. Post false-positive mammogram care may therefore still be very 
important for the Medicaid insured to ensure that they receive appropriate care to deal with a 
potentially difficult experience.18 However, additional research may be needed to better 
understand the mechanism that is leading to worse cholesterol medication adherence following a 
false-positive mammogram and whether this effect is present for other types of false-positive 
results and for other types of preventive care including other types of medication, vaccinations, 
or other types of screening. 
                                                 
18 In my concurrent work showing increased depression/anxiety medication initiation for women experiencing a 
false-positive mammogram, I find significant increases for both the commercially insured and Medicaid insured. 
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The estimated improvement in cholesterol medication adherence for the Medicaid 
population suggests that policies that help improve interaction with the health care system, but 
without the serious negative consequences of a false-positive, are essential for improving 
medication adherence for vulnerable populations that may suffer from access problems. As the 
results show, increased interaction with the health care system is essential to improving 
medication adherence, but the key is to find the most cost-effective way of doing this. One 
example may be policies to ensure that even during visits for unrelated types of care, medical 
care providers (physician or non-physician) communicate with patients about all medications 
they may be taking. Another example would include policies to encourage more frequent contact 
with the health system but through low cost providers. However, this study is just one example 
of this type of spillover effect. Future research is needed on the spillover effects of other types of 
cancer screening (e.g. Pap test or colorectal cancer screening) on medication adherence for 
cholesterol, diabetes, and additional types of medications. With additional data I also plan on 
looking at the effect of a false-positive on future mammogram screening19.  Finally, this 
approach could be applied to a number of other types of screening where false-positives are 
important (e.g. newborn screening). 
 Another important issue relates to some possible anticipated effects of the ACA. The 
ACA includes two important provisions that relate to the results of this study. First, the ACA 
requires all health insurance plans to cover annual mammograms for women ages 40 and older 
with no cost sharing. This has the possibility of increasing both the number of women receiving 
mammograms but also the number experiencing a false-positive. With potentially more women 
                                                 
19 With limited years of data, this was not currently feasible. To get a sense of pre- and post-period screening I would 
need multiple years of data for each woman. The advantage of analyzing medication adherence is that it is not as 
data restrictive. 
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experiencing false-positive mammograms, policies should be in place to help with follow-up 
care to ensure that appropriate care continues and to help with the potentially significant anxiety 
that can surround a false-positive result. 
Second, a large portion of the ACA health insurance expansion is expected to occur 
through Medicaid expansion in the states that have chosen to expand the program. The results of 
this study suggest that despite having insurance, it may be important to ensure that the Medicaid 
insured population has adequate access to physicians to maintain optimal levels of medication 
adherence. Especially for Medicaid insured individuals it may be important that medical care 
providers discuss health issues that may be unrelated to the specific visit and to proactively 
maintain regular contact with patients who have chronic conditions treated with medications. 
2.9 Limitations 
 Although this is the first study to examine how medication adherence can be affected by  
the potential spillover effects of a false-positive mammogram, there are several limitations. First, 
due to the use of claims data, I do not actually have information on the specific test results so I 
do not definitively know whether the mammogram actually came back as positive or abnormal. 
However, in the case of the false-positive definition it is unlikely that a woman would receive a 
subsequent mammogram, a breast biopsy, or the other follow-up tests unless it was to further test 
for the likelihood of breast cancer. This is consistent with the findings in Hubbard et al. (2014) 
that finds that a claims-based algorithm for identifying abnormal screening mammograms has a 
sensitivity of 74.9 percent and specificity of 99.4 percent. In addition there is the possibility that 
a mammogram could come back as positive or abnormal but a woman did not return for follow-
up testing. However, this is most likely to bias the results towards zero as some treatment woman 
would be misclassified as being in the control group.  
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 A limitation of the Medicaid results is the significant sample restrictions that require two 
years of continuous Medicaid enrollment. While this is necessary to ensure that no claims are 
missed, it means the Medicaid results are not representative of the general Medicaid population, 
which is characterized by high rates of churn (Short and Graefe, 2003; Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, 2000). In ongoing work, I find the continuously enrolled population is 
poorer, sicker, and more likely disabled. So while this limits the generalizability of the Medicaid 
results to the overall Medicaid population, the restriction is necessary to ensure the internal 
validity of the results while also focusing on a population that may be important from a public 
health standpoint. 
 Another limitation is that I look at medication adherence within a therapeutic class so I 
do not look at drug switching. Although future work will examine the issue of medication 
switching, I assume that an individual has a medical need for at least one medication in the 
therapeutic class so looking at access to any drug is the most conservative level of adherence.20    
While I may miss partial non-adherence to one but not all medications, my measure of adherence 
can be thought of as the minimum required treatment—a day with no medication of any kind 
indicates a true lack of available treatment. 
 The final limitation is that I have a limited set of years, in particular for the commercially 
insured population, and a limited set of demographics. Future work will try to add years of 
commercially insured claims, while the issue of limited demographic information is hopefully 
mitigated by the rich set of health data. In particular, longer follow-up would be needed to assess 
whether the observed effects are transitory or more persistent. 
                                                 
20 Given that the sample is restricted to individuals who have not just initiated medication and have not stopped 
completely during the pre-period, the analysis sample is largely individuals who have taken the medications for 
more than just a short period of time. Therefore it is more likely that they receive medical benefit from the 
medications. 
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2.10 Conclusions 
 While many studies have examined factors affecting medication adherence, this study 
provides the first example of how a woman’s mammogram screening experience, a seemingly 
unrelated type of care, may have significant spillover effects onto cholesterol medication 
adherence. Focusing on the experience of a false-positive mammogram, a plausibly exogenous 
shock to the preventive care experience, I show that a false-positive leads to a significant 
improvement in cholesterol medication adherence for the Medicaid insured but a significant 
decline in adherence for the commercially insured. The results highlight the complicated nature 
of this type of spillover effect. On the one hand, for a vulnerable population with problems 
accessing the medical care system, a false-positive mammogram may lead to increased contact 
with the health care system and consequently improved cholesterol medication adherence. 
However, there may be significant negative consequences of a false-positive on medication 
adherence in addition to or as a result of the negative affect and lower trust in health care 
following a false-positive.  The results of this paper suggest that future health policy needs to 
better help women who have experienced a false-positive mammogram to ensure appropriate 
care is received, as well as looking for improved ways to help women with limited access to the 
health care system gain access to improve medication adherence without the negative 
consequences of experiencing a false-positive.  
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Figure 1  Diagram of the Analytic Approach 
  
42 
 
 
Table 2-1  Baseline means by insurance group and medication class 
 
Medicaid Commercial 
Diabetes Cholesterol Diabetes Cholesterol 
Pre-period characteristics Control 
group 
FP 
group 
Control 
group 
FP 
group 
Control 
group 
FP 
group 
Control 
group 
FP 
group 
Age 54.9 
(6.2) 
54.2 
(6.5) 
55.3 
(6.2) 
54.6 
(6.4) 
55.9 
(5.6) 
55.5 
(6.0) 
56.9 
(5.2) 
56.4 
(5.6) 
White 0.39 
(0.49) 
0.40 
(0.49) 
0.49 
(0.50) 
0.50 
(0.50) 
- - - - 
Black 0.42 
(0.49) 
0.44 
(0.50) 
0.32 
(0.47) 
0.32 
(0.46) 
- - - - 
Hispanic 0.03 
(0.17) 
0.02 
(0.15) 
0.02 
(0.15) 
0.02 
(0.14) 
- - - - 
Other race 0.17 
(0.37) 
0.13 
(0.34) 
0.17 
(0.38) 
0.17 
(0.37) 
- - - - 
Number of screening 
mammograms 
2.76 
(0.48) 
2.81 
(0.92) 
2.77 
(0.48) 
2.70 
(0.94) 
1.82 
(0.39) 
1.40 
(0.49) 
1.82 
(0.38) 
1.47 
(0.50) 
Days to first fill in data 
 
752.8 
(275.4) 
781.3 
(292.7) 
719.2 
(266.9) 
737.3 
(280.6) 
347.4 
(51.2) 
338.2 
(49.4) 
346.0 
(49.9) 
338.6 
(48.1) 
Capitated Medicaid 
 
0.43 
(0.49) 
0.40 
(0.49) 
0.42 
(0.49) 
0.41 
(0.49) 
- - - - 
Time between screening 
mammogram and FP 
resolution 
 
- 26.5 
(21.4) 
- 26.4 
(21.2) 
- 24.21 
(20.55) 
- 21.12 
(18.99) 
False-positive included biopsy 
 
- 0.07 
(0.25) 
- 0.06 
(0.24) 
- 
 
0.1 
(0.2) 
- 
 
0.1 
(0.2) 
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Outpatient/ER costs 
 
7,645 
(12,212) 
8,728 
(14,278) 
7,293 
(13,028) 
7,688 
(14,059) 
3,125 
(6.974) 
3,189 
(5,327) 
2,338 
(4,822) 
2,589 
(4,390) 
Inpatient costs 
 
2,798 
(12,082) 
4,272 
(16,121) 
2,135 
(10,045) 
3,036 
(13,828) 
1,040 
(5,465) 
1,381 
(7,264) 
667 
(4,247) 
821 
(4,436) 
# of CCI comorbidities 
 
1.37 
(1.50) 
1.49 
(1.52) 
0.94 
(1.31) 
0.97 
(1.32) 
1.31 
(0.81) 
1.29 
(0.82) 
0.44 
(0.73) 
0.42 
(0.72) 
N 8,688 910 13,112 1,408 7,936 930 25,096 2,840 
Means (SD) 
FP: False-positive 
* All values are for the pre-period 
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Table 2-2  Means for adherence variables 
 
 
 Medicaid  
 
 Diabetes   Cholesterol  
Variable Control pre Control post FP pre FP post Control pre Control post FP pre FP post 
Days no 
drugs 
46.8 
(78.3) 
54.1 
(88.9) 
44.4 
(76.5) 
50.6 
(84.6) 
81.6 
(99.8) 
100.6 
(115.3) 
85.9 
(102.1) 
97.7 
(112.7) 
At least 
80% of days 
with 
medication 
0.77 
(0.42) 
0.75 
(0.43) 
0.78 
(0.41) 
0.76 
(0.43) 
0.63 
(0.48) 
0.57 
(0.49) 
0.61 
(0.49) 
0.58 
(0.49) 
Discontinue 
medication 
0.03 
(0.17) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
N 4,344 4,344 455 455 6,556 6,556 704 704 
 
           Commercial  
  Diabetes   Cholesterol  
Variable Control pre Control post  FP pre   FP post  Control pre Control post  FP pre   FP post  
Days no 
drugs 
31.1 
(55.7) 
38.1 
(65.5) 
36.1 
(57.5) 
46.3 
(72.1) 
45.9 
(63.5) 
59.0 
(76.8) 
52.1 
(67.3) 
69.2 
(83.7) 
At least 
80% of days 
with 
medication 
0.79 
(0.40) 
0.75 
(0.43) 
0.73 
(0.44) 
0.69 
(0.46) 
0.71 
(0.45) 
0.64 
(0.48) 
0.68 
(0.47) 
0.59 
(0.49) 
Discontinue 
medication 
0.03 
(0.18) 
0.03 
(0.18) 
0.04 
(0.20) 
0.04 
(0.20) 
0.06 
(0.25) 
0.06 
(0.25) 
0.05 
(0.22) 
0.05 
(0.22) 
N 3,968 3,968 465 465 12,548 12,548 1,420 1,420 
 
Means (SD) 
FP: False-positive 
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Table 2-3  Main regression results: difference-in-difference estimates 
 
  Medicaid Commercial 
Variable Diabetes Cholesterol Diabetes Cholesterol 
 Days with no drugs 
False-positive -1.73 
(3.71) 
4.21 
(3.92) 
4.51 
(2.75) 
5.99*** 
(1.86) 
Post 7.26*** 
(0.97) 
19.08*** 
(1.13) 
6.97*** 
(0.80) 
13.05*** 
(0.58) 
False-positive x 
Post 
-1.04 
(3.43) 
-7.25** 
(3.48) 
3.23 
(2.99) 
4.05** 
(1.86) 
 Adherent 
False-positive 0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.06*** 
(0.02) 
-0.03*** 
(0.01) 
Post -0.02*** 
(0.01) 
-0.06*** 
(0.01) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.08*** 
(0.01) 
False-positive x 
Post 
<0.001 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
<0.001 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
N 9,598 14,520 8,866 27,936 
(Robust standard errors clustered by individual) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
Medicaid: 12 months pre/post, Commercial: 9 months pre/post 
All regressions control for age, race/ethnicity (Medicaid only), time since first prescription, number of CCI comorbidities, year fixed effects. 
  
46 
 
Table 2-4  Difference-in-difference estimates for days with no drugs number of follow-up visits 
for the Medicaid population 
 
 Sample Diabetes Cholesterol 
# follow-up visits x Post 
 
-1.79 
(2.79) 
-5.28** 
(2.67) 
N 9,598 14,520 
 
(Robust standard errors clustered by individual) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
Medicaid: 12 months pre/post, Commercial: 9 months pre/post 
All regressions control for age, race/ethnicity (Medicaid only), time since first prescription, number of CCI comorbidities, year fixed effects. 
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Table 2-5  Difference-in-difference estimates by pre-period adherence status for cholesterol 
medication 
 
  Medicaid Commercial 
Variable 
Adherent in 
pre-period 
Not adherent in 
pre-period 
Adherent in 
pre-period 
Not adherent in 
pre-period 
False-positive x Post 1.64 
(3.71) 
-13.20** 
(6.29) 
1.27 
(1.78) 
13.74*** 
(4.31) 
N 9,124 5,396 19,816 8,120 
 
(Robust standard errors clustered by individual) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Medicaid: 12 months pre/post, Commercial: 9 months pre/post 
All regressions control for age, race/ethnicity (Medicaid only), time since first prescription, number of CCI comorbidities, year fixed effects.  
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Table 2-6  Results from robustness checks for difference-in-difference estimates 
 
Days no drugs 
  Medicaid  Commercial 
 Diabetes Cholesterol Diabetes Cholesterol 
 
 Days no drugs 
Baseline -1.04 
(3.43) 
-7.25** 
(3.48) 
3.23 
(2.99) 
4.05** 
(1.86) 
Propensity score 
regressions 
  
-1.45 
(5.46) 
-7.30 
(5.72) 
3.30 
(4.48) 
4.12 
(3.00) 
9 month pre-/post-
period 
  
-0.66 
(2.67) 
-5.28* 
(2.56) 
- - 
 Adherent 
Baseline <0.001 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
<0.001 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
Propensity score 
regressions 
  
<0.001 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
< -0.001 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
9 month pre-/post-
period 
  
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
- - 
N 9,598 14,520 8,866 27,936 
 
(Robust standard errors clustered by individual) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Medicaid: 12 months pre/post, Commercial: 9 months pre/post unless otherwise noted 
All regressions control for age, race/ethnicity (Medicaid only), time since first prescription, number of CCI comorbidities, year fixed effects. 
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Table A-2-1 Baseline mean values for conditions within the CCI 
 
Medicaid Commercial 
 Diabetes Cholesterol Diabetes Cholesterol 
Pre-period 
characteristics Control FP Control FP Control FP Control FP 
CCI: 
myocardial 
infarction 
(fraction) 
 
0.03 
(0.16) 
0.02 
(0.15) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
CCI: congestive 
heart failure 
(fraction) 
 
0.08 
(0.27) 
0.09 
(0.28) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
0.07 
(0.25) 
0.03 
(0.16) 
0.03 
(0.18) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
0.01 
(0.12) 
CCI: peripheral 
vascular disease 
(fraction) 
 
0.05 
(0.21) 
0.07 
(0.26) 
0.04 
(0.20) 
0.05 
(0.23) 
0.02 
(0.13) 
0.02 
(0.13) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
CCI: peptic 
ulcer (fraction) 
 
0.01 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.05) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
CCI: 
moderate/severe 
liver disease 
(fraction) 
 
0.00 
(0.05) 
0.00 
(0.07) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
CCI: 
cerebrovascular 
disease 
(fraction) 
 
0.07 
(0.25) 
0.08 
(0.27) 
0.08 
(0.27) 
0.09 
(0.28) 
0.05 
(0.21) 
0.03 
(0.18) 
0.04 
(0.19) 
0.03 
(0.18) 
CCI: chronic 
pulmonary 
disease 
(fraction) 
 
0.21 
(0.41) 
0.24 
(0.43) 
0.22 
(0.41) 
0.26 
(0.44) 
0.10 
(0.30) 
0.10 
(0.30) 
0.09 
(0.29) 
0.08 
(0.28) 
CCI: dementia 
(fraction) 
 
0.00 
(0.05) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.05) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
CCI: rheumatic 
disease 
(fraction) 
 
0.03 
(0.17) 
0.02 
(0.12) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
0.02 
(0.14) 
0.02 
(0.14) 
0.02 
(0.15) 
0.02 
(0.14) 
0.02 
(0.14) 
CCI: mild liver 
disease 
(fraction) 
 
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
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Medicaid Commercial 
 Diabetes Cholesterol Diabetes Cholesterol 
Pre-period 
characteristics Control FP Control FP Control FP Control FP 
CCI: diabetes 
no 
complications 
(fraction) 
 
0.59 
(0.49) 
0.63 
(0.48) 
0.30 
(0.46) 
0.29 
(0.45) 
0.90 
(0.30) 
0.87 
(0.33) 
0.19 
(0.39) 
0.18 
(0.39) 
CCI: diabetes 
with 
complications 
(fraction) 
 
0.20 
(0.40) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
0.09 
(0.29) 
0.08 
(0.27) 
0.13 
(0.33) 
0.13 
(0.34) 
0.02 
(0.15) 
0.02 
(0.15) 
CCI: renal 
disease 
(fraction) 
 
0.04 
(0.20) 
0.04 
(0.18) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
0.03 
(0.18) 
0.02 
(0.13) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
CCI: 
malignancy 
(fraction) 
 
0.04 
(0.19) 
0.04 
(0.18) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
0.04 
(0.19) 
0.03 
(0.18) 
0.03 
(0.18) 
0.03 
(0.16) 
0.03 
(0.16) 
CCI: metastatic 
solid tumor 
(fraction) 
 
0.00 
(0.06) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.05) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.05) 
0.00 
(0.06) 
CCI: 
HIV/AIDS 
(fraction) 
 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
CCI: 
hemiplegia or 
paraplegia 
(fraction) 21 
 
0.01 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.00 
(0.05) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
0.00 
(0.05) 
N 8,688 910 13,112 1,408 7,936 930 25,096 2,840 
Means (SD) 
* All values are for the pre-period 
 
  
                                                 
21 All CCI variables fractions are for having any claim in the pre-period. Therefore it is also possible to have a 
condition but not have any claims, which explains why the diabetes column does not necessarily have a value of 1 
for the CCI diabetes variables. 
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Table A-2-2 Full coefficients from main results (days with no drugs as dependent variable) 
 Medicaid Commercial 
  Diabetes Cholesterol Diabetes Cholesterol 
Age 
  
-1.28*** 
(0.21) 
-1.29*** 
(0.2) 
-1.50*** 
(0.16) 
-1.45*** 
(0.11) 
Black 
  
16.86*** 
(2.73) 
37.35*** 
(2.97) 
- - 
Hispanic  
  
11.96 
(7.83) 
41.59*** 
(8.6) 
- - 
Other race 
  
13.98*** 
(3.84) 
19.44*** 
(3.45) 
- - 
Days to first fill in 
data 
  
-0.03*** 
(0.01) 
-0.07*** 
(0.01) 
-0.12*** 
(0.03) 
-0.14*** 
(0.02) 
# of CCI 
comorbidities 
  
-5.83 
(36.07) 
-54.30*** 
(12.76) 
83.92*** 
(30.49) 
6.46 
(23.81) 
CCI: myocardial 
infarction 
  
10.17 
(35.32) 
46.45*** 
(14.52) 
-74.27** 
(31.64) 
-19.54 
(24.31) 
CCI: congestive 
heart failure 
  
10.09 
(36.26) 
51.99*** 
(13.45) 
-81.95*** 
(31.01) 
-11.09 
(24.2) 
CCI: peripheral 
vascular disease  
  
6.3 
(36.67) 
53.14*** 
(14.88) 
-70.82** 
(31.31) 
-7.42 
(24.22) 
CCI: peptic ulcer  
  
28.02 
(40.17) 
51.24*** 
(19.24) 
-90.99** 
(36.24) 
22.51 
(35.51) 
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 Medicaid Commercial 
  Diabetes Cholesterol Diabetes Cholesterol 
CCI: 
moderate/severe 
liver disease  
  
- - - -6.05 
(30.61) 
CCI: 
cerebrovascular 
disease 
  
2.57 
(36) 
50.69*** 
(13.68) 
-85.77*** 
(30.94) 
-10.36 
(23.95) 
CCI: chronic 
pulmonary disease 
  
9.8 
(35.98) 
64.86*** 
(12.96) 
-81.75*** 
(30.72) 
-4.09 
(23.88) 
CCI: dementia 
  
42.63 
(47.3) 
52.57* 
(27.35) 
-99.17*** 
(32.03) 
46.86 
(47.48) 
CCI: rheumatic 
disease 
  
26.24 
(37.4) 
70.80*** 
(14.19) 
-75.42** 
(30.86) 
-2.91 
(24.15) 
CCI: mild liver 
disease 
  
52.92 
(47.25) 
80.06*** 
(27.88) 
-84.85** 
(33.83) 
33.43 
(30.53) 
CCI: diabetes no 
complications 
  
5.37 
(36.13) 
47.87*** 
(13.19) 
-107.44*** 
(30.69) 
-11.64 
(23.89) 
CCI: renal disease 
  
16.18 
(36.93) 
53.80*** 
(14.59) 
-69.53** 
(31.91) 
-12.91 
(24.19) 
CCI: malignancy 
  
-3.00 
(36.71) 
58.26*** 
(14.54) 
-87.34*** 
(30.73) 
-3.62 
(24.04) 
CCI: metastatic solid 
tumor 
33.04 58.32** -101.88*** -17.84 
53 
 
 Medicaid Commercial 
  Diabetes Cholesterol Diabetes Cholesterol 
  (45.71) (26.1) (31.51) (25.94) 
CCI: HIV/AIDS 
  
-4.42 
(37.2) 
40.65** 
(19.67) 
-123.44*** 
(30.84) 
- 
CCI: diabetes with 
complications 
  
3.96 
(36.45) 
53.94*** 
(13.46) 
-83.74*** 
(30.59) 
-8.84 
(24.31) 
CCI: hemiplegia or 
paraplegia 
  
27.42 
(41.67) 
54.11*** 
(17.04) 
-66.26* 
(35.83) 
0.27 
(30.81) 
FP 
  
-1.73 
(3.71) 
4.21 
(3.92) 
4.51 
(2.75) 
5.99*** 
(1.86) 
Post 
  
7.26*** 
(0.97) 
19.08*** 
(1.13) 
6.97*** 
(0.8) 
13.05*** 
(0.58) 
FP x Post 
  
-1.04 
(3.43) 
-7.25** 
(3.48) 
3.23 
(2.99) 
4.05** 
(1.86) 
Constant 
  
118.40*** 
(12.44) 
204.44*** 
(12.37) 
185.73*** 
(14.24) 
183.26*** 
(9.17) 
N 9,598 14,520 8,866 27,936 
 
(Robust standard errors clustered by individual) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 Medicaid: 12 months pre/post, Commercial: 9 months pre/post 
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Table A-2-3 Triple difference-in-difference estimates 
 Medicaid Commercial DDD estimate (Medicaid 
vs. Commercial) 
 Diabetes Cholesterol Diabetes Cholesterol Diabetes Cholesterol 
  Days with no 
drugs 
 
  Days with no drugs 
 
DD estimate -1.04 
(3.43) 
-7.25** 
(3.48) 
3.23 
(2.99) 
4.05** 
(1.86) 
- - 
DDD 
estimate - 
-6.21 
(4.60) 
- 
0.81 
(3.42) 
-4.27 
(4.55) 
-11.30*** 
(3.94) 
   
Adherent 
 
    
Adherent 
 
DD estimate <0.001 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
<0.001 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
- - 
DDD 
estimate - 
0.03 
(0.03) 
- 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
N 9,598 14,520 8,866 27,936   
 
(Robust standard errors clustered by individual) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
Medicaid: 12 months pre/post, Commercial: 9 months pre/post unless otherwise noted 
All regressions control for age, race/ethnicity (Medicaid only), time since first prescription, number of CCI comorbidities, year fixed effects 
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Table A-2-4 Regression results by length of time to resolve false-positive 
  Medicaid Commercial 
Variable Diabetes Cholesterol Diabetes Cholesterol 
 Days with no drugs 
False-positive -7.86 
(5.52) 
6.37 
(6.25) 
7.12* 
(4.15) 
3.77 
(2.68) 
Post 7.26*** 
(0.97) 
19.08*** 
(1.13) 
6.97*** 
(0.80) 
13.05*** 
(0.58) 
False-positive x 
Post 
7.93 
(5.19) 
-4.64 
(5.38) 
-2.76 
(3.98) 
6.74** 
Length 0.19 
(0.19) 
-0.11 
(0.17) 
-0.12 
(0.12) 
0.09 
(0.09) 
Length x Post -0.34** 
(0.15) 
-0.10 
(0.15) 
0.25** 
(0.12) 
-0.13 
(0.09) 
N 9,598 14,520 8,866 27,936 
(Robust standard errors clustered by individual) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
All regressions control for age, race/ethnicity (Medicaid only), time since first prescription, number of CCI comorbidities, year fixed effects 
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Table A-2-5 Regression results by use of breast biopsy to resolve false-positive 
  Medicaid Commercial 
Variable Diabetes Cholesterol Diabetes Cholesterol 
 Days with no drugs 
False-positive -2.19 
(3.82) 
5.24 
(4.14) 
3.89 
(2.81) 
5.86*** 
(1.92) 
Post 7.26*** 
(0.97) 
19.08*** 
(1.13) 
6.97*** 
(0.8) 
13.05*** 
(0.58) 
False-positive x 
Post 
-1.53 
(3.52) 
-8.00** 
(3.60) 
2.8 
(3.08) 
4.25** 
(1.91) 
Biopsy -8.82 
(14.49) 
-29.22** 
(12.3) 
4.63 
(12.28) 
-2.60 
(7.56) 
Biopsy x Post 7.37 
(13.79) 
11.79 
(12.62) 
8.4 
(13.94) 
-3.91 
(7.58) 
N 9,598 14,520 8,866 27,936 
(Robust standard errors clustered by individual) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
All regressions control for age, race/ethnicity (Medicaid only), time since first prescription, number of CCI comorbidities, year fixed effects 
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Table A-2-6 Diagnosis and procedure codes 
 
Condition Code type Code # Source 
Screening mammogram 
  
CPT 76092 Freeman et al. (2002); Tan et 
al. (2006); Randolph et al. 
(2002) 
ICD-9 V76.12 Adams and Koch (2014); 
Randolph et al. (2002) 
        
Other mammogram 
  
CPT 76090, 76091 Freeman et al. (2002); Tan et 
al. (2006); Randolph et al. 
(2002) 
ICD-9 87.37, V76.11 Freeman et al. (2002)  
     
Breast biopsy 
  
CPT 19100, 19101, 19120 Freeman et al. (2002); Tan et 
al. (2006) 
ICD-9 85.11, 85.12, 85.20, 85.21 Freeman et al. (2002); Tan et 
al. (2006) 
        
Breast ultrasound CPT 76645 Freeman et al. (2002); Tan et 
al. (2006) 
        
Other breast radiological 
procedures 
  
CPT 76003, 76086, 76087, 76088, 
76095, 76098, 76100, 76101, 
76102, 76120, 76125, 76140, 
76150, 76350, 76355, 76360, 
76362, 76365 
Freeman et al. (2002) 
ICD-9 87.35, 87.36, 87.73, 88.85 Freeman et al. (2002) 
        
Breast cancer treatment 
  
CPT 19160, 19162, 19180, 19200, 
19220, 19240, 38740, 38745 
Warren et al. (1999); Cooper 
et al. (1999); Freeman et al. 
(2000) 
ICD-9 174.x, 233.0, V103 Warren et al. (1999); Cooper 
et al. (1999); Freeman et al. 
(2000) 
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 Chapter 3. 
The effect of false-positive mammograms on depression and anxiety 
medication initiation
 
3.1 Introduction and Background 
There has been increasing research and attention paid to the possible adverse effects of 
false-positive mammograms. A recently published study by Ong and Mandl (2015) finds that the 
direct medical costs of a false-positive mammogram is $852 per beneficiary, leading to total 
costs of nearly $3 billion annually in the United States. Despite the substantial cost, this is likely 
an underestimate as it only includes the direct costs of the false-positive follow-up tests. There 
may be additional costs such as increased depression or anxiety, changes in future 
mammography utilization, or changes in decisions for other types of treatment. In this study I 
focus on the first effect, specifically the effect of a false-positive mammogram on the likelihood 
of initiating depression or anxiety medication. 
While multiple studies, including several systematic reviews and meta-analyses have 
shown that a false-positive mammogram may lead to increased depression or anxiety (Brett et 
al., 2005; Brewer, Salz, and Lillie, 2007; Hafslund and Nortvedt, 2009; Salz, Richman, and 
Brewer, 2010; Bond et al., 2013), all of the extant studies have used survey or self-reported 
measures of depression or anxiety (e.g the Psychological Consequences Questionnaire, the Beck 
Depression Index, the General Health Questionnaire, and the Hospital Anxiety and Depression 
Scale among others) making it difficult to determine what the effect would be on clinical 
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utilization and what the potential costs of this adverse effect might be. This limitation is also true 
of several more recent studies that have examined the psychosocial effects of false-positive 
mammograms (Bredal et al., 2013; Brodersen and Siersma (2013); Tosteson et al., 2014; Bond et 
al., 2015; Heleno, Siersma, and Brodersen (2015a, b)).The current study is the first to 
demonstrate that this adverse effect of a false-positive rises to the serious clinical level of 
increasing the probability of depression or anxiety medication initiation. Importantly this 
demonstrates that the effect goes beyond reported depression and anxiety and it allows the 
estimation of an additional cost associated with a false-positive mammogram. The issue further 
highlights the importance of creating appropriate health policy to both improve post false-
positive follow-up care especially for those most likely to suffer from increased anxiety or 
depression as well as trying to find ways to minimize the incidence of false-positive while 
maintaining proper identification of breast cancer cases. It therefore also provides an important 
input in the ongoing debate about optimal screening frequency and timing, which the US 
Preventive Task Force (2015) is in the process of revising. 
In addition a few of the studies on the effect of false-positive mammograms on 
depression and anxiety have tried to identify the populations most at risk of adverse 
psychological consequences, typically focusing on women who receive invasive screening (i.e. a 
breast biopsy) and women who have a longer period of time to resolve the false-positive 
mammogram. There is somewhat mixed evidence on whether more invasive screening is more 
likely to lead to worse adverse psychological effects. Studies by Barton et al. (2001), Brett and 
Austoker (2001), and Lampic et al. (2001 all find worse psychosocial effects for women 
receiving a biopsy, while studies by Absetz (2003) and Espasa et al. (2012) do not find any 
difference. However, these studies all have limited sample sizes. A more recent and larger scale 
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study by Heleno, Siersma, and Brodersen (2015a) finds similar reported psychological 
consequences for women receiving an invasive procedure compared to those receiving a non-
invasive procedure. However, this study also uses self-reported psychological measures and like 
many of the earlier studies is based in Europe, where the effects may be different from the 
United States. 
A second set of studies have focused on whether increased time between the initial 
abnormal mammogram and final resolution leads to worse psychological consequences.  A meta-
analysis by Brett et al. (2005) finds increased waiting time to be a factor predicting worse 
psychosocial outcomes. Similarly, a study by Lindfors, O’Connor, and Parker (2001) find that 
immediate versus later work-up can reduce the stress of a false-positive mammogram. However, 
a more recent study by Heleno, Siersma, and Brodersen (2015b) finds no significant effect of 
time to resolution, although the sample was relatively small in terms of longer waiting times. 
The importance of better understanding the harms surrounding a false-positive 
mammogram has been further highlighted by several studies comparing the rates of subsequent 
mammography screening for women who have a false-positive mammogram to those who have a 
true-negative mammogram. The results have been somewhat mixed but two findings stand out. 
First, several studies find significant decreases in the likelihood of future screening among 
women who receive a false-positive mammogram (Alamo-Junquera et al., 2012; Bond et al., 
2013; Klompenhouwer et al., 2014), which is a particularly damaging effect of a false-positive. 
On the other hand, some studies have found the opposite—higher rates of subsequent screening 
for women experiencing a false-positive (Brewer et al., 2007; Maxwell et al., 2013). However, in 
these studies the mechanism appears to be that women believe they are at higher risk of breast 
cancer as a result of the false-positive. Furthermore, the higher rates of subsequent screening 
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may also need to be taken in context. In one of the largest recent studies, Setz-Pels et al. (2013) 
find comparable rates of subsequent mammography screening in the false-positive and true-
negative populations but find that over the ensuing 4 years, the population that experiences a 
false-positive has significantly lower rates of screening. Again, one limitation with many of these 
studies is the smaller sample sizes and that many are based outside the United States, where 
effects may be very different. Although estimating the effect on future screening is outside the 
scope of this project, future work could use a similar framework to estimate this effect and also 
attempt to further connect this study’s focus on depression and anxiety medication initiation to 
future screening behavior. 
More generally, the issue of false-positive mammograms has been getting increased 
attention as both medical experts and public health policymakers debate the optimal frequency of 
mammography given growing evidence of potential harms (Pace and Keating, 2014; Tosteson et 
al., 2014; Welch and Passow, 2014). While the existing studies have focused on both false-
positive mammograms as well as overtreatment (treatment of cancers that would not likely lead 
to mortality), I focus this study on false-positive mammograms. Highlighting the importance of 
false-positives in terms of mammography screening, there is increasing evidence that false-
positive mammogram results are fairly common with estimates that between 1/3 to 1/2 of all 
women will experience a false-positive over 8 to 10 years of screening (Elmore et al., 1998; 
Hubbard et al., 2011; Jacobsen et al., 2015). As screening recommendations continue to change22 
(US Preventive Services Task Force, 2009; National Cancer Institute, 2014), it is important to 
get an accurate estimate of the potential adverse effects in order to best determine both 
appropriate screening frequency but more importantly to be able to best identify populations 
                                                 
22 The current USPSTF mammography recommendations are also currently being updated with the current draft online with public comments just 
recently closed (US Preventive Task Force, 2015). 
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most at risk from harm in order to target harm minimization efforts—i.e. to better help the 
women who may need additional follow-up care or who might be less likely to screen in the 
future. 
3.2 Methods 
 For all analyses I estimate the likelihood of initiating either depression or anxiety 
medication in the period following either a false-positive mammogram, a true-negative 
mammogram, or a true-positive mammogram while controlling for various individual level 
factors. I therefore first identify and restrict all analyses to the sample of women between the 
ages of 40 and 64 who have a screening mammogram. I exclude women under the age 40 since 
they are not currently included in any of the current screening guidelines for regular 
recommended screening (US Preventive Services Task Force, 2009; National Cancer Institute, 
2014). I exclude women ages 65 and older because of their Medicare eligibility which could 
mean they have claims for additional mammography, follow-up screening, or medication 
utilization that I am unable to observe. 
 I further restrict the sample to women who have a screening mammogram, which I define 
as a claim for a screening mammogram (CPT code 76092 or ICD-9 procedure code V76.12) with 
no claim for a mammogram in the prior 12 months. The 12 month look back period is to ensure 
that the screening mammogram is in fact for screening, rather than for women at high risk or for 
short interval follow-up for “probably benign” findings (Raza et al., 2008). Additionally, none of 
the current sets of screening guidelines recommend screening more frequently than annually (US 
Preventive Services Task Force, 2009; National Cancer Institute, 2014) so it is unlikely that more 
frequent mammography is truly screening in nature. For similar reasons, I also exclude all 
women who have claims for breast cancer treatment prior to the screening mammogram. 
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 For each screening mammogram, I classify it as either a true-negative23 result, a true-
positive result, or a false-positive result. I define a true-negative result as a screening 
mammogram with no subsequent claims for either follow-up testing or breast cancer. I define a 
true-positive as a screening mammogram with a subsequent claim for breast cancer. Finally, I 
define a false-positive as a screening mammogram followed by at least one claim for follow-up 
testing in the ensuing 3 months. Follow-up testing includes a subsequent mammogram (listed as 
either screening or diagnostic), a breast biopsy, a breast ultrasound, or other radiological breast 
testing (see Table A-3-5 for codes based upon Cooper et al, 1999; Warren et al., 1999; Freeman 
et al., 2000; Randolph et al., 2002; Tan et al., 2006; Fenton et al., 2014).  
One potential concern when identifying a false-positive mammogram using a claims-
based algorithm is that I do not actually observe the result of the mammogram itself. However, a 
recent study by Hubbard et al. (2015) using Medicare claims data linked to actual mammogram 
results finds 99.4 percent of false-positive mammograms identified by claims data are indeed 
false-positive mammograms. This is not surprising as women are unlikely to receive follow-up 
testing unless there is an abnormal finding in the initial screening mammogram. On the other 
hand, a lower but still relatively high 79.4 percent of abnormal mammograms were able to be 
identified using the claims algorithm. This lower percent could be a result of women who do not 
return for follow-up testing or for some reason are told not to return once the original scan has 
been re-examined. In either case, this population of women who actually have an abnormal result 
but are classified as true-negative results is more likely to actually bias my estimates towards 
zero. This is because women who are told they have abnormal result but do not return are placed 
in the control group and to the extent that they are more likely to initiate depression or anxiety 
                                                 
23 One note is that technically it is difficult to distinguish between true-negative and false-negative results in the claims data comparing two actual 
mammogram films and see that there had been a growth missed. Although I refer to the results as true-negative this simply means the woman has 
no follow-up tests no breast cancer treatment. 
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medication, similar to their false-positive or true-positive counterparts, they bias my estimates 
downwards. 
 I then merge the analysis sample of women receiving a screening mammogram to the 
outpatient prescription drug claims files to identify any claims for depression or anxiety 
medications. Using the Marketscan therapeutic classes, I define depression or anxiety 
medications as a medication classified as an “anti-depressant”, “benzodiazepines”, or 
“anxiolytic/sedative/hypnotic” (Mark and Coffey, 2003). As an alternative analysis, I also 
analyze the effect of a false-positive mammogram on another set of psychiatric medications that 
are sometimes prescribed for anxiety, although often for other types of psychiatric conditions. 
These medications include  “tranquilizers/anti-psychotics” and “barbiturates”. The second set of 
medications is included as an alternative set of psychiatric medications that would be predicted 
to be less directly affected by a false-positive mammogram since the medications are less 
directly tied to depression or anxiety. For the two classes of medications, I create a series of 
dependent variables indicating whether the woman has initiated medication by 1, 2, …, 12 
months post screening mammogram in the Medicaid analyses and 1-1124 months in the 
commercially insured analyses.  
 I also restrict the analysis to women who do not have a claim for depression or anxiety 
medication prior to the index screening mammogram. Because I am focusing on medication 
initiation I want to ensure that they are not already taking the medication. As an alternate 
analysis I examine the effect of a false-positive on women who have a prior medication claim but 
not for at least 6 months prior to the screening mammogram. 
                                                 
24 The difference in months for the two sets of analyses is due to only having two years of commercial claims data so I cannot create variables 
both 12 months before and after a screening mammogram. 
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 Finally, to ensure that I am not missing any claims that might bias the results,  I restrict 
the sample to women continuously enrolled in either the Medicaid or commercial claims data. 
The baseline restriction is that women must be continuously enrolled for 12 months prior to the 
screening mammogram to ensure they do not have a prior mammogram in the 12 months prior. 
However, due to limited years of data and therefore sample I relax this to include women 
continuously enrolled for the 9 months prior to the screening mammogram. In addition, in order 
to capture any depression or anxiety medication claims, I separately restrict the sample to women 
who are continuously enrolled for 6, 9, and 12 months after the screening mammogram for the 
Medicaid sample and 6, 9, and 11 months after the screening mammogram for the commercially 
insured sample. This slight difference is again due to the limited years of commercial claims. 
With only two years of commercial claims, I cannot include women both 12 months before and 
after a screening mammogram. 
 Econometrically, I estimate linear probability models with depression or anxiety 
medication initiation as the dependent variable for the Medicaid and commercially insured 
samples separately. The two independent variables of interest are then the false-positive and the 
true-positive variables, where true-negative is the omitted category. In addition I control for 
several additional individual level variables, which vary slightly depending on the data set. On 
the Medicaid side I control for age, race/ethnicity, reason for Medicaid eligibility (blind/disabled, 
adult based on unemployment, adult not based on unemployment, NBCCCEDP, and unknown), 
whether the plan is capitated, and whether the plans is a comprehensive Medicaid plan. On the 
commercially insured side I control for age, insurance type (comprehensive25, exclusive provider 
organization (EPO), health maintenance organization (HMO), non-capitated point of service 
                                                 
25 Namely, that there is no incentive for a patient to use a particular set of providers. 
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(POS), capitated point of service (POS capitated), preferred provider organization (PPO), 
consumer driven health plan (CDHP)), and location (see Table A-3-1). Unfortunately 
race/ethnicity is not available in the commercial claims. With multiple years of data, an 
individual may appear more than once in the sample so I cluster the standard errors by 
individual. As a sensitivity analysis I also run all regressions using just the first observed 
mammogram in the data.  In addition to the baseline models, I also separate the false-positive 
variable into whether it was the first false-positive or second or more; I separate the false-
positive variable into whether or not a biopsy was performed; and I separate the false-positive 
variable into the length of time it takes to resolve (within a week vs. longer and within a month 
vs. longer).  
3.3 Data 
 All analyses are based on two sets of claims data—the 2003-2007 Truven Health 
MarketScan Medicaid Multistate Database and the 2003-2004 Truven Health MarketScan 
Commercial Claims and Encounters Database. The Medicaid database includes administrative 
claims data for approximately 7 million Medicaid recipients from 8 geographically diverse, but 
not identifiable states. The data are designed to be nationally representative but given the wide 
variation in state Medicaid programs, the representativeness may be somewhat limited. The 
commercial claims database collects claims and enrollment data from over 13 million 
commercially insured beneficiaries and their dependents. The data include employer and health 
plan data from a variety of types of health plans including fee-for-service, preferred provider 
organizations, health maintenance organizations, and others (Adamson, Chang, and Hansen, 
2006). The Marketscan commercial sample is primarily composed of self-insured, medium, and 
large employers. Compared to the nationally representative sample of commercial health 
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insurance enrollees from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, the Marketscan commercial 
enrollees are generally similar demographically except for being over-representative of the 
southern region (Aizcorbe et al., 2012). While the similarity demonstrates the Marketscan data 
are generally representative of the population with employer sponsored health insurance, one 
cautionary note in terms of generalizability is that this is a subset of the overall population and 
even the population with private health insurance. 
 Both the Medicaid and the commercial claims data include inpatient, outpatient, and 
prescription drug claims in addition to enrollment and plan characteristic data as well as a limited 
number of demographic variables that vary slightly between the two data sets (Adamson, Chang, 
and Hansen, 2006). In particular, as mentioned above, the Medicaid claims data include race and 
ethnicity information, while the commercial claims contain geographic information. The primary 
advantage of the Marketscan claims data for these analyses is they are the only data set with both 
a large, representative population and information on all types of medical care utilization. 
Although Medicare claims would be another possible source of data, there are a few limitations. 
The first limitation is that the rate of mammography false-positive declines significantly with age 
(Elmore et al., 1998). The second limitation is that the Medicare population likely has a much 
longer history of screening and therefore more likely to have previously had a false-positive 
mammogram so may be less likely initiate depression or anxiety medication following a false-
positive—it is estimated that between 1/3 and 1/2 of women will experience a false-positive over 
8 to 10 years of screening (Elmore et al., 1998; Hubbard et al., 2011; Jacobsen et al., 2015). 
Finally, another advantage to using Medicaid and commercial claims therefore allows a 
comparison of the effect of a false-positive mammogram on depression or anxiety medication 
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initiation across insurance types for a similar age group. However, it would be important to see if 
the results hold for the Medicare population in future research. 
 
3.4 Results 
 I first provide summary statistics by result of the screening mammogram—true-negative, 
true-positive, and false-positive. As both Table 3-1 and Table 3-2 show, there are limited 
differences between the three screening outcome populations. As Table 3-1 shows, there is some 
evidence that the Medicaid false-positive population is somewhat younger but that is consistent 
with the prior literature (Christiansen et al., 2000). The Medicaid false-positive population also 
appears to be slightly less likely to be eligible due to disability, although there is no obvious a 
priori reason why this might affect the results26. On the commercially insured side the three 
populations look remarkably similar. 
In the baseline regressions in Table 3-3 and Table 3-4, I find significant increases in 
depression or anxiety medication initiation following a false-positive mammogram in both for 
the Medicaid and commercially insured populations. On the Medicaid side I find that a false-
positive leads to approximately a 0.5 percentage point increase in the probability of initiation in 
the month following the false-positive up to a 1.5 percentage point increase by month 12. The 
increase is somewhat larger in the commercially insured than the Medicaid insured population, 
possibly due to better access to care in the commercially insured population (Berk and Schur, 
1998 ; Kellerman and Weinick, 2012). The effect increases from an approximate 1 percentage 
point increase in the first month to a 4-6 percentage point increase by month 11.  In both the 
                                                 
26 Even if the disability population is more likely to be taking depression or anxiety medication at baseline, this would just mean they are more 
likely to be excluded from the analysis sample, meaning there should be limited effect on initiation following the screening mammogram itself. 
  
69 
 
Medicaid and commercially insured population most of the effects occurs in the first 7 to 9 
months following the false-positive mammogram. 
To put these effects in context, I find an approximately 4- to 5-fold larger increase in the 
effect of a true positive mammogram on depression or anxiety medication initiation. The true 
positive effect is consistent with other estimates from the literature that show a breast cancer 
diagnosis leads to significant increases in depression and anxiety (Burgess et al., 2005; Reich, 
Lesur, Perdrizet-Chevall, 2007). Although there is no good a priori estimate of how the effect of 
a false-positive on medication initiation should compare to the true-positive effect, it appears 
reasonable that the effect is higher than for a true-negative result but significantly lower than for 
a true-positive result. 
Certainly, one concern with the analyses is the restriction of continuous enrollment and 
how attrition might affect the results. Yet Table 3-3 and Table 3-4 show this may not be a 
significant problem. I find the results do not change qualitatively with the differing continuous 
enrollment restrictions. Furthermore, when the analysis is restricted to 6 or 9 months continuous 
enrollment after the mammogram I see little change in the 7-11/12 or 10-11/12 month rates of 
initiation (i.e. the period where some of the sample has been attrited). If differential attrition were 
a significant problem I would expect to see much larger differences. For example, the 7-12 
month results should look very different in the sample where I restrict to those continuously 
enrolled for 6 months compared to 9 or 12 months. Since they do not, it suggests that attrition 
may be less of an issue. 
Another potential concern is that an individual may be observed more than once in the 
data and these multiply observed individuals may be differentially affecting the results. This is a 
slightly larger concern in the Medicaid data because of the greater number of years of data. 
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However as Table 3-5 and Table 3-6 show the results change very little, and if anything get 
slightly larger on the Medicaid side, when restricting the analyses to only the first mammogram 
observed. 
To build on the baseline analyses, I also try to examine some factors that predict greater 
depression or anxiety medication initiation. I first examine if the effects are larger when the 
false-positive is a woman’s first experience with a false-positive. If a woman has previously 
experienced a false-positive, the negative psychological consequences might be lower for 
subsequent false-positives as a woman has a better idea of what to expect and may better 
understand that the additional testing may ultimately rule out breast cancer. Interestingly, while 
this seems to be the case on the Medicaid side, there is less evidence of this on the commercially 
insured side.  
As Table 3-7 shows, the only positive and significant increases in depression or anxiety 
medication initiation are for the populations experiencing a first false-positive or a true-positive. 
However, in the commercially insured population both the first and second false-positives seem 
to be associated with fairly similar sized and significant increases in medication initiation (see 
Table 3-8). The result is somewhat more surprising given the sample restriction that an 
individual cannot have previously taken depression or anxiety medication. This means that in the 
commercially insured population, some women initiate depression or anxiety medication 
following the second false-positive but not the first27. Given that many women believe they are 
at higher risk following a false-positive (Aro et al., 2000; Brett et al., 2005), it is certainly 
possible that anxiety increases after a second false-positive because the first time may have 
seemed like an anomaly while the second is additional evidence of high risk. One possibility for 
                                                 
27 Given that there are only two years of commercial claims data, there are relatively few women observed to have multiple false-positive 
mammograms. Although the number varies depending on the specific sample restrictions, there are only at most a couple of hundred women in 
the commercial claims with multiple false-positive mammograms. 
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why the pattern might be seen in the commercially insured but not the Medicaid insured is that 
the Medicaid population may have lower trust in the health care system (Boulware et al., 2003; 
Armstrong et al., 2007) and view a subsequent abnormal result as another mistake while the 
commercially insured population might view it as a stronger signal that there may truly be a 
suspicious growth.  
In addition to the number of false-positives experienced, another important factor that 
could lead to greater medication initiation is the invasiveness of the follow-up procedures. 
Splitting the false-positive variable into those that include a biopsy and those that do not, I again 
find different results by insurance type. On the Medicaid side in Table 3-9, I see fairly 
comparable effects for both biopsy and non-biopsy false-positives with each group having higher 
rates of initiation depending on the number of months of follow-up. However, in the 
commercially insured analyses, in Table 3-10, I see significantly higher rates of depression or 
anxiety medication initiation in the false-positive population that undergoes a breast biopsy. The 
rates are nearly 2 to 3 times higher for the population that undergoes a breast biopsy, with the 
results remaining fairly consistent at each month of follow-up. Again this could be related to 
different expectations or interpretations of the final results for the two different populations. 
Another potential risk factor for worse psychological consequences is the length of 
follow-up. Interestingly, the results once again vary by insurance status. On the Medicaid side, 
there is not much difference in the effect if the false-positive is resolved within a week (see 
Table 3-11) compared to longer; and if anything the population whose false-positive is resolved 
in less than a month appears to have a slightly higher initiation rate than the population whose 
resolution is at least a month (see Table 3-13). However, I see the more commonly predicted 
pattern of longer resolution time leading to greater depression or anxiety medication initiation in 
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the commercially insured population. On the commercially insured side, in both cases—using a 
one week cut-point or a one month cut-point—the group with the longer false-positive resolution 
time has almost twice the probability of initiating depression or anxiety medication (see Table 
3-12 and Table 3-14). One possible reason for the discrepancy between the Medicaid and 
commercially insured populations is that a greater delay in resolution may unfortunately not be 
as unfamiliar for the Medicaid insured population (Medicaid Access Study Group, 1994; 
Bisgaier and Rhodes, 2011). Being more used to delayed care may mean less anxiety about 
delayed results for the Medicaid population. 
While a false-positive appears to have a significant effect on the extensive margin of 
increasing the probability of initiating depression or anxiety medication, I also examine the effect 
on the intensive margin. I estimate the effect of a false-positive or true-positive on the number of 
fills at 6, 9, and 11/12 months as well as the total amount spent on depression or anxiety 
medication at 6, 9, 11/12 months. I see very little effect of a false-positive on either the number 
of fills or the total amount spent on medication for the Medicaid population in Table 3-15. On 
the commercially insured side, I see a modest increase in the number of fills and a modest $15-
20 increase in amount spent as a result of a false-positive (see Table 3-16). For both the 
Medicaid and commercially insured population, most of the effect appears to be on the extensive 
margin, suggesting more short-lived depression or anxiety. 
As another sensitivity analysis, I estimate the baseline models using the 
alternative definition of depression or anxiety medications (i.e. “tranquilizers/anti-
psychotics” and “barbiturates”). While the medications are psychiatric medications and 
some may be prescribed for depression or anxiety, there are many other unrelated 
psychiatric conditions for which these medications might be prescribed. Therefore, while 
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it is possible that I will see greater rates of initiation among women who experience a 
false-positive or true-positive, the effect should be smaller than in the baseline estimates. 
As 
Table A-3-2 and Table A-3-3 show, I see much smaller and mostly negligible effects. 
Although some of the effects are statistically significant they are all several orders of magnitude 
smaller than in the baseline regressions. Therefore, although a false-positive may lead to an 
increase in the initiation of these alternative medications, the effects are likely economically 
small. 
As a final analysis, I re-run the baseline analyses but restricted to the sample of women 
who have a prior claim for a depression or anxiety medication but do not have a claim in the 
prior 6 months. However, I see little effect of a false-positive on increasing the likelihood of re-
initiating depression or anxiety medication (see Table A-3-4). There is also little effect of a true-
positive on re-initiation, so this may be a small and unusually selected population. Given the 
small sample, it is not surprising that I find little effect in this analysis so ultimately I do not 
focus on those results. 
3.5 Discussion 
 This study provides the first evidence that the adverse psychological effects surrounding 
a false-positive mammogram actually rise to the clinical level of significantly increasing the 
likelihood of initiating depression or anxiety medication. This is important both in terms of 
demonstrating a strong negative psychological effect from a false-positive as well as increasing 
the costs associated with a false-positive mammogram and therefore mammography more 
generally. I find significantly larger effects of a false-positive on medication initiation in the 
commercially insured population compared to the Medicaid insured but this may in part be due 
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to the much higher baseline rates of depression or anxiety medication utilization in the Medicaid 
population. In my sample, approximately 61% of the Medicaid sample has a claim for depression 
or anxiety medication prior to the index mammogram, in part a reason why the Medicaid sample 
is even smaller than it could be. On the other hand, only about 4% of the commercially insured 
population has a depression or anxiety medication claim prior to the screening mammogram. 
 The results also suggest that there are several false-positive populations most at risk of 
experiencing depression or anxiety that leads to initiation of these medications. For the 
population with Medicaid insurance, the only factor that seems to lead to increased risk of 
depression or anxiety medication initiation is if the false-positive is the first one experienced. For 
those with private insurance, the more invasive the procedure (i.e. those who undergo a breast 
biopsy) and those who have a longer time to resolution are more likely to initiate depression or 
anxiety medication. This suggests that these subpopulations may be particularly in need of good 
follow-up care following a false-positive to ensure they are coping effectively and also to 
mitigate negative psychological consequences that may make these women less likely to screen 
in the future, an effect that also warrants additional research and attention. 
 Extrapolating from the results of this study, we can estimate the total number of women 
and the total cost of depression or anxiety medication initiation as a result of a false-positive 
mammogram. Given the high baseline rates of depression or anxiety medication utilization in the 
Medicaid population the total numbers are relatively small so I focus primarily on the 
commercially insured. There are 43.6 million women between the ages of 40 and 64 (Ong and 
Mendl, 2015), of whom 70.4% have private health insurance (Cohen and Martinez, 2014). The 
private health insurance mammography rate is 75.6% (National Center for Health Statistics, 
2013) and I find an 11% false-positive rate, which is nearly identical to the one found by Ong 
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and Mendl (2015). This means approximately 2.5 million with private insurance experience a 
false-positive mammogram. I then find an approximate 5 percentage point increase in the 
probability of initiating depression or anxiety medication within 12 months of the mammogram, 
leading to a total estimate of nearly 128,000 women initiating medication as a result of a false-
positive mammogram. While overall this is a relatively small percentage of women undergoing a 
mammogram, this is a serious adverse effect and likely significantly understates the total number 
of women who experience significant increases in anxiety or depression that does not rise to the 
level of initiating medication use. To further get a sense of the magnitude, about the same 
number of women between the ages of 40 and 64 will be diagnosed with breast cancer as will 
initiate depression or anxiety medication as a result of a false-positive (National Cancer Institute, 
2015). 
In the commercial claims data I find on average women with a false-positive have 2.67 
fills at a total cost of $134 leading to a total cost of $17 million. However, this total cost estimate 
just includes women initiating depression or anxiety medication. A population particularly at risk 
for adverse psychological consequences would be women currently taking depression or anxiety 
medications, who may extend use as a result of experiencing a false-positive. In fact, I find 
women who have a previous depression or anxiety medication claim and then experience a false-
positive mammogram on average spend $20 more in the Medicaid population and $67 more in 
the commercially insured population. In addition women may seek non-pharmaceutical 
treatment. Therefore this estimate is likely a significant underestimate of the financial 
consequences of the adverse psychological effects of a false-positive mammogram. Also maybe 
more significant than the overall cost is the 128,000 women who have such an adverse 
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experience that they initiate depression or anxiety medication, which may also indicate an 
additional risk that they may be reluctant to screen in the future. 
More generally, the results suggest that there can be serious adverse psychological 
consequences as a result of a false-positive mammogram. Although most women tend to report 
an understanding that there is a risk of a false-positive, they tend to underestimate the probability 
(Schwartz et al., 2000) and have varying levels of tolerance for overdetection (Van den Bruel et 
al., 2015). In spite of this, based on survey responses, the risk of false-positive does not appear to 
affect of stated enthusiasm for mammography screening (Schwartz et al., 2004). However, it is 
important to both fully understand and communicate the potential harms of screening to women 
so they can make optimal individual screening decisions. Furthermore, the results further 
highlight that there may be particular value in best targeting screening for women based on both 
risk of breast cancer and preferences for screening (Pace and Keating, 2014). This is similar to 
the growing call for more “precision medicine” where screening can be best targeted at high risk 
women (Collins and Varmus, 2015), thereby potentially avoiding adverse psychological 
consequences in particular for low women at low risk of breast cancer. This is certainly not to 
say that these results suggest women should not undergo mammography, but rather that the full 
set of possible harms, such as false-positives, are explained. Furthermore, once a false-positive 
has been resolved,  it is important to ensure that follow-up care is sufficient to both identify and 
treat women who may be suffering from clinical depression or anxiety. In particular, the results 
also help identify population who may be most at risk of clinical depression or anxiety so that 
follow-up care can be appropriately targeted at these women. This care might include further 
explaining the reasons for the false-positive, what future risk of cancer might be (especially 
when there is no elevated risk), and what additional follow-up steps might need to be taken.  
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3.6 Limitations 
 One of the major limitations for the analyses within the Medicaid population is the 
generalizability of the results even within the Medicaid population. The research design requires 
the Medicaid population to be continuously enrolled for a minimum of 15 months but more 
generally for over 2 years. However, there is a well-documented high rate of churn in the 
Medicaid population (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2000; Short and Graefe, 
2003; Duggan, 2004). This likely means the Medicaid population in this study is not 
representative of the overall Medicaid sample. The study sample is likely sicker and more 
disabled—e.g. as Table 3-1 shows the longer the population is continuously enrolled the greater 
the proportion of individuals who are eligible for Medicaid due to disability. 
 A related limitation is that the requirement of continuous enrollment and limited years of 
data mean I cannot be sure an individual has never previously taken depression or anxiety 
medication. In an alternate analysis I show that there is little effect of a false-positive on 
depression or anxiety medication utilization among women who have taken the medication 
previously but not in the prior 6 months, although there are obvious sample limitations to this. 
But more generally, this limitation should not be too much of a problem because a woman 
restarting depression or anxiety medication following a false-positive more than a year after 
previously taking it is an important effect of a false-positive. 
Another limitation is that this study only examines the effect of a false-positive 
mammogram on psychiatric medications, but there could also be effects on counseling or other 
types of non-pharmaceutical psychological care. In addition this study only captures the effect on 
depression and anxiety that rises to the clinical level of medication utilization. Certainly there 
could remain serious and important psychological consequences that do not rise to the level of 
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requiring medication as previous studies using questionnaires have shown (Brett et al., 2005; 
Brewer, Salz, and Lillie, 2007; Hafslund and Nortvedt, 2009; Salz, Richman, and Brewer, 2010; 
Bond et al., 2013). 
Finally, I am limited by not being able to observe the actual results of the mammogram 
itself. Although as previously demonstrated, the claims-based approach to identifying false-
positives has been validated (Hubbard et al., 2014). Furthermore, the main limitation appears to 
be that some women who experience an abnormal result may not receive additional follow-up 
testing. To the extent that these women are more likely to initiate depression or anxiety 
medication but are misclassified as true-negatives in the analyses, this is only likely to bias my 
estimates towards finding no effect. 
3.7 Conclusions 
Although previous studies have shown some evidence that a false-positive mammogram 
may increase depression or anxiety, this is the first study to show that this rises to the clinical 
level of significantly increasing the probability of initiating depression or anxiety medication 
utilization. I also provide evidence that the commercially insured populations most at risk for 
initiating depression or anxiety medication are those that undergo more invasive false-positives 
(i.e. those involving a breast biopsy) and those with a longer time to resolution, whereas on the 
Medicaid side it is women experiencing their first false-positive. This suggests these are 
populations that should be more closely followed to ensure that they are receive appropriate 
follow-up care including monitoring for adverse psychological effects. More generally, the 
results also further add to the list of adverse effects that should be considered when determining 
optimal screening frequency and timing. 
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Table 3-1  Summary statistics by mammogram outcome for the Medicaid population 
  Enrolled 6 months post Enrolled 9 months post Enrolled 12 months post 
  
True 
Negative 
True 
Positive 
False 
Positive 
True 
Negative 
True 
Positive 
False 
Positive 
True 
Negative 
True 
Positive 
False 
Positive 
Age 51.61 53.53 50.63 51.60 53.42 50.72 51.60 53.41 50.78 
  (6.99) (6.81) (6.87) (6.9) (6.7) (6.84) (6.78) (6.62) (6.75) 
White 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.30 0.30 0.33 0.30 0.31 0.33 
  (0.46) (0.46) (0.47) (0.46) (0.46) (0.47) (0.46) (0.46) (0.47) 
Black 0.47 0.51 0.43 0.47 0.53 0.45 0.49 0.53 0.46 
  (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) 
Hispanic 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 
  (0.14) (0.09) (0.12) (0.13) (0.08) (0.11) (0.14) (0.07) (0.11) 
Other race 0.21 0.17 0.22 0.20 0.16 0.21 0.19 0.15 0.19 
  (0.41) (0.37) (0.42) (0.4) (0.37) (0.41) (0.4) (0.36) (0.4) 
Reason for Medicaid 
eligibility - blind or 
disabled 0.59 0.70 0.55 0.62 0.70 0.58 0.65 0.72 0.61 
  (0.49) (0.46) (0.5) (0.49) (0.46) (0.49) (0.48) (0.45) (0.49) 
Reason for Medicaid 
eligibility - adult not 
based on 
unemployment status 0.35 0.27 0.37 0.33 0.26 0.35 0.31 0.25 0.33 
  (0.48) (0.44) (0.48) (0.47) (0.44) (0.48) (0.46) (0.43) (0.47) 
Reason for Medicaid 
eligibility - unknown 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.06 
  (0.23) (0.19) (0.26) (0.22) (0.19) (0.25) (0.21) (0.17) (0.23) 
Reason for Medicaid 
eligibility - 
unemployed adult 0.00 - - 0.00 - - 0.00 - - 
  (0.01) - - (0.01) - - (0.01) - - 
Reason for Medicaid 
eligibility - 
NBCCEDP 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 
  (0.03) - (0.01) (0.03) - (0.02) (0.02) - (0.02) 
Capitated Medicaid 
plan 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.51 
  (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) 
Comprehensive 
Medicaid plan 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.49 
  (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) 
                    
Initiate 
depression/anxiety 
meds within 3 months 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.05 
  (0.19) (0.27) (0.2) (0.19) (0.27) (0.21) (0.19) (0.28) (0.21) 
Initiate 
depression/anxiety 
meds within 6 months 0.07 0.16 0.08 0.07 0.16 0.08 0.07 0.16 0.08 
  (0.25) (0.37) (0.27) (0.26) (0.37) (0.27) (0.26) (0.37) (0.27) 
Initiate 
depression/anxiety 
meds within 9 months 0.09 0.19 0.11 0.10 0.19 0.11 0.10 0.19 0.11 
  (0.29) (0.39) (0.31) (0.3) (0.39) (0.32) (0.3) (0.39) (0.32) 
Initiate 
depression/anxiety 
meds within 12 
months 0.11 0.22 0.13 0.12 0.22 0.14 0.13 0.22 0.14 
  (0.32) (0.41) (0.33) (0.33) (0.42) (0.34) (0.33) (0.41) (0.35) 
N 39,330  528  4,968  33,082  480  4,182  27,535  436  3,507  
Mean (SD) All means are for individuals enrolled for 12 months continuously prior to the index mammogram.  
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Table 3-2  Summary statistics by mammogram outcome for the commercially insured population 
  Enrolled 6 months post Enrolled 9 months post Enrolled 11 months post 
  
True 
Negative 
True 
Positive 
False 
Positive 
True 
Negative 
True 
Positive 
False 
Positive 
True 
Negative 
True 
Positive 
False 
Positive 
Age 53.13 55.18 52.27 53.08 55.14 52.23 53.13 55.36 52.33 
 (6.55) (6.23) (6.63) (6.55) (5.93) (6.65) (6.54) (5.88) (6.62) 
Insurance - 
comprehensive 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.16 
 (0.39) (0.39) (0.37) (0.39) (0.38) (0.37) (0.39) (0.36) (0.37) 
Insurance - EPO <0.001 - <0.001 <0.001 - 0.00 0.00 - <0.001 
 (0.03) - (0.03) (0.03) - (0.04) (0.03) - (0.03) 
Insurance- HMO 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.18 
 (0.39) (0.39) (0.38) (0.39) (0.38) (0.38) (0.4) (0.4) (0.38) 
Insurance - POS 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.16 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.35) (0.37) (0.37) 
Insurance - POS 
capitated 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) 
Insurance - PPO 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.45 0.44 0.47 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
Insurance - CDHP <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 - <0.001 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) - (0.02) 
Region - Northeast 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.08 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.27) (0.26) (0.28) (0.27) (0.24) (0.26) 
Region - North 
Central 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.30 
 (0.47) (0.46) (0.46) (0.47) (0.47) (0.46) (0.47) (0.47) (0.46) 
Region - South 0.39 0.37 0.42 0.38 0.37 0.41 0.38 0.34 0.43 
 (0.49) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (0.48) (0.5) 
Region - West 0.21 0.24 0.19 0.21 0.24 0.19 0.20 0.27 0.19 
 (0.41) (0.43) (0.39) (0.41) (0.43) (0.39) (0.4) (0.44) (0.39) 
Region - Unknown 0.01 <0.001 0.01 0.01 <0.001 <0.001 0.01 <0.001 <0.001 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) 
Initiate 
depression/anxiety 
meds within 3 
months 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.02 
  (0.04) (0.32) (0.15) (0.04) (0.32) (0.16) (0.04) (0.32) (0.15) 
Initiate 
depression/anxiety 
meds within 6 
months 0.00 0.18 0.04 0.00 0.18 0.04 0.00 0.16 0.04 
  (0.06) (0.38) (0.19) (0.06) (0.38) (0.19) (0.05) (0.36) (0.2) 
Initiate 
depression/anxiety 
meds within 9 
months 0.00 0.21 0.05 0.00 0.21 0.05 0.00 0.20 0.05 
  (0.07) (0.4) (0.21) (0.07) (0.41) (0.22) (0.07) (0.4) (0.23) 
Initiate 
depression/anxiety 
meds within 11 
months 0.00 0.21 0.05 0.01 0.23 0.06 0.01 0.21 0.07 
  (0.07) (0.41) (0.22) (0.07) (0.42) (0.24) (0.07) (0.41) (0.25) 
N 
         
229,002  
         
1,262  
         
20,863  
         
112,292  
            
671  
         
10,291  
         
36,082  
            
235  
         
3,260  
Mean (SD) 
All means are for individuals enrolled for 12 months continuously prior to the index mammogram.  
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Table 3-3  Baseline regression estimates for the Medicaid population 
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 6+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.004 0.006* 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.009* 0.011* 0.014** 0.015** 0.012* 0.013** 44,826 
Positive (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  
              
True- 0.021** 0.030** 0.044*** 0.050*** 0.069*** 0.093*** 0.094*** 0.097*** 0.099*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.107***  
Positive (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)  
              
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 9+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.005* 0.007* 0.006 0.008* 0.008* 0.009* 0.010* 0.013** 0.016** 0.017** 0.014* 0.015** 37,744 
Positive (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)  
              
True- 0.022** 0.034** 0.045*** 0.053*** 0.069*** 0.090*** 0.092*** 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.103***  
Positive (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)  
              
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 12+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.006* 0.007* 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.011* 0.013* 0.014* 0.01 0.011 31,478 
Positive (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  
              
True- 0.019* 0.032** 0.045*** 0.054*** 0.069*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.095*** 0.094*** 0.094***  
Positive (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020)  
              
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 6+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.006** 0.008** 0.007* 0.008* 0.007* 0.009* 0.010* 0.013** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.014** 0.015** 53,207 
Positive (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)  
              
True- 0.021** 0.034*** 0.047*** 0.050*** 0.062*** 0.083*** 0.081*** 0.087*** 0.089*** 0.099*** 0.097*** 0.099***  
Positive (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)  
              
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 9+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.009** 0.010** 0.009* 0.010* 0.011* 0.014** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.015** 0.016** 45,187 
Positive (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  
              
True- 0.022** 0.036*** 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.062*** 0.081*** 0.079*** 0.085*** 0.087*** 0.097*** 0.094*** 0.093***  
Positive (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)  
              
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 12+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.008** 0.010** 0.009* 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.011* 0.014* 0.014* 0.011 0.012* 38,160 
Positive (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)  
              
True- 0.019* 0.035*** 0.049*** 0.054*** 0.062*** 0.078*** 0.075*** 0.080*** 0.079*** 0.088*** 0.085*** 0.083***  
Positive (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)  
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(Robust standard errors clustered by individual) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
All regressions also control for age, race/ethnicity, reason for Medicaid eligibility, capitation, whether plan is comprehensive. 
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Table 3-4  Baseline regression estimates for the commercially insured population 
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 6+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.009*** 0.016*** 0.021*** 0.025*** 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.036*** 0.039*** 0.042*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 251,127 
Positive (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)  
             
True- 0.042*** 0.084*** 0.111*** 0.142*** 0.164*** 0.177*** 0.190*** 0.197*** 0.202*** 0.207*** 0.209***  
Positive (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)  
   
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 9+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.009*** 0.017*** 0.023*** 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.054*** 123,254 
Positive (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
             
True- 0.047*** 0.088*** 0.116*** 0.148*** 0.164*** 0.176*** 0.192*** 0.200*** 0.209*** 0.219*** 0.222***  
Positive (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)  
             
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 11+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.009*** 0.017*** 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.033*** 0.037*** 0.042*** 0.046*** 0.049*** 0.056*** 0.060*** 39,577 
Positive (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  
             
True- 0.046*** 0.097*** 0.114*** 0.126*** 0.142*** 0.155*** 0.175*** 0.188*** 0.196*** 0.204*** 0.208***  
Positive (0.014) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027)  
             
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 6+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.009*** 0.016*** 0.022*** 0.026*** 0.030*** 0.035*** 0.039*** 0.042*** 0.045*** 0.048*** 0.050*** 403,749 
Positive (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
             
True- 0.039*** 0.073*** 0.097*** 0.123*** 0.139*** 0.151*** 0.164*** 0.171*** 0.179*** 0.184*** 0.192***  
Positive (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  
             
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 9+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.009*** 0.017*** 0.023*** 0.027*** 0.032*** 0.037*** 0.041*** 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.053*** 0.057*** 270,423 
Positive (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
             
True- 0.039*** 0.070*** 0.094*** 0.118*** 0.130*** 0.142*** 0.156*** 0.163*** 0.174*** 0.181*** 0.190***  
Positive (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  
             
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 11+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.010*** 0.016*** 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.033*** 0.038*** 0.042*** 0.046*** 0.050*** 0.054*** 0.059*** 184,066 
Positive (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
             
True- 0.035*** 0.065*** 0.085*** 0.104*** 0.115*** 0.126*** 0.141*** 0.148*** 0.159*** 0.165*** 0.175***  
Positive (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)  
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(Robust standard errors clustered by individual) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
All regressions also control for age, insurance plan type, and location of residence. 
  
  
90 
 
Table 3-5  Baseline regression estimates for the Medicaid population restricted to first observed mammogram 
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 6+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.005 0.008* 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.012* 0.015* 0.015* 0.012 0.012 23,092 
Positive (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)  
              
True- 0.024* 0.041** 0.051** 0.052** 0.062** 0.091*** 0.088*** 0.097*** 0.095*** 0.104*** 0.100*** 0.106***  
Positive (0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)  
              
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 9+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.008* 0.011* 0.010* 0.008 0.008 0.01 0.011 0.017* 0.019** 0.019** 0.015* 0.015* 19,741 
Positive (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)  
              
True- 0.023* 0.043** 0.047** 0.048** 0.057** 0.082*** 0.079*** 0.089*** 0.086*** 0.095*** 0.091*** 0.093***  
Positive (0.012) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)  
              
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 12+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.009* 0.011* 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.012 0.014 0.014 0.01 0.009 16,548 
Positive (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  
              
True- 0.018 0.040* 0.046* 0.048* 0.050* 0.070** 0.063** 0.071** 0.068** 0.078** 0.073** 0.075**  
Positive (0.012) (0.016) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)  
              
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 6+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.008** 0.010** 0.008* 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.012* 0.015** 0.015* 0.012* 0.013* 31,207 
Positive (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  
              
True- 0.022* 0.042** 0.052*** 0.050** 0.052** 0.075*** 0.068*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.093*** 0.088*** 0.090***  
Positive (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)  
              
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 9+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.012** 0.010* 0.008 0.01 0.01 0.015* 0.017** 0.017** 0.014* 0.014* 26,974 
Positive (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)  
              
True- 0.022* 0.042** 0.049** 0.047** 0.048** 0.068*** 0.062*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.084*** 0.078*** 0.078***  
Positive (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)  
              
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 12+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.011*** 0.013** 0.011* 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.01 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.009 23,054 
Positive (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)  
              
True- 0.019 0.042** 0.050** 0.048** 0.045* 0.059** 0.050** 0.059** 0.057** 0.070** 0.064** 0.063**  
Positive (0.010) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022)  
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(Robust standard errors) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01   
All regressions also control for age, race/ethnicity, reason for Medicaid eligibility, capitation, whether plan is comprehensive. 
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Table 3-6  Baseline regression estimates for the commercially insured population restricted to first observed mammogram 
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 6+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.009*** 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.036*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.046*** 0.048*** 0.049*** 150,012 
Positive (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
             
True- 0.040*** 0.083*** 0.105*** 0.137*** 0.162*** 0.176*** 0.193*** 0.203*** 0.206*** 0.209*** 0.211***  
Positive (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)  
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 9+ months after index mammogram  
             
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.010*** 0.018*** 0.024*** 0.030*** 0.034*** 0.039*** 0.044*** 0.047*** 0.052*** 0.056*** 0.058*** 85,200 
Positive (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  
             
True- 0.038*** 0.082*** 0.106*** 0.144*** 0.163*** 0.175*** 0.193*** 0.203*** 0.208*** 0.214*** 0.216***  
Positive (0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)  
             
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 11+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.008*** 0.017*** 0.022*** 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.038*** 0.042*** 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.054*** 0.059*** 32,473 
Positive (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)  
             
True- 0.040** 0.085*** 0.105*** 0.120*** 0.135*** 0.149*** 0.174*** 0.189*** 0.193*** 0.203*** 0.208***  
Positive (0.014) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029)  
             
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 6+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.010*** 0.017*** 0.023*** 0.027*** 0.032*** 0.037*** 0.041*** 0.045*** 0.048*** 0.051*** 0.054*** 302,366 
Positive (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
             
True- 0.038*** 0.070*** 0.092*** 0.117*** 0.132*** 0.146*** 0.160*** 0.168*** 0.176*** 0.180*** 0.189***  
Positive (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)  
             
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 9+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.010*** 0.017*** 0.023*** 0.028*** 0.033*** 0.038*** 0.043*** 0.047*** 0.051*** 0.055*** 0.058*** 232,285 
Positive (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
             
True- 0.036*** 0.067*** 0.088*** 0.113*** 0.126*** 0.138*** 0.153*** 0.160*** 0.170*** 0.176*** 0.185***  
Positive (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  
             
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 11+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.010*** 0.016*** 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.038*** 0.042*** 0.046*** 0.049*** 0.054*** 0.059*** 176,953 
Positive (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
             
True- 0.034*** 0.062*** 0.083*** 0.102*** 0.113*** 0.125*** 0.140*** 0.147*** 0.158*** 0.163*** 0.175***  
Positive (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)  
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(Robust standard errors) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
All regressions also control for age, insurance plan type, and location of residence. 
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Table 3-7  Regression estimates for the Medicaid population by the number of false-positives 
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 6+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.005* 0.006* 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.009* 0.012** 0.015** 0.017*** 0.014** 0.015** 44,826 
Positive 
(1st) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
 
              
False- -0.011*** 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.009 0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 -0.009 -0.012 -0.004  
Positive 
(2+) (0.003) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) 
 
              
True- 0.021** 0.030** 0.044*** 0.050*** 0.069*** 0.093*** 0.094*** 0.097*** 0.099*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.107***  
Positive (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)  
              
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 9+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.006* 0.007* 0.007 0.008* 0.008 0.009* 0.011* 0.014** 0.017** 0.019*** 0.016** 0.016** 37,744 
Positive 
(1st) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
              
False- -0.014*** 0.002 0.004 0.011 0.011 0.007 0.002 0 -0.002 -0.006 -0.01 -0.001  
Positive 
(2+) (0.001) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
 
              
True- 0.022** 0.034** 0.045*** 0.053*** 0.069*** 0.090*** 0.092*** 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.103***  
Positive (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)  
              
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 12+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.007** 0.008* 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.012* 0.014* 0.016** 0.012 0.012 31,478 
Positive 
(1st) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
              
False- -0.014*** 0.004 0.009 0.018 0.016 0.01 0.005 0.005 0.003 -0.006 -0.009 0.002  
Positive 
(2+) (0.001) (0.011) (0.014) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) 
 
              
True- 0.019* 0.032** 0.045*** 0.054*** 0.069*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.095*** 0.094*** 0.094***  
Positive (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020)  
              
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 6+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.007*** 0.008** 0.007* 0.008* 0.008* 0.010* 0.011** 0.014** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 53,207 
Positive 
(1st) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
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False- -0.009* 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.001 -0.005 -0.008 -0.01 -0.015 -0.018 -0.012 
 
Positive 
(2+) (0.004) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
 
              
True- 0.021** 0.034*** 0.047*** 0.050*** 0.062*** 0.083*** 0.081*** 0.087*** 0.089*** 0.099*** 0.097*** 0.099***  
Positive (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)  
              
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 9+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010** 0.010** 0.009* 0.011* 0.011* 0.015** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.017** 0.018*** 45,187 
Positive 
(1st) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
 
              
False- -0.011** 0.003 0.004 0.009 0.008 0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.008 -0.013 -0.017 -0.009  
Positive 
(2+) (0.004) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
 
              
True- 0.022** 0.036*** 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.062*** 0.081*** 0.079*** 0.085*** 0.087*** 0.097*** 0.094*** 0.093***  
Positive (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)  
              
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 12+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.009*** 0.010** 0.009* 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.012* 0.014** 0.015** 0.012* 0.013* 38,160 
Positive 
(1st) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
              
False- -0.011* 0.005 0.009 0.017 0.014 0.006 0 0 -0.002 -0.012 -0.016 -0.005  
Positive 
(2+) (0.004) (0.012) (0.014) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) 
 
              
True- 0.019* 0.035*** 0.049*** 0.054*** 0.062*** 0.078*** 0.075*** 0.080*** 0.079*** 0.088*** 0.085*** 0.083***  
Positive (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)  
(Robust standard errors clustered by individual) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
All regressions also control for age, race/ethnicity, reason for Medicaid eligibility, capitation, whether plan is comprehensive. 
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Table 3-8  Regression estimates for the commercially insured population by the number of false-positives 
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 6+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.009*** 0.016*** 0.021*** 0.025*** 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.036*** 0.039*** 0.042*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 251,127 
Positive 
(1st) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
             
False- 0.012** 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.028*** 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.041*** 0.050*** 0.052*** 0.054*** 0.054***  
Positive 
(2+) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
 
             
True- 0.042*** 0.084*** 0.111*** 0.142*** 0.164*** 0.177*** 0.190*** 0.197*** 0.202*** 0.207*** 0.209***  
Positive (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)  
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 9+ months after index mammogram  
             
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.009*** 0.017*** 0.023*** 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.054*** 123,254 
Positive 
(1st) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
             
False- 0.009 0.018 0.031* 0.031* 0.040** 0.039** 0.043** 0.047** 0.052** 0.056*** 0.056***  
Positive 
(2+) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
 
             
True- 0.047*** 0.088*** 0.116*** 0.148*** 0.164*** 0.176*** 0.192*** 0.200*** 0.209*** 0.219*** 0.222***  
Positive (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)  
             
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 11+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.009*** 0.017*** 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.033*** 0.037*** 0.042*** 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.055*** 0.060*** 39,577 
Positive 
(1st) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 
             
False- -0.001* 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.064 0.064 0.097 0.096 0.096 0.095 0.095  
Positive 
(2+) (0.000) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.045) (0.045) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
 
             
True- 0.046*** 0.097*** 0.114*** 0.126*** 0.142*** 0.155*** 0.175*** 0.188*** 0.196*** 0.204*** 0.208***  
Positive (0.014) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027)  
             
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 6+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.009*** 0.016*** 0.022*** 0.026*** 0.030*** 0.035*** 0.039*** 0.042*** 0.045*** 0.048*** 0.050*** 403,749 
Positive 
(1st) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
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False- 0.011** 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.028*** 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.041*** 0.049*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.053***  
Positive 
(2+) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
 
             
True- 0.039*** 0.073*** 0.097*** 0.123*** 0.139*** 0.151*** 0.164*** 0.171*** 0.179*** 0.184*** 0.192***  
Positive (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  
             
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 9+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.009*** 0.017*** 0.022*** 0.027*** 0.032*** 0.037*** 0.041*** 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.053*** 0.057*** 270,423 
Positive 
(1st) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
             
False- 0.009 0.017 0.031* 0.030* 0.039** 0.039** 0.043** 0.047** 0.051** 0.055*** 0.055***  
Positive 
(2+) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
 
             
True- 0.039*** 0.070*** 0.094*** 0.118*** 0.130*** 0.142*** 0.156*** 0.163*** 0.174*** 0.181*** 0.190***  
Positive (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 11+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.010*** 0.016*** 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.038*** 0.042*** 0.046*** 0.049*** 0.054*** 0.059*** 184,066 
Positive 
(1st) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
             
False- -0.001*** 0.032 0.031 0.031 0.063 0.063 0.096 0.095 0.095 0.094 0.093  
Positive 
(2+) (0.000) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.046) (0.046) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
 
             
True- 0.035*** 0.065*** 0.085*** 0.104*** 0.115*** 0.126*** 0.141*** 0.148*** 0.159*** 0.165*** 0.175***  
Positive (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)  
(Robust standard errors clustered by individual) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
All regressions also control for age, insurance plan type, and location of residence. 
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Table 3-9  Regression estimates for the Medicaid population by use of biopsy 
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 6+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- -0.001 0.017 0.014 0.012 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.009 0.019 0.012 0.006 0.003 44,826 
Positive  (0.008) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)  
(B) 
             
 
False- 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.009* 0.011* 0.013** 0.015** 0.013* 0.014**  
Positive  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  
(NB) 
             
 
True- 0.021** 0.030** 0.044*** 0.050*** 0.069*** 0.093*** 0.094*** 0.097*** 0.099*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.107***  
Positive (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)  
              
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 9+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- -0.004 0.01 0.008 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.01 0.022 0.013 0.006 0.003 37,744 
Positive  (0.007) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)  
(B) 
             
 
False- 0.005* 0.007* 0.006 0.008* 0.008* 0.009* 0.010* 0.014** 0.015** 0.018** 0.014** 0.016**  
Positive  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)  
(NB) 
             
 
True- 0.022** 0.034** 0.045*** 0.053*** 0.069*** 0.090*** 0.092*** 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.103***  
Positive (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)  
              
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 12+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- -0.003 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.004 0.005 0.014 0.011 0.014 0.005 -0.003 -0.007 31,478 
Positive  (0.009) (0.015) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)  
(B) 
             
 
False- 0.006* 0.007* 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.011* 0.013* 0.015* 0.011 0.012  
Positive  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  
(NB) 
             
 
True- 0.019* 0.032** 0.045*** 0.054*** 0.069*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.095*** 0.094*** 0.094***  
Positive (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020)  
              
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 6+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.002 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.011 0.011 0.016 0.015 0.021 0.013 0.014 0.017 53,207 
Positive  (0.008) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)  
(B) 
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False- 0.006** 0.007** 0.007* 0.008* 0.007* 0.009* 0.009* 0.013** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.014** 0.015**  
Positive  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  
(NB) 
             
 
True- 0.021** 0.034*** 0.047*** 0.050*** 0.062*** 0.083*** 0.081*** 0.087*** 0.089*** 0.099*** 0.097*** 0.099***  
Positive (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)  
              
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 9+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.001 0.014 0.013 0.009 0.006 0.007 0.015 0.014 0.022 0.013 0.014 0.017 45,187 
Positive  (0.009) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)  
(B) 
             
 
False- 0.008*** 0.009** 0.009** 0.010** 0.009* 0.010* 0.010* 0.014** 0.016** 0.017*** 0.015** 0.016**  
Positive  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  
(NB) 
             
 
True- 0.022** 0.036*** 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.062*** 0.081*** 0.079*** 0.085*** 0.087*** 0.097*** 0.094*** 0.093***  
Positive (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)  
              
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 12+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.003 0.014 0.014 0.011 0.009 0.012 0.021 0.017 0.016 0.006 0.008 0.011 38,160 
Positive  (0.010) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025)  
(B) 
             
 
False- 0.008*** 0.009** 0.008* 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.011* 0.013* 0.014* 0.011 0.012*  
Positive  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  
(NB) 
             
 
True- 0.019* 0.035*** 0.049*** 0.054*** 0.062*** 0.078*** 0.075*** 0.080*** 0.079*** 0.088*** 0.085*** 0.083***  
Positive (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)  
(Robust standard errors clustered by individual) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
All regressions also control for age, race/ethnicity, reason for Medicaid eligibility, capitation, whether plan is comprehensive. 
(B) biopsy (NB) no biopsy  
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Table 3-10  Regression estimates for the commercially insured population by use of biopsy 
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 6+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.031*** 0.055*** 0.065*** 0.073*** 0.081*** 0.086*** 0.091*** 0.097*** 0.105*** 0.108*** 0.112*** 251,127 
Positive 
(B) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
 
             
False- 0.007*** 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.029*** 0.033*** 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.041***  
Positive 
(NB) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
             
True- 0.042*** 0.084*** 0.111*** 0.142*** 0.164*** 0.177*** 0.190*** 0.197*** 0.202*** 0.207*** 0.209***  
Positive (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)  
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 9+ months after index mammogram  
             
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.032*** 0.053*** 0.061*** 0.072*** 0.080*** 0.083*** 0.087*** 0.097*** 0.111*** 0.117*** 0.124*** 123,254 
Positive 
(B) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
             
False- 0.007*** 0.015*** 0.020*** 0.024*** 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.037*** 0.040*** 0.044*** 0.048*** 0.049***  
Positive 
(NB) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
             
True- 0.047*** 0.088*** 0.116*** 0.148*** 0.164*** 0.176*** 0.192*** 0.200*** 0.209*** 0.219*** 0.222***  
Positive (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)  
             
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 11+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.009 0.013 0.022* 0.042** 0.061*** 0.066*** 0.070*** 0.084*** 0.104*** 0.113*** 0.137*** 39,577 
Positive 
(B) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.014) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025) 
 
             
False- 0.009*** 0.017*** 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.046*** 0.052*** 0.055***  
Positive 
(NB) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
 
             
True- 0.046*** 0.097*** 0.114*** 0.126*** 0.142*** 0.155*** 0.175*** 0.188*** 0.196*** 0.204*** 0.208***  
Positive (0.014) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027)  
             
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 6+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.034*** 0.059*** 0.069*** 0.077*** 0.088*** 0.095*** 0.101*** 0.110*** 0.116*** 0.121*** 0.125*** 403,749 
Positive 
(B) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
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False- 0.008*** 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.031*** 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.045***  
Positive 
(NB) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
             
True- 0.039*** 0.073*** 0.097*** 0.123*** 0.139*** 0.151*** 0.164*** 0.171*** 0.179*** 0.184*** 0.192***  
Positive (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  
             
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 9+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.036*** 0.060*** 0.070*** 0.079*** 0.089*** 0.096*** 0.101*** 0.114*** 0.122*** 0.129*** 0.135*** 270,423 
Positive 
(B) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
 
             
False- 0.008*** 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.024*** 0.028*** 0.033*** 0.037*** 0.040*** 0.044*** 0.048*** 0.051***  
Positive 
(NB) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
             
True- 0.039*** 0.070*** 0.094*** 0.118*** 0.130*** 0.142*** 0.156*** 0.163*** 0.174*** 0.181*** 0.190***  
Positive (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  
             
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 11+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.033*** 0.054*** 0.065*** 0.076*** 0.089*** 0.098*** 0.104*** 0.119*** 0.126*** 0.133*** 0.143*** 184,066 
Positive 
(B) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
 
             
False- 0.008*** 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.025*** 0.029*** 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.041*** 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.053***  
Positive 
(NB) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
             
True- 0.035*** 0.065*** 0.085*** 0.104*** 0.115*** 0.126*** 0.141*** 0.148*** 0.159*** 0.165*** 0.175***  
Positive (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)  
(Robust standard errors clustered by individual) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
All regressions also control for age, insurance plan type, and location of residence. 
(B) biopsy (NB) no biopsy 
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Table 3-11  Regression estimates for the Medicaid population by length of follow-up (1 week) 
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 6+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.004 0.006* 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.009* 0.012* 0.014** 0.011* 0.012* 44,826 
Positive 
(≥1 
week) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
 
              
False- 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.011 0.014 0.025 0.029* 0.026 0.027 0.028  
Positive 
(<1 
week) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
 
              
True- 0.021** 0.030** 0.044*** 0.050*** 0.069*** 0.093*** 0.094*** 0.097*** 0.099*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.107***  
Positive (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)  
              
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 9+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.005* 0.008* 0.007 0.008* 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.011* 0.013* 0.015** 0.011* 0.012* 37,744 
Positive 
(≥1 
week) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
              
False- 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.013 0.019 0.033* 0.038* 0.034* 0.036* 0.037*  
Positive 
(<1 
week) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
 
              
True- 0.022** 0.034** 0.045*** 0.053*** 0.069*** 0.090*** 0.092*** 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.103***  
Positive (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)  
              
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 12+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.006* 0.009* 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.01 0.012* 0.013* 0.009 0.01 31,478 
Positive 
(≥1 
week) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
 
              
False- 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.007 0.021 0.026 0.021 0.018 0.021  
Positive 
(<1 
week) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
 
              
True- 0.019* 0.032** 0.045*** 0.054*** 0.069*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.095*** 0.094*** 0.094***  
Positive (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020)  
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 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 6+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.006** 0.008** 0.007* 0.008* 0.008* 0.009* 0.009* 0.011* 0.014** 0.015** 0.012* 0.014** 53,207 
Positive 
(≥1 
week) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
 
              
False- 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.012 0.014 0.025 0.028* 0.027* 0.028* 0.029*  
Positive 
(<1 
week) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
              
True- 0.021** 0.034*** 0.047*** 0.050*** 0.062*** 0.083*** 0.081*** 0.087*** 0.089*** 0.099*** 0.097*** 0.099***  
Positive (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)  
              
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 9+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.008** 0.010** 0.009** 0.010** 0.009* 0.009* 0.009* 0.011* 0.013** 0.015** 0.011* 0.013* 45,187 
Positive 
(≥1 week) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
 
              
False- 0.006 0.007 0.01 0.012 0.013 0.019 0.022 0.037* 0.042** 0.040* 0.042** 0.043**  
Positive 
(<1 
week) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
 
              
True- 0.022** 0.036*** 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.062*** 0.081*** 0.079*** 0.085*** 0.087*** 0.097*** 0.094*** 0.093***  
Positive (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)  
              
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 12+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.008** 0.010** 0.009* 0.008* 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.01 0.012* 0.012* 0.009 0.01 38,160 
Positive 
(≥1 week) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
 
              
False- 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.011 0.025 0.03 0.028 0.026 0.028  
Positive 
(<1 
week) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
 
              
True- 0.019* 0.035*** 0.049*** 0.054*** 0.062*** 0.078*** 0.075*** 0.080*** 0.079*** 0.088*** 0.085*** 0.083***  
Positive (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)  
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(Robust standard errors clustered by individual) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
All regressions also control for age, race/ethnicity, reason for Medicaid eligibility, capitation, whether plan is comprehensive. 
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Table 3-12  Regression estimates for the commercially insured population by length of follow-up (1 week) 
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 6+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.010*** 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.036*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.046*** 0.048*** 0.049*** 251,177 
Positive  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
(≥1 week) 
            
 
False- 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.025***  
Positive  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  
(<1 week) 
            
 
True- 0.042*** 0.083*** 0.110*** 0.141*** 0.163*** 0.176*** 0.189*** 0.196*** 0.201*** 0.206*** 0.208***  
Positive (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 9+ months after index mammogram  
             
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.010*** 0.019*** 0.025*** 0.029*** 0.034*** 0.039*** 0.043*** 0.048*** 0.053*** 0.057*** 0.059*** 123,280 
Positive  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  
(≥1 week) 
            
 
False- 0.005** 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.028*** 0.031*** 0.031***  
Positive  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  
(<1 week) 
            
 
True- 0.047*** 0.088*** 0.116*** 0.148*** 0.164*** 0.175*** 0.191*** 0.199*** 0.208*** 0.218*** 0.221***  
Positive (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)  
             
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 11+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.010*** 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.030*** 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.052*** 0.059*** 0.064*** 39,579 
Positive  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)  
(≥1 week) 
            
 
False- 0.004 0.012* 0.017** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.042*** 0.042***  
Positive  (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)  
(<1 week) 
            
 
True- 0.046*** 0.096*** 0.113*** 0.125*** 0.141*** 0.154*** 0.174*** 0.186*** 0.194*** 0.202*** 0.206***  
Positive (0.014) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)  
             
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 6+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.010*** 0.018*** 0.024*** 0.029*** 0.033*** 0.039*** 0.043*** 0.046*** 0.049*** 0.052*** 0.055*** 403,851 
Positive  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
(≥1 week) 
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(Robust standard errors clustered by individual) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
All regressions also control for age, insurance plan type, and location of residence. 
  
False- 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.029***  
Positive  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
(<1 week) 
            
 
True- 0.039*** 0.073*** 0.097*** 0.122*** 0.138*** 0.150*** 0.163*** 0.171*** 0.179*** 0.184*** 0.191***  
Positive (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  
             
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 9+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.010*** 0.019*** 0.025*** 0.030*** 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.053*** 0.058*** 0.061*** 270,500 
Positive  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
(≥1 week) 
            
 
False- 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.028*** 0.031*** 0.033***  
Positive  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  
(<1 week) 
            
 
True- 0.039*** 0.070*** 0.093*** 0.118*** 0.130*** 0.141*** 0.156*** 0.163*** 0.174*** 0.180*** 0.190***  
Positive (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  
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Table 3-13  Regression estimates for the Medicaid population by length of follow-up (1 month) 
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 6+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.002 44,826 
Positive  (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)  
(≥1 
month) 
             
 
False- 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.011* 0.012* 0.015** 0.018** 0.020*** 0.018** 0.020**  
Positive  (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  
(<1 
month) 
             
 
True- 0.021** 0.030** 0.044*** 0.050*** 0.069*** 0.093*** 0.094*** 0.097*** 0.099*** 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.107***  
Positive (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)  
              
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 9+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.002 37,744 
Positive  (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)  
(≥1 
month) 
             
 
False- 0.006* 0.009* 0.007 0.010* 0.011* 0.012* 0.014* 0.017** 0.021** 0.023*** 0.020** 0.023**  
Positive  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)  
(<1 
month) 
             
 
True- 0.022** 0.034** 0.045*** 0.053*** 0.069*** 0.090*** 0.092*** 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.104*** 0.103*** 0.103***  
Positive (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)  
              
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 12+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.001 31,478 
Positive  (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)  
(≥1 
month) 
             
 
False- 0.007* 0.009* 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.01 0.013 0.017* 0.018* 0.014 0.017*  
Positive  (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)  
(<1 
month) 
             
 
True- 0.019* 0.032** 0.045*** 0.054*** 0.069*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.095*** 0.094*** 0.094***  
Positive (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020)  
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(Robust standard errors clustered by individual) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
All regressions also control for age, race/ethnicity, reason for Medicaid eligibility, capitation, whether plan is comprehensive. 
 
  
Enrolled- 9+ months before and 6+ months after index mammogram 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.004 53,207 
Positive  (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)  
(≥1 
month) 
             
 
False- 0.007** 0.008** 0.007 0.010* 0.009* 0.013** 0.014** 0.017** 0.021*** 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.022***  
Positive  (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  
(<1 
month) 
             
 
True- 0.021** 0.034*** 0.047*** 0.050*** 0.062*** 0.083*** 0.081*** 0.087*** 0.089*** 0.099*** 0.097*** 0.099***  
Positive (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)  
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 9+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.003 -0.001 0.003 45,187 
Positive  (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  
(≥1 
month) 
             
 
False- 0.008** 0.011** 0.010* 0.013** 0.012* 0.015** 0.016** 0.019** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.024***  
Positive  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)  
(<1 
month) 
             
 
True- 0.022** 0.036*** 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.062*** 0.081*** 0.079*** 0.085*** 0.087*** 0.097*** 0.094*** 0.093***  
Positive (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)  
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 12+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.001 0.004 38,160 
Positive  (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)  
(≥1 
month) 
             
 
False- 0.009** 0.011** 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.01 0.014* 0.018** 0.019** 0.017* 0.017*  
Positive  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)  
(<1 
month) 
             
 
True- 0.019* 0.035*** 0.049*** 0.054*** 0.062*** 0.078*** 0.075*** 0.080*** 0.079*** 0.088*** 0.085*** 0.083***  
Positive (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)  
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Table 3-14  Regression estimates for the commercially insured population by length of follow-up (1 month) 
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 6+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.014*** 0.032*** 0.041*** 0.048*** 0.054*** 0.059*** 0.062*** 0.066*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 251,177 
Positive  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  
(≥1 
month) 
            
 
False- 0.007*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.026*** 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.037*** 0.038***  
Positive  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
(<1 
month) 
            
 
True- 0.042*** 0.083*** 0.110*** 0.141*** 0.163*** 0.176*** 0.189*** 0.196*** 0.201*** 0.206*** 0.208***  
Positive (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)  
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 9+ months after index mammogram  
             
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.013*** 0.031*** 0.041*** 0.048*** 0.055*** 0.060*** 0.064*** 0.070*** 0.076*** 0.079*** 0.082*** 123,280 
Positive  (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  
(≥1 
month) 
            
 
False- 0.008*** 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.029*** 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.042*** 0.046*** 0.048***  
Positive  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
(<1 
month) 
            
 
True- 0.047*** 0.088*** 0.116*** 0.148*** 0.164*** 0.175*** 0.191*** 0.199*** 0.208*** 0.218*** 0.221***  
Positive (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)  
             
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 11+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.014** 0.024*** 0.032*** 0.045*** 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.057*** 0.059*** 0.061*** 0.069*** 39,579 
Positive  (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)  
(≥1 
month) 
            
 
False- 0.007*** 0.015*** 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.029*** 0.034*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.047*** 0.054*** 0.058***  
Positive  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)  
(<1 
month) 
            
 
True- 0.046*** 0.096*** 0.113*** 0.125*** 0.141*** 0.154*** 0.174*** 0.186*** 0.194*** 0.202*** 0.206***  
Positive (0.014) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)  
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 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 6+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.015*** 0.032*** 0.041*** 0.049*** 0.056*** 0.062*** 0.066*** 0.070*** 0.073*** 0.076*** 0.080*** 403,851 
Positive  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  
(≥1 
month) 
            
 
False- 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.024*** 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.041*** 0.043***  
Positive  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
(<1 
month) 
            
 
True- 0.039*** 0.073*** 0.097*** 0.122*** 0.138*** 0.150*** 0.163*** 0.171*** 0.179*** 0.184*** 0.191***  
Positive (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 9+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.014*** 0.031*** 0.041*** 0.050*** 0.057*** 0.063*** 0.067*** 0.072*** 0.076*** 0.081*** 0.086*** 270,500 
Positive  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  
(≥1 
month) 
            
 
False- 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.025*** 0.030*** 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.042*** 0.046*** 0.049***  
Positive  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
(<1 
month) 
            
 
True- 0.039*** 0.070*** 0.093*** 0.118*** 0.130*** 0.141*** 0.156*** 0.163*** 0.174*** 0.180*** 0.190***  
Positive (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 11+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.016*** 0.030*** 0.040*** 0.051*** 0.057*** 0.064*** 0.068*** 0.070*** 0.074*** 0.078*** 0.085*** 184,121 
Positive  (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  
(≥1 
month) 
            
 
False- 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.026*** 0.031*** 0.035*** 0.039*** 0.043*** 0.048*** 0.052***  
Positive  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
(<1 
month) 
            
 
True- 0.035*** 0.064*** 0.085*** 0.104*** 0.115*** 0.126*** 0.141*** 0.148*** 0.159*** 0.164*** 0.175***  
Positive (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)  
(Robust standard errors clustered by individual) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
All regressions also control for age, insurance plan type, and location of residence.
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Table 3-15  Cost and number of fills estimates for the Medicaid population 
 Continuously enrolled 12+ months before 
 Fills Costs 
 6 months 9 months 12 months  6 months 9 months 12 months  
False- 0.003 -0.036 0.102 -8.090* -7.084 -3.385 
Positive (0.105) (0.125) (0.153) (3.965) (5.277) (6.159) 
       
True- -0.254 0.051 0.429 -9.789 -5.868 0.954 
Positive (0.141) (0.214) (0.314) (7.307) (10.085) (14.524) 
       
N 3,654 4,094 4,229 3,654 4,094 4,229 
       
 Continuously enrolled 9+ months before 
 Fills Costs 
 6 months 9 months 12 months  6 months 9 months 12 months  
False- 0.067 0.015 0.153 -4.481 -3.26 -2.1 
Positive (0.090) (0.110) (0.135) (4.099) (5.363) (5.462) 
       
True- -0.072 0.185 0.464 -8.425 -7.383 -1.823 
Positive (0.157) (0.225) (0.296) (6.711) (8.838) (12.027) 
       
N 4,784 5,371 5,568 4,784 5,371 5,568 
(Robust standard errors clustered by individual) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
All regressions also control for age, race/ethnicity, reason for Medicaid eligibility, capitation, whether plan is comprehensive. 
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Table 3-16  Cost and number of fills estimates for the commercially insured population 
 Continuously enrolled 12+ months before 
 Fills Costs 
 6 months 9 months 11 months  6 months 9 months 11 months  
False- 0.022 0.089 -0.162 4.745 20.619 19.099 
Positive (0.084) (0.147) (0.291) (7.103) (11.299) (21.858) 
       
True- 0.428** 0.673* 0.736 -3.64 27.028 48.139 
Positive (0.137) (0.278) (0.545) (9.835) (19.862) (44.969) 
       
N 1,740 1,205 452 1,740 1.205 452 
       
 Continuously enrolled 9+ months before 
 Fills Costs 
 6 months 9 months 11 months  6 months 9 months 11 months  
False- 0.031 0.132 0.135 3.47 15.849* 17.182 
Positive (0.061) (0.093) (0.114) (5.355) (7.493) (9.671) 
       
True- 0.488*** 0.657*** 0.790*** 2.426 28.005* 42.348** 
Positive (0.103) (0.166) (0.209) (7.513) (12.119) (16.052) 
       
N 3,026 2,828 2,309 3,026 2,828 2,309 
(Robust standard errors clustered by individual) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
All regressions also control for age, insurance plan type, and location of residence. 
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Appendix Tables 
 
Table A-3-1 Location summary statistics for the commercially insured population 
  Enrolled 6 months post Enrolled 9 months post Enrolled 12 months post 
Location 
True 
Negative 
True 
Positive 
False 
Positive 
True 
Negative 
True 
Positive 
False 
Positive 
True 
Negative 
True 
Positive 
False 
Positive 
          
Connecticut 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) 
          
Maine 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0) (0.03) (0.04) 
          
Massachusetts 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) 
          
New Hampshire 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0) (0.06) (0.06) 
          
Rhode Island 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0) (0.03) (0.04) 
          
Vermont 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0) (0.03) (0.03) 
          
New Jersey 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.14) (0.12) 
          
New York 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) 
          
Pennsylvania 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.12) (0.15) (0.14) 
          
Illinois 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.2) (0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.2) (0.19) 
          
Indiana 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.14) (0.17) (0.17) 
          
Michigan 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.14 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.34) (0.33) (0.35) (0.35) (0.34) (0.33) (0.35) 
          
Ohio 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.25) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.26) (0.23) (0.22) 
          
Wisconsin 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.09) (0.08) 
          
Iowa 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) 
          
Kansas 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) 
          
Minnesota 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) 
          
Missouri 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.17) 
          
Nebraska 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0) (0.03) (0.04) 
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  Enrolled 6 months post Enrolled 9 months post Enrolled 12 months post 
Location 
True 
Negative 
True 
Positive 
False 
Positive 
True 
Negative 
True 
Positive 
False 
Positive 
True 
Negative 
True 
Positive 
False 
Positive 
North Dakota 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0) (0.02) (0.02) 
          
South Dakota 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0) (0.03) (0.03) 
          
Washington, DC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0) (0.01) (0.01) 
          
Delaware 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
          
Florida 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.21) (0.18) (0.18) (0.13) (0.2) (0.18) 
          
Georgia 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.10 
 (0.3) (0.3) (0.33) (0.31) (0.3) (0.3) (0.34) (0.31) (0.3) 
          
Maryland 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.1) (0.1) (0.09) (0.11) (0.1) (0.1) (0.11) (0.1) (0.09) 
          
North Carolina 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) 
          
South Carolina 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.1) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.1) (0.09) 
          
Virginia 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.12) (0.1) 
          
West Virginia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) 
          
Alabama 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.1) (0.1) (0.08) (0.09) (0.1) (0.1) (0.08) (0.09) (0.1) 
          
Kentucky 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.11) (0.11) 
          
Mississippi 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) 
          
Tennessee 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.07 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.21) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.19) (0.24) (0.25) 
Arkansas 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.1) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.1) (0.08) 
          
Louisiana 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.1) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.1) (0.11) (0.11) 
          
Oklahoma 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
          
Texas 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.06 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.21) (0.25) (0.23) (0.23) (0.2) (0.25) (0.23) 
          
Arizona 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.1) (0.1) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.1) (0.09) 
          
Colorado 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
          
Idaho 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
          
Montana 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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  Enrolled 6 months post Enrolled 9 months post Enrolled 12 months post 
Location 
True 
Negative 
True 
Positive 
False 
Positive 
True 
Negative 
True 
Positive 
False 
Positive 
True 
Negative 
True 
Positive 
False 
Positive 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
          
Nevada 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) 
          
New Mexico 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) 
          
Utah 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.04) 
          
Wyoming 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
          
Alaska 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0) (0.03) (0.02) 
          
California 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.15 0.17 
 (0.38) (0.38) (0.4) (0.36) (0.38) (0.38) (0.4) (0.36) (0.37) 
          
Hawaii 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0) (0.01) (0.02) 
          
Oregon 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) 
          
Washington 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
          
Puerto Rico 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0) (0.02) (0.01) 
Unknown region 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) 
          
N 39,330  528  4,968  33,082  480  4,182  27,535  436  3,507  
Mean (SD) 
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Table A-3-2 Alternate medication definition regression estimates for the Medicaid population 
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 6+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0 0 0 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 88,830 
Positive (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
              
True- 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.008* 0.014** 0.012* 0.016** 0.017** 0.017** 0.017** 0.018**  
Positive (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  
              
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 9+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- <0.001 <0.001 0.001 <0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 75,715 
Positive (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
              
True- 0.001 <0.001 0.002 0.001 0.008 0.014** 0.012* 0.016** 0.018** 0.018** 0.018** 0.019**  
Positive (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  
              
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 12+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- <0.001 0.001 <0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 <0.001 63,725 
Positive (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)  
              
True- 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.008 0.014** 0.012* 0.017** 0.017** 0.017** 0.017** 0.017** 0.001  
Positive (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002)  
              
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 6+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 104,141 
Positive (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
              
True- 0.001 <0.001 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.013** 0.013** 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017** 0.017**  
Positive (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  
              
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 9+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003* 0.004* 0.003 0.004* 89,501 
Positive (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
              
True- 0.001 <0.001 0.001 <0.001 0.006 0.014** 0.013** 0.017** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018** 0.018**  
Positive (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)  
              
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 12+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N 
False- <0.001 0.001 0.001 <0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 76,197 
Positive (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
              
True- 0.001 <0.001 0.001 <0.001 0.006 0.013** 0.013** 0.017** 0.018** 0.018** 0.017** 0.017**  
Positive (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)  
(Robust standard errors clustered by individual) 
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* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
All regressions also control for age, race/ethnicity, reason for Medicaid eligibility, capitation, whether plan is comprehensive. 
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Table A-3-3 Alternate medication definition regression estimates for the commercially insured population 
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 6+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0 <0.001 0.000** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 262,110 
Positive (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
             
True- <0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003* 0.004* 0.005** 0.005** 0.006** 0.006**  
Positive (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 9+ months after index mammogram  
             
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- <0.001 <0.001 0.001* 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 128,533 
Positive (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  
             
True- <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 -0.000* 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005* 0.006* 0.006*  
Positive (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)  
             
 Enrolled- 12+ months before and 11+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002** 0.002** 0.003** 41,149 
Positive (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
             
True- <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.01 0.01  
Positive (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)  
             
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 6+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- 0.000* 0.000** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 421,099 
Positive (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
             
True- -0.000* <0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002* 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***  
Positive (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
             
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 9+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- <0.001 0.000** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 281,863 
Positive (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
             
True- <0.001 -0.000* <0.001 <0.001 0.001 0.002* 0.002* 0.003* 0.003** 0.004** 0.004**  
Positive (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
             
 Enrolled- 9+ months before and 11+ months after index mammogram  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 N 
False- <0.001 0.000* 0.000* 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 191,680 
Positive (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
             
True- <0.001 -0.000* <0.001 <0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002* 0.003* 0.004* 0.003*  
Positive (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
(Robust standard errors clustered by individual) 
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* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
All regressions also control for age, insurance plan type, and location of residence.
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Table A-3-4 Baseline regressions restricted to women with previous depression or anxiety fill 
but not in last 6 months 
 Continuously enrolled 12+ months before 
 Medicaid Commercial 
 6 months 9 months 12 months  6 months 9 months 11 months  
False- -0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.006 
Positive (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) 
       
True- 0.005 0.006 0.002 -0.006 -0.003 -0.012 
Positive (0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.014) (0.012) (0.022) 
       
N 40,926 36,211 31,271 5,909 2,981 888 
       
 Continuously enrolled 9+ months before 
 Medicaid Commercial 
 6 months 9 months 12 months  6 months 9 months 11 months  
False- <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.003 <0.001 -0.004 
Positive (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
       
True- 0.001 0.006 0.004 -0.006 <0.001 -0.004 
Positive (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) 
       
N 46,785 41,654 36,334 9,745 6,706 4,543 
(Robust standard errors clustered by individual) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
Medicaid regressions also control for age, race/ethnicity, reason for Medicaid eligibility, capitation, whether plan is comprehensive. 
Commercial regressions also control for age, insurance plan type, and location of residence. 
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Table A-3-5 Diagnosis and procedure codes 
Condition Code type Code # Source 
Screening mammogram 
  
CPT 76092 Freeman et al. (2002); Tan 
et al. (2006); Randolph et al. 
(2002) 
ICD-9 V76.12 Adams and Koch (2014); 
Randolph et al. (2002) 
        
Other mammogram 
  
CPT 76090, 76091 Freeman et al. (2002); Tan 
et al. (2006); Randolph et al. 
(2002) 
ICD-9 87.37, V76.11 Freeman et al. (2002)  
     
Breast biopsy 
  
CPT 19100, 19101, 19120 Freeman et al. (2002); Tan 
et al. (2006) 
ICD-9 85.11, 85.12, 85.20, 85.21 Freeman et al. (2002); Tan 
et al. (2006) 
        
Breast ultrasound CPT 76645 Freeman et al. (2002); Tan 
et al. (2006) 
        
Other breast radiological 
procedures 
  
CPT 76003, 76086, 76087, 76088, 
76095, 76098, 76100, 76101, 
76102, 76120, 76125, 76140, 
76150, 76350, 76355, 76360, 
76362, 76365 
Freeman et al. (2002) 
ICD-9 87.35, 87.36, 87.73, 88.85 Freeman et al. (2002) 
        
Breast cancer treatment 
  
CPT 19160, 19162, 19180, 19200, 
19220, 19240, 38740, 38745 
Warren et al. (1999); 
Cooper et al. (1999); 
Freeman et al. (2000) 
ICD-9 174.x, 233.0, V103 Warren et al. (1999); 
Cooper et al. (1999); 
Freeman et al. (2000) 
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 Chapter 4. 
Stocking up or delaying: the effects of future unemployment and uninsurance 
on preventive health care utilization
 
5.1 Introduction  
Despite evidence of its effectiveness in improving health, utilization of preventive health 
services remains suboptimal (Maciosek et al., 2006; Maciosek et al., 2010; McGlynn et al., 
2003). This set of circumstances helped in part to spur the requirement in the ACA that all health 
plans cover a variety of preventive services without cost sharing (Koh and Sebelius, 2010; 
Health and Human Services, 2012). In addition to the broad efforts to increase rates of 
preventive care utilization as part of the ACA, recent studies have also pointed to economic 
downturns as periods when preventive health services may be particularly under-utilized ( Tefft 
and Kageleiry, 2014; King et al., 2014; Lusardi et al., 2015). Despite this recent evidence, two 
issues remain unexplored. First, it is not clear how much of the effect is due to the loss of a job, 
the loss of health insurance, or the combination of the two. Second, current studies ignore 
potentially important anticipatory effects—anticipated unemployment or uninsurance may have 
very different effects than concurrent unemployment or uninsurance and ignoring the 
anticipatory effects may mask important outcomes. For example, if in anticipation individuals 
stock up on care this may mean current negative effects are overestimated while if individuals 
delay care this may mean currently estimated negative effects actually understate the problem. 
This study provides the first estimates of the effect of future unemployment and/or uninsurance 
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on preventive health utilization, showing that anticipated unemployment may lead to increased 
preventive care utilization (stocking up) while anticipated uninsurance may lead to reduced 
utilization (delaying). 
This has important policy implications, in particular in terms of how best to create policy 
to encourage preventive health care utilization during recessions and which populations may 
need to be targeted. The results suggest that if an individual is able to maintain a source of health 
insurance then the observed stocking up behavior may mean anticipated unemployment is less of 
an issue. However, policies to improve access to preventive services as well as policies to better 
guide individuals at risk of losing health insurance to affordable options for health insurance 
coverage that cover care for cancer and other chronic diseases without excessive cost sharing28 
may be particularly important during economic recessions. 
5.2 Background 
This study combines several different strands of the health economic and health services 
research literature. First, it fits in broadly with the work that has been done both on how 
unemployment and uninsurance may affect utilization as well as how cyclical variations in the 
macroeconomy may affect employment and insurance and in turn affect utilization. This study 
also fits into the literature on anticipatory effects on care utilization, specifically focusing on how 
the anticipated effects of both unemployment and uninsurance may affect preventive care 
utilization. 
At the individual level, most of the work on the effects of unemployment on health and 
health care utilization has focused on mental health, finding worse mental health and increased 
mental health care following unemployment (Hamilton et al., 1990; Dooley, Fielding, Levi, 
                                                 
28 This could include marketplace plans or Medicaid. 
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1996; Keefe et al., 2002). Some studies also find worse physical functioning in addition to worse 
mental health (Gallo et al., 1999; Burgard, Brand, and House, 2007), although certainly one of 
the difficulties in estimating the effect of unemployment on utilization and health is reverse 
causality—poor health may lead to unemployment (Riphahn, 1998; Garcia-Gomez, 2011; 
Garcia-Gomez, Jones, and Rice 2010). In part to get around this issue, many studies that examine 
the effect of unemployment on health care utilization focus more on state-level cyclical 
variations of employment to identify the effects on utilization. Given that these studies primarily 
examine the effect of cyclical variations, I focus on this set of studies in more detail in the 
subsequent set of studies. Finally, much of the effect of unemployment on health care utilization 
is likely to operate through its effect on insurance, so disentangling the two, although not often 
done, is important. 
An even greater number of studies have tried to analyze the effect of health insurance on 
both health and health care utilization. Similar to unemployment, one of the econometric 
difficulties is that worse health may lead to a lower likelihood of health insurance (Levy and 
Meltzer, 2008) or at least employer-provided health insurance (Buchmueller et al., 2005). 
Although evidence of the effect of insurance on health, especially in terms of magnitude, remains 
somewhat mixed (Levy and Meltzer, 2008; Baicker et al., 2013) there is fairly strong evidence 
that insurance leads to increased utilization including preventive care utilization (Buchmueller et 
al., 2005; Card, Dobkin, and Maestas, 2008; Finkelstein and McKnight, 2008; Finkelstein et al., 
2012; Baicker et al., 2013). 
While the aforementioned work has focused on the effect of unemployment and 
insurance on health care utilization, a related set of literature has then further focused on the 
effect of cyclical variation in the macroeconomy, particularly changes in unemployment, on both 
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health and health care utilization. A study by Ruhm (2003) finds modest increases in any 
hospitalization and any physician visit with declining unemployment (pro-cyclical effects), while 
two studies by McInerney and Mellor (2012a, 2012b) find significant increases in hospital care, 
physician and clinical services, and nursing home care as state unemployment levels rise among 
Medicare beneficiaries (counter-cyclical effects). A study by Quinn, Catalano, and Felber (2009) 
finds significant decreases in preventive dental visits when unemployment rises—further 
suggesting utilization may be pro-cyclical. Similarly, Tefft and Kageleiry (2014) find that the 
quantity of preventive services utilized appears to be pro-cyclical, using an index of services 
including mammograms, Pap tests, colorectal cancer scope exams, PSA tests, digital rectal 
exams, annual checkups, and seasonal flu vaccinations. However, one limitation with all of these 
studies is the use of state unemployment rates as the main variable of interest, which makes 
understanding the mechanism of the result difficult to interpret, particularly when trying to 
disentangle the current and anticipatory effects. Furthermore, it masks potentially important 
differences in the effects of unemployment and uninsurance.29 
Several studies have also focused specifically on the Great Recession of 2008-2009 
finding that breast and cervical cancer screening decreased significantly (King et al., 2014) as did 
screening colonoscopy among the insured (Dorn et al., 2012). Finally, using cross-national data 
Lusardi, Schneider, and Tufano (2015) find significant reductions in routine care utilization 
during the recession, with the largest declines among those who become unemployed or have the 
greatest losses in wealth as well as for individuals living in the United States. However, similar 
                                                 
29 There is also a substantial literature on cyclical variation in weight, smoking, and physical activity (see e.g. Ruhm, 2000; Charles and DeCicca, 
2008; Colman and Dave, 2014; Currie, Duque, and Garfinkel, 2014), although these are outside the main focus of this paper which is on medical 
care, and more specifically preventive care utilization. One main reason I focus on preventive rather than curative care is that preventive care is 
typically more discretionary. 
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to the aforementioned studies, these are limited by the inability to separate concurrent and 
anticipatory effects.30 
While the literature on cyclical variations in care utilization has mostly ignored 
anticipatory effects, several studies have focused on the existence of anticipatory effects more 
generally in the literature on medical care utilization. Two earlier studies find limited evidence of 
individuals stocking up in anticipation of losing health insurance. A study by Long et al. (1998) 
analyzes the effect of health insurance transitions on physician visits and inpatient admissions, 
finding little evidence that individuals who transition from being insured to uninsured utilize 
more of either type of care. The study has several limitations, though. First, the number of 
individuals who transition is low. Second, and more importantly, the measures of utilization are 
not ideal for detecting stocking up. Inpatient admissions are far less discretionary and are a poor 
candidate for stocking up, while total physician visits as opposed to preventive care or other 
more elective visits may suffer from similar problems. Finally, the study does include any 
exogenous source of uninsurance. This is a problem as I will show later, since the population 
who becomes uninsured may be low utilizers and therefore value health insurance less. The 
second study that finds limited evidence of stocking up is a working paper by Gross (2009) that 
focuses on medical utilization in the teenage population. This study takes advantage of the 
plausibly exogenous loss of health insurance in the population that turns 19 and therefore can no 
longer be on a parent’s health insurance. However, one limitation with this study is that the 
young adult population typically has low rates of medical care utilization. Therefore it may not 
be surprising that little evidence of stocking up is found. 
                                                 
30 In the case of the study by Lusardi, Schneider, and Tufano (2015), the effect is largely due to unemployment in Germany, France, and the 
United Kingdom given the national health insurance programs. However, the limitation still exists for the results for the United States, where the 
unemployment and insurance effects are not teased apart. 
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While these two earlier studies are more suggestive of myopic behavior, three more 
recent studies suggest the possibility of anticipatory behavior in medical care utilization. A 
recent working paper by Alpert (2014) finds seniors may have reduced chronic disease (but not 
acute condition) medication utilization between the time the Medicare Part D law was passed and 
when it was actually implemented, which suggests anticipatory behavior.  Another study finding 
evidence of anticipatory behavior is one by Aron-Dine et al. (2015) that examines how 
individuals that face the same “spot” price but different “future” prices have different rates of 
utilization. The difference in prices comes from comparing individuals with different join dates, 
and therefore different probabilities of reaching the plan deductible. While the current price paid 
does not differ, individuals who join the firm later in the year are less likely to meet the 
deductible, therefore face a higher “future” price, and are found to have lower initial month 
utilization. Aron-Dine et al. extend the analysis and find similar results for prescription drug 
utilization using Medicare Part D, showing anticipatory behavior appears to exist across a wide 
set of populations.  
Finally, a study by Hughes and Khaliq (2014) uses data on state unemployment rates but 
tries to focus on anticipatory effects by restricting the analyses to individuals who remain 
employed and insured. The authors use 1996-2008 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) 
data to examine the effect of state unemployment rates on counts of different types of provider 
visits (inpatient, outpatient, office-based, ER) as well as select services (sonogram, x-ray, 
mammogram, MRI and CT, or other diagnostic services). The study finds an increase in the state 
unemployment rates is associated with a significant increase in hospital outpatient and 
emergency room visits, and in mammography among women ages 50 and older. However, the 
study has several limitations including: focusing on fairly broad types of visits, largely missing 
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the Great Recession, not separating unemployment and uninsurance, and not making it clear how 
at risk the population was of becoming unemployed or uninsured by focusing solely on the 
always employed and insured population. This last point is important because the paper intends 
to focus on anticipatory effects, so knowing how likely either unemployment of uninsurance is 
for the study population is critical to understanding how to interpret the anticipatory effects. 
Building on these different strands of the literature, the current study makes several 
contributions to the literature. It is the first study to separately estimate the effect of both 
unemployment and uninsurance on utilization; and the first to focus on both in terms of 
anticipated effects. Finally, it is the first to examine anticipated effects in the time period that 
includes the Great Recession. 
5.3 Theoretical Framework 
 While most of the existing research has focused on how current unemployment or 
uninsurance may affect health or health care utilization, this paper focuses on the potential 
anticipatory effects of future unemployment or uninsurance on utilization. Anticipatory effects 
can manifest themselves in one of two forms—stocking up (i.e. increasing utilization) or 
delaying (i.e. decreasing utilization) in anticipation of unemployment or uninsurance. The effect 
of anticipated unemployment and uninsurance can both have multiple effects operating in 
opposite directions. Although the overall sign of each effect is ambiguous, they are composed of 
the following potential effects. 
Anticipated unemployment could have three potential effects. 
(1) Becoming unemployed could mean potentially becoming uninsured, the effects of 
which will be discussed shortly. However even if unemployment does not lead to 
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uninsurance (or even temporary uninsurance), it could mean switching health plans 
and therefore needing to change providers. If the current provider is well liked, an 
individual might try to stock up on care with the current provider.  
(2) The anticipated reduced future income could lead to lower current period utilization 
as preventive health care is delayed until income is higher in a future period.  
(3) Finally, if an individual anticipates potential unemployment, she may try to work 
additional hours in order to lower the likelihood of being laid off or otherwise 
becoming unemployed31. With time as an important input in the health production 
function (Grossman, 1972), this could lead to delayed care as time is more 
constrained. Similarly, if an individual thinks she is likely to become unemployed, 
she may delay care until the time of unemployment when there may be more time to 
go to an appointment, although this ignores any potential changes in the out-of-pocket 
price of care. 
 
As with anticipated unemployment, the effect of anticipated uninsurance has an 
ambiguous effect on preventive health utilization with two possible contrasting effects. 
(1) Anticipated uninsurance would mean that the future price of preventive care would be 
higher thus leading to greater current utilization (stocking up). 
(2) However, preventive care is a unique type of medical care. While care such as a flu 
vaccination may directly prevent an illness (primary prevention), more commonly 
(secondary) preventive care is used to identify a condition early on in order to treat it 
more effectively (Dekker and Sibai, 2001). For secondary prevention, subsequent 
                                                 
31 In addition to not wanting to leave work for an appointment during a period when unemployment may become more likely, an individual may 
also want to avoid utilizing care that may make her seem like a more costly employee. Certainly employment decisions cannot be made based on 
what an employee’s health care costs are but if the employee believes they are this might further discourage care. 
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treatment is how an individual is able to improve health. Individuals who believe they 
are likely to lose health insurance may be less likely to utilize secondary preventive 
health care because there is little benefit if they will be unable or less able to afford 
subsequent treatments. This may be particularly true of screening for high cost 
conditions such as cancer. 
One final possible effect is that anticipated unemployment could also mean an individual 
is more likely to have to use public health insurance32, as result of either losing employer 
provided health insurance and/or reduced income. Given that not all providers accept Medicaid 
(Decker 2012, Decker 2013), an individual might worry about having to find an alternate 
provider. In anticipation of this, she might stock up on preventive care with the current, preferred 
provider33. This also suggests that anticipating a greater likelihood of using public insurance 
might lead to greater stocking up. In addition, the possibility of public insurance may mitigate 
the delaying of preventive care because an individual would still have future treatment covered 
in the event the screening came back positive. Despite these factors leading to the possibility of 
stocking up, an individual’s out-of-pocket price is likely lower under public insurance given the 
relatively low levels of cost sharing in Medicaid (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
2013). Thus there is also potentially an incentive to delay preventive care. Therefore, a 
secondary set of analyses include measures of anticipated move from private to public insurance 
to capture these potential effects. 
                                                 
32 In addition to public insurance there are also various programs that provide free or reduced cost preventive care. For example, the National 
Breast and Cervical Cancer Early Detection Program (NBCCEDP) provides free or reduced cost mammograms and Pap tests to low income and 
uninsured or under-insured women (see http://www.cdc.gov/cancer/nbccedp/). 
33 This is admittedly a somewhat unlikely event given that physicians are likely to accept Medicaid insurance from an existing patient even if they 
are less likely to accept a new patient with Medicaid. 
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5.4 Hypotheses 
Given the numerous possible effects of anticipated unemployment or uninsurance on 
preventive health utilization, it is difficult to empirically disentangle each of the effects, so the 
empirical analyses will focus on the overall effect, which is likely a combination of multiple, 
simulataneous effects. However, there are a few predictable effects that I hypothesize are likely 
to occur. 
 First, although the sign on the future uninsurance variable is unclear, it is likely to be 
more negative (or positive and smaller in magnitude) for the cancer screenings. To the extent that 
cancer is a particularly expensive disease (Mariotto et al., 2011) and known to lead to higher 
rates of bankruptcy (Himmelstein et al., 2009), an individual may be more likely to delay if she 
expects to be uninsured in the near future when any potential treatments might be likely to occur. 
 Second, regardless of the sign on either the unemployment or uninsurance variable, the 
effect is likely larger the more likely the individual is to become unemployed or uninsured. I 
therefore predict that the magnitudes of the unemployment and uninsurance variables are likely 
to increase as I move from the baseline sample, to the sample in the 75th percentile of greater of 
predicted unemployment or uninsurance to the 90th percentile or greater. 
 Third, again regardless of the sign of the unemployment and uninsurance effects, the 
effects should be larger in magnitude during the Great Recession of 2008-2009. If the effects are 
truly a result of anticipated unemployment and uninsurance then the effects should be largest 
when the risk of both is highest, i.e. during the Great Recession. I estimate this by restricting the 
sample to the year 2007-2010 to allow for a year before and after the Great Recession. 
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5.5 Data 
 In this study I use 2000-2012 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) data, a 
nationally representative survey of the civilian, non-institutionalized population that collects 
demographic, employment, health status, health insurance, and health care utilization data. The 
survey is a two year overlapping panel design, where each individual provides five rounds of 
data over two years. In any given year of the survey, approximately half of the sample is in their 
first year of collection and half is in their second. (Cohen, Cohen, and Banthin, 2009). For nearly 
all individuals, rounds 1 and 2 are collected in the first calendar year; round 3 spans calendar 
years 1 and 2; and rounds 4 and 5 are collected in the second calendar year.  
 The survey design is particularly important in terms of understanding the creation of the 
three main sets of variables of interest in this study. Employment and insurance status are 
collected from respondents in each round. However, data on utilization of preventive health 
services are collected only in rounds 3 and 5. For most of the preventive care services (i.e. 
physical exam, blood pressure checked, cholesterol checked, flu vaccination, mammogram, Pap 
test, PSA test) I define the variable as having received the service within the past year based on 
the individual’s response in round 3 of MEPS34. To then best match anticipated unemployment35 
and uninsurance to these measures of the dependent variable, I define future 
unemployment/uninsurance as a response of being unemployed/uninsured in rounds 4 or 5. 
5.6 Methods 
 One of the important empirical difficulties in estimating the effect of future employment 
and/or uninsurance on preventive care utilization is the issue of endogeneity. Multiple studies 
                                                 
34 One note is that I will refer to rounds 1-3 as the “first year” and rounds 4-5 as the “second year” even though round 3 may straddle the two 
calendar years. However, the reference is largely due to the fact that the round 3 preventive service utilization questions refer to the past year. 
35 One note about using the term unemployment is that it should be most accurately be described as not employed, but unfortunately there is no 
MEPS variable about looking for employment so I cannot truly identify unemployment in the strict economic sense. 
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have shown that poor health or health shocks may lead to unemployment (Riphahn, 1998; 
Garcia-Gomez, 2011; Garcia-Gomez, Jones, and Rice 2010) and increase the length of the 
unemployment spell (Stewart, 2001), making it difficult to disentangle the direction of the effect 
of anticipated unemployment on preventive health care utilization. The issue exists for 
preventive care utilization, although the direction of the bias is not necessarily clear. Low 
preventive care utilization could lead to poor health outcomes and therefore a greater likelihood 
of unemployment. However, individuals in worse health or with a greater number of chronic 
conditions might use more preventive care to avoid complications but then also be more likely to 
become unemployed. A similar problem exists for the possibility of becoming uninsured. For 
individuals with employer provided health insurance, worse health leading to job loss could also 
lead to loss of health insurance (Bradley, Neumark, and Motika, 2012). However, the issue is 
further complicated by the issue of job lock, whereby individuals in worse health are may be 
more likely to remain at a job in order to maintain health insurance (Gruber and Madrian, 2002; 
Bradley, Neumark, and Barkowski, 2013). 
 While each of these mechanisms may be important, the purpose of describing them is to 
highlight the potential problem with solely using measures of future unemployment or 
uninsurance in a regression framework. To try to ameliorate these problems I use two different 
analytic techniques. The first is to use predicted unemployment and uninsurance to create a 
subsample of individuals who are most likely to become unemployed or uninsured and the 
second is to use layoffs as a more plausibly exogenous reason for becoming unemployed and/or 
uninsured. One alternative approach will also be to use the predicted values themselves in place 
of the actual unemployment and uninsurance variables, although I will discuss some of the 
drawbacks to this approach later. 
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 The general analytic approach is to estimate the effect of next period unemployment 
and/or uninsurance on the probability of utilizing various types of preventive care in the current 
period while controlling for various current period characteristics. To most accurately capture the 
effects of anticipated unemployment and uninsurance on preventive care utilization, I make 
several sample restrictions. First, I restrict the sample to individuals who have two years of 
MEPS data so that I have multiple observable periods allowing for the use of future 
unemployment and uninsurance. Then I restrict the sample to individuals between the ages of 24 
and 64. The lower age bound is similar to the one used by Colman and Dave (2015) and ensures 
that the analyses are focused on the full-time employed population rather than students; while the 
upper bound is to exclude the Medicare insured population, who would likely not become 
uninsured and may be more likely to retire and therefore have a very different set of employment 
effects.  
The next restriction is to limit the sample to individuals who are employed and insured 
their entire first year (i.e. rounds 1, 2, and 3). This restriction is to ensure that any differences in 
preventive care utilization are due to future or anticipated unemployment and uninsurance and 
not concurrent unemployment and uninsurance. I also exclude all women who are pregnant as 
their health care utilization and potential changes in employment status may be very different 
from the rest of the sample. I further exclude individuals who retire in the second period because 
this decision is likely to have very different effects than becoming unemployed.Finally, the 
sample also varies slightly depending on the specific type of preventive care. For example, the 
sample only includes women ages 40 and older when estimating models of mammogram 
utilization, women for models of Pap tests, and men ages 50 and older for models of PSA testing. 
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5.7 Econometric Model 
 Baseline regressions analyses are estimated using the following format: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑥𝑥 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1+ 𝛽𝛽4𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑇𝑇 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 
I run separate analyses for each dependent variable, Yi,t-1, which is a measure of preventive care 
utilization including: physical within the past year, blood pressure checked within the past year, 
cholesterol checked within the past year, flu vaccination within the past year, mammogram 
within the past year, Pap test within the past year, PSA test within the past year36. The dependent 
variables are all created using responses from round 3 and therefore refer to care within the 
respondent’s first year in MEPS37. The unemployed variable indicates whether the individual 
reports being unemployed in either round 4 or 5, and similarly the uninsured variable indicates 
whether the individual is uninsured in rounds 4 or 5. I therefore regress current utilization on 
future unemployment and uninsurance while controlling for various current individual level 
factors (X) as well as year fixed effects (T). Alternatively, in addition to the measure of 
uninsurance, I also include a measure of a future move from private insurance to public 
insurance, which includes any response for receiving Medicaid, Medicare, or TRICARE in the 
second year. For ease of interpretation, I run these as linear probability models.  
 The individual level factors I control for include age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, 
marital status, income, number of employees in firm, region, urban residence, self-reported 
health status, presence of physical limitations of work, smoking status, a series of risk preference 
                                                 
36 Initial models also included colonoscopy/sigmoidoscopy but the results were very inconsistent, so I drop this dependent variable. The 
variability is likely a result of the infrequency of recommended screening, i.e. every 5-10 years (Levin et al., 2008; Qaseem et al., 2012). 
37 The preventive care questions are only asked in rounds 3 and 5. Therefore responses of utilization in the past year refer, respectively, to the first 
and second year in MEPS, respectively. 
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measures38, and presence of comorbidities39 both in oneself and in one’s spouse. The risk 
preference measures are included to attempt to control for the fact that individual risk 
preferences may influence decisions to utilize preventive care, which are inherently risk-reducing 
measures rather than amelioration of any type of illness, pain, or discomfort. The measures are 
based on responses to questions about beliefs on an individual’s need for health insurance, 
whether health insurance is worth the cost, whether an individual can overcome illness without 
medical help, and whether the individual is more likely to take risk. Although the risk measures 
are included in most specifications, excluding them ultimately has little effect on any reported 
results. This may be in part due to the sample restriction that individuals must be insured for the 
entire first year thereby eliminating many of the very risk tolerant individuals. 
 In addition to the baseline model, instead of using the full sample I first predict the 
likelihood of unemployment or uninsurance and then restrict the preventive care utilization 
analyses to the individuals who are at higher risk of becoming unemployed or uninsurance, 
namely those in either the 75th percentile or greater of predicted unemployment or uninsurance. 
To get the predictions, I first estimate the probability of becoming unemployed or uninsured 
using a probit model and regressors similar to the ones used in the baseline mode as well as 
additional job-related measures including industry, occupation, hours worked, and hourly wage. 
One limitation with the MEPS data is that both the industry and occupation codes are 
significantly condensed in the publicly available data, somewhat limiting their predictive power. 
The additional measures are factors that may make an individual more or less likely to become 
unemployed or uninsured, and more importantly might help to inform an individual’s own 
                                                 
38 See Table A-4-1 for means by unemployment and uninsurance transition population. 
39 Comorbidities include cancer, diabetes, disorders of lipid metabolism (i.e. high cholesterol), cardiovascular disease, chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease (COPD), asthma, kidney disease, joint disorders, osteoporosis, anxiety disorders, or mood disorders based largely on the 
Charlson Comorbidity Index (e.g. Quan et al., 2011) along with two types of mental disorders. One difference from the standard comorbidity 
indices is that I have limited ICD-9 detail so I use the MEPS clinical classification codes. 
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assessment of her likelihood of becoming unemployed or uninsured. While I use actual future 
unemployment, uninsurance, and their cross-product in the preventive care utilization 
regressions, I restrict the sample to all individuals in in either the 75th percentile or greater of 
predicted unemployment or uninsurance. I also vary the percentile cutoff to the 90th percentile. 
Although, I go into more detail later, one reason I use this approach rather than using the 
predicted values themselves is that, especially given the industry and occupation variable 
limitations, the predictions are relatively weak. I am therefore worried about biased estimates 
with these weak “instruments” (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker, 1995). 
For the second alternate specification I define two sets of unemployed and uninsured 
variables. The first is unemployment as a result of being laid off while the second is 
unemployment for all other reasons (uninsurance is similarly defined). This approach is similar 
to the one used by Colman and Dave (2015) who use layoffs as a potentially more exogenous 
source of unemployment. 
For each of the three main sets of regressions, I run various alternate specifications. I 
estimate all analyses restricted to the population with only private health insurance for all rounds 
of the baseline period, and to the population with employer provided health insurance for all 
rounds of the baseline. Finally, I also restrict the analyses to the year 2007-2010 to specifically 
target the Great Recession of 2008-2009. 
In addition to the main analyses I run two alternate sets of regressions. The first 
sensitivity analysis is to replace actual unemployment and uninsurance with their predicted 
values from the prediction equationsThe predicted values are estimated using the same analyses 
used to create the predictions for the restricted sample analyses, where the “instruments” are 
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occupation and industry. I estimate predicted unemployment and uninsurance using both a 
logged version of the prediction as well as using an indicator for being in the 75th percentile or 
greater of the prediction distribution. Given that I am using predicted unemployment and 
uninsurance in the second stage of the model, the standard errors would be underestimated by not 
taking into account the variation from the first part of the model (Murphy and Topel, 1985; Inoue 
and Solon, 2010). However, the one difficulty with estimating the standard errors using the 
traditional approach suggested by Murphy and Topel (1985) or Inoue and Solon (2010) is the use 
of two separate first stage regressions. I therefore estimate bootstrapped standard errors using 
1000 replications, similar to one of the suggestions in Inoue and Solon (2010).  
While I include this analysis as a sensitivity analysis, the reason to not include it in the 
main set of analyses is that the “instruments” are relatively weak40. As previously mentioned, 
while the predictions are higher for those who actually become unemployed or uninsured, I am 
still unable to predict most instances of unemployment or uninsurance based on observables. 
Again, the likely main limitation is that the occupation and industry codes are condensed in the 
publicly available MEPS files, meaning larger groups of employees with varying levels of 
potential unemployment and uninsurance risk are grouped together, making these variables 
relatively weak in terms of serving as instrumental variables. In addition there is a concern about 
the excludability of the “instruments”, namely that individuals in particular industries or 
occupations may vary in their propensity to utilize preventive services based on some set of 
unobservables. This is somewhat mitigated by the inclusion of controls for education, income, 
other job related variables, and several measures of risk preferences (see Table A-4-1). 
                                                 
40 Namely what would be first stage F-statistics of typically around 3-4. 
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5.8 Results 
In this section, I first present baseline estimates using measures of actual future 
unemployment and uninsurance but then present evidence that suggests there may be 
endogeneity issues. I therefore focus most of the results and discussion on the two preferred 
analytic techniques—restricting the sample to individuals with high predicted values of 
unemployment or uninsurance and using layoffs. Table 4-1 shows summary demographic and 
socioeconomic information for the overall sample and by second year unemployment and 
uninsurance status. Overall, approximately 2 percent of the sample becomes unemployed and 3.5 
percent of the sample becomes uninsured, including nearly 1 percent of the sample becoming 
both unemployed and uninsured. Although these rates may seem low, it is largely due to the 
sample restriction that all individuals are both employed and insured for the first year. Somewhat 
surprisingly, unemployment and uninsurance are relatively uncoupled. Within the population that 
becomes unemployed about twice as many people maintain insurance as become uninsured. The 
difference is even more dramatic on the uninsurance side, where nearly five times as many 
people remain employed as become unemployed. Therefore, as will be seen, the main effects 
tend to be more significant than the interaction effects. 
Not surprisingly, the characteristics of the populations with different employment and 
insurance trajectories vary considerably. Generally, the population that remains insured but 
becomes unemployed actually looks more similar to the population that remains employed and 
insured rather than to the two populations that become uninsured. The one exception is that 
individuals that become unemployed (both those who remain insured and those who become 
uninsured) are more likely to report fair or poor health and are more likely to report limitations to 
their daily activities. Most of the observed differences are in the population that becomes 
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uninsured (both those that remain employed and those that become unemployed) who are in 
general younger, more likely non-white, lower education, less likely married, lower income, and 
more likely to smoke in the first year. 
In addition to differences in demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, there are 
important health related differences between the four different unemployment and uninsurance 
transition populations. In general, as Table 4-2 shows, the highest rates for the various health 
conditions tend to be in the population that becomes unemployed but remains insured. This is 
consistent with existing evidence that serious health conditions may make the probability of 
unemployment more likely (Garcia-Gomez, 2011; Garcia-Gomez, Jones, and Rice 2010; 
Riphahn, 1998). Although, interestingly, compared to the population that becomes unemployed 
but retains health the insurance, the population that also becomes uninsured is less likely to have 
many of the health conditions. This may be a selection issue whereby individuals who have 
serious health conditions and become unemployed have a strong incentive to find a source of 
health insurance. Alternatively, if an individual has a serious health condition and another 
possible source of health insurance, she may be more likely to leave the job and become 
unemployed at least temporarily. The final common pattern is that the population that remains 
employed but becomes uninsured has the lowest rates of most of the health conditions. This 
could be in part due to this population being the youngest, but may also be an artifact of the 
selection story whereby they have less of an incentive to find alternative sources of health 
insurance if they lose it or they may be more willing to choose another job even if it does not 
offer health insurance because they are in relatively better health. Overall, this provides some 
initial evidence that endogeneity and selection issues may be present and may bias estimates of 
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the effect of actual future unemployment and uninsurance measures on preventive care 
utilization. 
Further bolstering the argument that there may endogeneity issues, are the results for the 
mean utilization rates of the various preventive service measures. As Table 4-3 shows, typically 
the highest rates of use are the in the population that becomes unemployed but remains insured, 
while the lowest are in the population that remains employed but becomes uninsured. While this 
does not necessarily indicate an issue, the rates of going at least 5 or more years without utilizing 
the various types of preventive care are more suggestive of selection issues. As Table A-4-2 
shows, the population that becomes uninsured but remains employed is the most likely to go five 
or more years without utilizing each of the preventive care measures, with Pap test utilization 
being the sole exception. Conversely, the population that becomes unemployed but remains 
insured is the least likely to go five or more years without utilizing each of the preventive care 
measures, again with the Pap test being the sole exception. The main advantage of using this 5 
year measure is that it isolates the individuals that are particularly low utilizers, as a 5 year 
window makes utilization particularly non-proximate to any of the unemployment or 
uninsurance transitions that are observed in the data41.  
Baseline regressions 
The baseline regression estimates of the effect of future unemployment and uninsurance 
on general preventive care and cancer screening are shown, respectively, in Table 4-4 and Table 
4-5. For each table, I present estimates for the overall population in column (1), for those with 
private health insurance for the entire first year in column (2), for those with employer provided 
                                                 
41 Certainly one limitation is that I do not know about potential unemployment or uninsurance transitions in the 4 years prior to the observable 
MEPS data. An individual who becomes unemployed and/or uninsured in the MEPS data may be more likely to be previously unemployed or 
uninsured, so this may be capturing some of this effect. 
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health insurance for the entire first year in column (3), and for those are not married in column 
(4). Despite some exceptions, the general pattern of results indicates a positive coefficient on the 
unemployment term, a negative coefficient on the uninsurance term, and a somewhat mixed set 
of results for the interaction term between unemployment and uninsurance. Although this is 
potentially consistent with stocking up if an individual anticipates unemployment but does 
expect to become uninsured; and potential delaying if an individual expects to become uninsured 
it is also consistent with the aforementioned selection story demonstrated by the mean utilization 
variables in Table 4-3 and Table A-4-2. 
Adding an indicator for moving from private health insurance in the first year to public 
health insurance any time in the second year does not drastically change the coefficients on the 
unemployment or uninsurance variables as shown in Table 4-6 and Table 4-7. The coefficient on 
the term indicating a move from private to public insurance is somewhat mixed with little effect 
on a physical in the last year, blood pressure checked in the last year, or a PSA test in the last 
year. With varying degrees of statistical significance, there appear to be signs of delaying for a 
move from private to public insurance for whether an individual has cholesterol checked in the 
past year, mammogram in the past year, or a Pap test in the past year. But for flu shots, a future 
move to public insurance is associated with a significant increase in utilization. However, given 
the potential endogeneity problems, I focus more on the following results rather than the baseline 
estimates. 
Regressions restricted to 75th percentile of predicted unemployment or uninsurance 
The first set of results I focus on are those restricted to the population with a predicted 
probability of unemployment or uninsurance in the 75th percentile or above (Table 4-8 and Table 
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4-9). I make this restriction to focus on the population most likely to become unemployed or 
uninsured in order to reduce the potential endogeneity problem. Although as Table A-4-3 shows, 
there are still some remaining differences in observables between the populations who become 
unemployed and/or uninsured. Again, this is likely a limitation of my prediction model, where I 
have a limited set of observables and condensed forms of the occupation and industry variables 
with which to predict unemployment or uninsurance, while an individual likely has unobservable 
information that would help make a better prediction of her own likelihood of unemployment or 
uninsurance. In terms of predicted unemployment, for an individual that actually becomes 
unemployed I find a predicted unemployment value of 3.7% for those who become unemployed 
compared to 1.7% for those who do not become unemployed. Similarly, I find a predicted 
uninsurance value of 7.4% for those who become uninsured compared to 4.0% for those who do 
not become uninsured. Although in percentage terms, my predictions are much higher (roughly 
45-55% higher for each), the predictions are clearly far from perfect. 
For both the general preventive care utilization and cancer screening utilization results, I 
see fairly consistent patterns. The coefficient on the unemployment term tends to remain positive 
(indicating stocking up) in nearly every all regressions. While only a handful of the coefficients 
are statistically significant, many of the positive effects42 are economically large with increases 
of 0.3 to 11.4 percentage points for a physical, 2.7 to 6.0 percentage points for a blood pressure 
check, 1.9 to 6.9 percentage points for a cholesterol check, 0.9 to 4.5 percentage points for a flu 
shot, 9.1 percentage points for a mammogram, 3.3 to 9.7 percentage points for a Pap test, and 4.5 
to 19.8 percentage points for a PSA test43. Typically I find the largest effects in the subsample 
                                                 
42 Although some coefficients are negative they tend to be much fewer and smaller in magnitude. 
43 A note about the interpretation of these results is that the effects can be interpreted as the anticipated effect of actual, future unemployment 
and/or uninsurance on a higher risk population rather than the effect of the small increase in the marginal probability of becoming unemployed 
and/or uninsured on preventive care utilization. This is likely due in part to the previously mentioned issue of underestimating the true probability 
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that has employer provided health insurance throughout the first year. This is consistent with the 
theoretical explanation that employer provider coverage is likely more generous (McDevitt et al., 
2010) and therefore possibly more likely to have a well-liked provider, as well as be attached to a 
job that may be more conducive to allowing time off to receive preventive care.  
However, in terms of future uninsurance I find the opposite effect, namely evidence of 
delaying. Across nearly each regression I find the coefficient on the uninsurance in year 2 
variable to be negative, with many statistically significant or nearly so. The opposite effect seen 
here, though, is not necessarily surprising compared to the evidence of stocking up I see for the 
unemployment variable. Since most of the preventive care services are screening services of 
some type (the exception of course is the flu vaccine and potentially the physician visit), the real 
benefit is in detecting a serious condition early. However, if an individual expects to be at least 
temporarily uninsured, then treatment may have a very high out-of-pocket cost (Warren et al., 
2008) lowering the value to screening in the current period. This is further supported by the 
larger negative values for the cancer screening services compared to the general preventive care 
services, as predicted by the first hypothesis. One final uninsurance result that may seem 
surprising at first is the relatively smaller magnitude of the delaying in the population that has 
employer provided health insurance (column 3 in the tables) since this population might be 
expected to have more generous coverage and be more reactive to the possibility of losing 
coverage. However, unlike the other regressions, the cross product between unemployment and 
uninsurance is large and negative for the population with employer provided coverage. Therefore 
the variables associated with future uninsurance are both negative as would be expected. 
                                                                                                                                                             
of an individual’s unemployment or uninsurance—i.e. an individual likely has additional unobserved information that affects her own prediction. 
So an individual’s behavior in anticipation of unemployment and/or uninsurance is likely in response to larger predicted probabilities.  
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In terms of the interaction term more generally, I find noisier and typically not 
statistically significant results for the cross product of unemployment and uninsurance. Except 
for flu vaccine, the coefficients are negative, although most  are not statistically significant. The 
generally negatively signed interaction terms indicates that the negative insurance effects seems 
to outweigh the positive unemployment effect.The lack of significance may in part be due to the 
competing effects attributed to unemployment and uninsurance rendering this interaction term 
closer to zero. As the results have largely shown, the unemployment and uninsurance variables 
are differently signed so the interaction term could be including these opposing effects. 
In addition to these results, I run separate analyses with a variable indicating whether an 
individual moves from private insurance in the first year to public insurance in the second year. 
This is meant to capture the possibility that even if an individual loses employer provided 
insurance, she does not necessarily become uninsured. As shown in Table 4-10 and Table 4-11, 
including the private to public insurance indicator variables has little effect on the other 
coefficients. In terms of the private to public insurance variables themselves, none are 
statistically significant except in the flu regressions; while in terms of sign, the coefficients tend 
to be positive for physicals and mammograms but negative for cholesterol check and Pap test. 
Given the lack of statistical significance and relatively inconsistent results there is not really a 
clear picture of the effect of an anticipated move to public insurance. However, one thing to note 
is that compared to the uninsurance terms there is much less evidence of delaying, especially for 
the cancer screening regressions. This further highlights the possibility that individuals expecting 
to become uninsured may delay cancer screenings, but anticipated access to public insurance 
could help mitigate this effect.  
  
146 
 
As stated in the second hypothesis, the magnitudes of the effect should increase as we 
move to individuals with higher and higher predicted unemployment and uninsurance (i.e. the 
coefficients should be larger in the regressions restricted to those in the 75th percentile or greater 
of predicted unemployment or uninsurance compared to the baseline, and larger still in the 
regressions restricted to individuals in the 90th percentile or greater). I see this in terms of both 
the unemployment and insurance coefficients. The stocking up behavior indicated by the positive 
coefficients on the unemployment main effect variables increase in magnitude as we move from 
individuals who are less likely to become unemployed to those who are more likely. We see this 
as the coefficients appear to increase in magnitude as we move from the baseline regressions 
(Table 4-4 and Table 4-5) to those restricted to individuals in the 75th percentile or greater of 
predicted unemployment or uninsurance (Table 4-8 and Table 4-9) and finally to those restricted 
to individuals in the 90th percentile or greater (Table A-4-4 and Table A-4-5). Similarly, the 
results indicating that increased future uninsurance is associated with increased delaying of 
preventive care follow a similar pattern. If delaying is an issue, we would expect to see it 
occurring more in the individuals with the higher levels of predicted uninsurance and in 
particular individuals who are not married so they do not have an alternate source of insurance, 
which we do in Table A-4-4 and Table A-4-5. The magnitude of the negative coefficient on 
future uninsurance typically becomes larger in the analyses restricted to the 75th and then larger 
still in the analyses restricted to the 90th percentile of predicted unemployment or uninsurance, 
particularly for indivdiuals who are not married. 
Finally, as the third hypothesis states generally I find larger magnitudes in the regressions 
restricted to the Great Recession time period. Focusing on the population with employer 
provided insurance, while the magnitude of stocking up on the unemployment variables is 
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similar, the magnitude of the  delaying on the uninsurance variables are larger during the Great 
Recession time period as Table A-4-10 shows. Given the much smaller sample size, the standard 
errors are also larger but many of the effects are large enough to remain statistically significant.  
Laid off regressions 
In the regressions where I split unemployment into layoffs and non-layoffs, I find less 
evidence of stocking up with the primary evidence supporting stocking up appearing in the 
population with employer provided health insurance for physicals, blood pressure checks, 
cholesterol checks, mammograms, and Pap tests (Table 4-12 and Table 4-13). Otherwise across 
all the regressions, I typically find coefficients on the unemployed due to lay off terms that are 
smaller in magnitude, compared to the previous unemployment coefficients. 
 There are a few possible reasons why I may be seeing less evidence of stocking up in the 
laid off specifications. First, layoffs may be more likely to also include a loss of health insurance 
making stocking up less likely. In fact, I find support for this in the data where the likelihood of 
becoming uninsured is twice as high in the laid off population compared to the unemployed but 
not laid off population—49.4% compared to only 31.6%. Second, there is also the possibility that 
layoffs may be more unexpected or at least less certain of whether they will occur. While this 
helps in terms of exogeneity, the unexpected nature may mean individuals have less time to 
respond thereby leading to a response that is smaller in magnitude. Therefore, it appears the 
previous results for unemployment are largely driven by the population who becomes 
unemployed but not through layoff. 
Similarly, the previously seen delaying related to the uninsurance variables appears to be 
largely in the non-layoff population, except in the case of mammograms and Pap tests. Again 
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that delaying is seen most strongly in cancer screening is not surprising as cancer screening 
largely derives its benefit if cancer can be caught early and treated, which may have large out-of-
pocket costs for individuals who become uninsured. Like the earlier results, these appear to 
support the first hypothesis that negative insurance effects are more likely in the cancer screening 
analyses. 
I also find support for the third hypothesis that the magnitude of the effects is likely to be 
largest during the Great Recession in Table A-4-11. Although the sample size is much smaller 
leading to larger standard error, the effect sizes themselves are much larger. I see fairly large 
positive coefficients on the laid off variables, showing greater evidence of stocking up that in the 
other time periods. In part this may because the possibility of layoffs was more anticipated 
during the Great Recession than in other periods, allowing individuals the time to react. I also see 
fairly large, but less precisely estimated, negative effects on the uninsurance variables. In all 
cases the flu shot results end up with different signed results, although this is maybe not 
surprising as it is the only type preventive care that actually directly prevents a condition. 
Finally, together with the initial laid-off regressions, I re-run the regressions including a 
term for individuals who move from private to public insurance in the second year. Again this 
has somewhat mixed effects. I see significant delaying related to moving to public insurance for 
cholesterol checks and Pap tests as well as some modest evidence of delaying for mammograms 
and PSA tests. I see significant stocking up for flu shots but almost no effect on physicals or 
blood pressure checks. These results are similar in sign to the regressions run using 
unemployment and uninsurance in the sample restricted to those in the 75th percentile or greater 
of predicted unemployment or uninsurance. 
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Predicted unemployment and uninsurance regressions 
The final alternate set of analyses include the full sample but use predicted 
unemployment and predicted uninsurance in place of the actual values. While this is done as a 
method of finding an exogenous source variation in the unemployment and uninsurance 
variables, as described previously, the predictions are relatively weak, lowering my confidence 
in the estimates44 which is why I focus primarily on the earlier estimates. Furthermore, using 
predicted unemployment and uninsurance changes the interpretation slightly. For the predicted 
values, individuals may have a high predicted value but may not actually become unemployed or 
uninsured. For example, if an individual thinks she might have a higher probability of becoming 
unemployed she might work additional hours to try to avoid becoming unemployed or as in the 
case of a job change might work additionally to obtain a new job. 
For the predicted unemployment and uninsurance regressions I run two sets of 
regressions. First, I use logged predicted unemployment and uninsurance as the regressors of 
interest. I use logged values so that the coefficients can be interpreted as percent changes in 
unemployment and uninsurance. And second, I use indicators for an individual being in the 75th 
percentile and greater for predicted unemployment or uninsurance and their cross-product. 
 Using logged unemployment and uninsurance, I find modest effects of unemployment on 
preventive care utilization, although I do find some evidence of significant delaying for having 
blood pressure, having cholesterol checked, and flu vaccination45. However, as Table A-4-6 and 
Table A-4-7 show, I find more consistent evidence of significant delaying on the predicted 
uninsurance coefficients for most types of care. The main exception is the positive coefficients 
                                                 
44 The first-stage F tests have values in the range of 3-4. 
45 I do not have a great explanation for why flu vaccination is so different and in the direction of increased delaying. Part of this may be the weak 
predictions not accurately capturing the true likelihood of unemployment. 
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for PSA testing. The effects are on the order of a 1 percent increase in the predicted probability 
of uninsurance leading to a 1-2 percentage point decrease in the probability of having a physical, 
having blood pressure checked, or having cholesterol checked. The effect is even larger for flu 
vaccination, mammography, and Pap testing with effects ranging from a 1 percent increase in the 
predicted uninsurance rate leading to a 4-8 percentage point decline in utilization. So while I see 
more limited support for stocking up on the unemployment variables, I continue to see 
significant evidence of delaying when looking at predicted uninsurance. 
 The results, however, change somewhat when I use indicators for being in the 75th 
percentile or greater of predicted unemployment or uninsurance. As Table A-4-8 and Table A-
4-9 show, I find significant signs of delaying for the main effect unemployment variables for 
physicals, blood pressure checks, cholesterol checks, and Pap tests among women with 
employer-sponsored health insurance. While the unemployment main effect is negative for 
mammogram screening, it is small and not statistically significant. These results appear to be the 
opposite of what I find previously. One possible explanation is that since most of these people do 
not end up actually becoming unemployed, they may be working additional hours to avoid 
becoming unemployed. Except for the flu shot regressions where I find positive and significant 
effects of predicted uninsurance, I mostly find negative effects for the other types of care 
although the effects are mostly not statistically significant. 
 The other main finding that differs from the previous ones is that I find significant 
evidence of stocking up on the interaction term, namely those people who have the highest 
predicted probability of becoming both unemployed and uninsured, in the physical, blood 
pressure, and cholesterol check regressions. Since blood pressure and cholesterol are often 
checked during a physical, these may all be happening during one visit. So one possible 
  
151 
 
explanation for the effect is that individuals who believe they may become unemployed and 
uninsured stock up on care from their usual provider. It is not exactly clear why this effect exists 
for predicted unemployment and uninsurance but not actual unemployment and uninsurance (see 
Table 4-8 and Table 4-9) but the types of people who are at risk for unemployment and 
uninsurance but are able to avoid it may be different than those who are unable to.  
5.9 Discussion 
 To summarize my findings, I find some evidence that future unemployment alone may 
lead to stocking up of preventive care services. However, I find stronger and more consistent 
evidence of delaying related to future uninsurance. Finally, I find limited evidence of an 
interaction between the two. The lack of a finding about the interaction of the two is likely 
because of two factors—multiple competing effects all acting at once potentially masking 
significant individual-level heterogeneity as well as a somewhat limited ability to create strong 
predictions of unemployment and uninsurance using the available observables. The latter is also 
hurt by having a more limited number of individuals who become both unemployed and 
uninsured. 
 Although I see fairly consistent results within specific sets of regressions, one of the 
major conclusions is that the effects of future unemployment and uninsurance on preventive care 
utilization appear to be heterogeneous and complicated. One of the main novel components of 
this paper is the inclusion of both unemployment and uninsurance in the analyses, whereas 
previous studies have tended to focus on one or the other. When thinking about concurrent 
unemployment or uninsurance, focusing on only one of the factors can be an important way to 
find exogenous variation that can lead to causal inference about the effect of unemployment or 
uninsurance on utilization. However, when thinking about future unemployment and 
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uninsurance, it becomes more difficult to disentangle the two. The findings in this study indicate 
that expectations about both are likely important and may be interwoven in a complicated 
manner. 
 The combination of results leads to several potential policy implications. To the extent 
that employed and insured individuals face primarily a risk of unemployment but not 
uninsurance (particularly post-ACA), concerns about underutilizing preventive care may not be 
as critical if these individuals are more likely to stock up on preventive care. A slightly different 
perspective might also be that given a good potential alternate source of health insurance, the risk 
of unemployment may be more minimal in its effect on under-utilizing preventive care. 
Relatedly, it appears the main policy concern is with future uninsurance rather than 
unemployment, where the risk of becoming uninsured may lead individuals to delay preventive 
care, particularly cancer screening. This further highlights that potentially the more critical 
cyclical effect is on making sure individuals are able to maintain insurance coverage more so 
than employment related effects46, particularly in terms of preventive care utilization. This 
means further ensuring that individuals who may become uninsured have knowledge about and 
are able to sign up for Medicaid coverage where eligible or know about and are able to sign up 
for marketplace coverage may be critical to ensuring appropriate preventive care utilization.  
Certainly one potentially important issue not examined in this study is the effect of 
anticipated changes in the generosity of health insurance coverage. If an individual does not 
expect to become uninsured but does anticipate a change in coverage that leads to potentially less 
generous coverage, one question is how that might affect current period preventive health care 
utilization. If the effects are similar to the uninsured results, one policy concern might be that 
                                                 
46 This is certainly not to minimize the negative effects of unemployment, just that they may be more limited in their effect specifically on 
preventive care utilization. 
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individuals who expect to have less comprehensive coverage may be more likely to delay 
preventive care, and in particular cancer screening.. This issue may be particularly relevant in the  
post-ACA world when individuals are required to have coverage, but given macroeconomic 
variations may go from more comprehensive employer provided coverage to other less 
comprehensive forms of coverage. 
 While I am limited to the publicly available MEPS data for this study, a future extension 
using restricted access data could provide several interesting improvements. First, with state of 
residence I could try to compare the results of future state unemployment to the commonly used 
concurrent state unemployment to better compare results to existing studies. One issue is that 
some of the negative effects of concurrent unemployment effects could in part be due to prior 
period stocking up.  Second, with state, and actually county, of residence and fully specified 
industry and occupation codes I could likely dramatically improve the predicted unemployment 
and uninsurance variables further strengthening the predicted unemployment and uninsurance 
analyses. Furthermore, improved predicted values could be particularly helpful in better teasing 
out why there are differences in the results between using actual and predicted unemployment 
and uninsurance. 
5.10 Limitations 
 Despite running a variety of analyses to try to narrow in on capturing the true effects of 
anticipated unemployment and uninsurance on preventive care utilization, this study has several 
important limitations. The first is that I do not know the exact date of unemployment, 
uninsurance, or preventive care utilization. However, given the format of the utilization 
questions—utilization in the past year is asked in round 3, and the requirement that all 
individuals are employed and insured in rounds 1-3, I can be fairly assured that any 
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unemployment or uninsurance occurs subsequent to the utilization. The main limitation then 
remains that it is not clear how proximate utilization or unemployment and uninsurance are. 
However, this largely means the results should be interpreted as the effect of potential but not 
guaranteed unemployment or uninsurance on utilization. The one obvious exception would be in 
the case of individuals utilizing care in the short period when they are told they will become 
unemployed or uninsured. However, this is likely somewhat minimized by the fact that it is 
difficult to schedule appointments quickly enough (Murray and Berwick, 2003; Farria et al., 
2005) to see a provider in between finding out that one will become unemployed or uninsured 
but before it actually happens. 
 A related limitation is that one factor that remains unobservable is an individual’s 
expectation about the length of unemployment or uninsurance, which could be an important 
factor involved in the decision to either stock up or delay utilization of prevent care. The results 
in Table A-4-10 and Table A-4-11 are suggestive of this, where the coefficients on the 
unemployment variables are similarly sized or larger, but more strikingly, negative effects on the 
uninsurance variables are larger when restricting the analyses to the years 2007-2010 (i.e. just 
before to just after the Great Recession of 2008-2009). This suggests that in a worse recession 
where unemployment and/or uninsurance may be expected to last longer, the effects of 
anticipated unemployment or uninsurance may be larger. 
 Another limitation is that with only two years of MEPS data available, I am not able to 
run a true individual fixed effects model similar to those by Currie, Duque, and Garfinkel (2014) 
or Colman and Dave (2015), which might be better able to control for some of the selection 
concerns. However, a couple of factors may help to mitigate this limitation. By restricting my 
analysis sample to all individuals who are both employed and insured for the entire first year in 
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the MEPS data, I control for some of the factors that may be driving both unemployment or 
uninsurance and utilization of preventive care. In addition, I try to use both predicted 
unemployment and uninsurance as well as variables for being laid off to create more exogenous 
sources of variation in unemployment and uninsurance.   
Although restricting the sample to those who have the highest likelihood of being 
unemployed or uninsured is intended to mitigate some of the endogeneity issues, the predictions 
themselves are not ideal. One of the main limitations is that I can only use observables such as 
occupation, industry, and some other fairly general individual and job level characteristics. 
However, individuals likely have other unobservable information that may make their own 
predictions of how likely they are to become unemployed or uninsured better than the ones I am 
able to estimate. 
 Another limitation is the generalizability of the results. The study is restricted to the age 
24-64 working population who is employed and insured for the entire first year. The results 
certainly may not be as applicable to individuals outside of this age range. From a policy 
perspective, another important limitation is that these results may not apply to individuals with 
much more volatile employment and insurance statuses or to individuals who are outside of the 
labor force, groups that may be particularly vulnerable to underutilization of preventive care. 
 One reason I focus on preventive care in this paper is that it is more elective than most 
acute types of care and therefore more likely to be affected by anticipated unemployment or 
uninsurance. Another possible type of care to examine is elective care such as elective surgeries 
or other procedures. While I do try to run similar analyses for elective care, I get very 
inconsistent and non-significant results. However, this is largely due to limitations in the level of 
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detail reported for the ICD-9 codes. In the publicly available MEPS data, most of the specific 
codes are aggregated to 3-digit codes to preserve respondent confidentiality, which unfortunately 
makes it very difficult to distinguish between elective and non-elective procedures. Although 
another future research extension could be to examine this issue using restricted access MEPS 
data that can provide more fully specified diagnosis and condition codes.  
One additional limitation in terms of interpreting results is that I find the most 
inconsistent results for PSA testing both in terms of variation across specifications and in 
comparison to the other types of preventive care. However, this may not be surprising given the 
much less frequent recommendations for this type of screening (little evidence of effectiveness 
more frequently than every 4 years) and the debate over its effectiveness for low risk men 
(Qaseem et al., 2013). This means that unlike the other types of care, in any given year it is much 
less likely that an individual would be recommended to have a PSA test. Furthermore, this means 
that in a given year utilization in the preceding years has an important bearing on whether an 
individual should get the screening and therefore may depend less on next year’s possible 
unemployment or uninsurance. There is also the further complication for PSA testing that 
starting in 2008 there became increasing evidence and pressure to limit the amount of PSA 
testing47. 
Finally, one concern might be that to some extent the issues discussed in this study may 
be lessened by the ACA. The intent of the ACA is to both lower rates of uninsurance and 
improve access to preventive health care, which should reduce the existence of stocking up or 
delaying recessions if the law works as intended. However, initial estimate suggest only about 
1/3 the previously uninsured have gained health insurance following the implementation of the 
                                                 
47 Although it was not until 2012 that the USPTF gave the final recommendation against PSA testing in men of all ages, somewhat limiting the 
effect in this study. 
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ACA (Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, 2015). In addition, I provide evidence 
that some of the unemployment or job-related effects (time constraints or concerns about 
changing providers) may exist independent of anticipated uninsurance. Furthermore, I find some 
modest, but mixed evidence of delaying among individuals who move from private insurance to 
Medicaid insurance, an important component of the ACA health insurance expansion. Finally 
there is the issue that even if the ACA works as intended people’s perceptions could still play an 
important role. For example, if an individual with employer provided health insurance anticipates 
possible unemployment and believed exchange plans might offer less desirable provider options, 
she might stock up on care. Therefore even if the ACA should mitigate many of the effects seen 
in this study it remains an empirical question whether or to what extent that will actually occur. 
 
5.11 Conclusion 
 I provide the first set of estimates for how both anticipated unemployment and 
uninsurance may affect preventive health care utilization. Importantly, the two effects appear 
very different from one another. I find some mixed evidence that increased expected 
unemployment but not uninsurance may lead to stocking up of preventive care. However, the 
stronger evidence I find is that individuals with increased expected uninsurance but not 
unemployment may delay preventive care, especially cancer screening. One important factor 
may be screening is of more limited value if an individual expects to be uninsured for a period of 
time because the real value behind screening is early treatment. Especially for the case of cancer, 
which is particularly costly, an individual may opt to delay screening until her insurance status is 
more stable. In addition, I see particularly strong evidence of these effects during the time 
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surrounding the Great Recession, suggesting the effects may be strongest during longer-lasting 
and more severe economic downturns. 
 The results suggest that from a policy perspective anticipated uninsurance is the more 
important focus in terms of ensuring individuals do not under-utilize preventive care. On the 
other hand, anticipated unemployment may have more limited negative effects and, in fact, 
individuals may actually stock up on preventive care potentially biasing the estimates of the 
effect of unemployment on preventive care utilization downwards.  
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Table 4-1  Summary statistics of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics by 
unemployment and uninsurance transition group 
  Overall 
Employed 
Insured 
Unemployed 
Insured 
Employed 
Uninsured 
Unemployed 
Uninsured 
            
Age 45.04 45.22 48.16 39.83 41.33 
  (11.63) (11.6) (13.67) (10.23) (11.1) 
Female 0.48 0.48 0.65 0.47 0.56 
  (0.5) (0.5) (0.48) (0.5) (0.5) 
White 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.75 0.68 
  (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.43) (0.47) 
Black 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.23 
  (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.38) (0.42) 
Other race 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 
  (0.28) (0.28) (0.27) (0.26) (0.28) 
Hispanic 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.24 0.26 
  (0.36) (0.36) (0.37) (0.43) (0.44) 
Education - No degree 0.09 0.08 0.18 0.17 0.17 
  (0.28) (0.28) (0.38) (0.37) (0.38) 
Education - High School 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.53 0.55 
  (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) 
Education - Bachelor's degree 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.14 
  (0.42) (0.42) (0.39) (0.38) (0.35) 
Education - Advanced degree 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.06 0.03 
  (0.33) (0.33) (0.28) (0.23) (0.18) 
Education - Other 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.09 
  (0.29) (0.3) (0.24) (0.26) (0.28) 
Education - Missing 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 
  (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.13) 
Marital status - Married 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.56 0.46 
  (0.47) (0.46) (0.47) (0.5) (0.5) 
Marital status - Widowed 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.03 
  (0.15) (0.15) (0.24) (0.12) (0.16) 
Marital status - Separated/Divorced 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.19 0.25 
  (0.35) (0.35) (0.34) (0.4) (0.44) 
Marital status - Never married 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.23 0.27 
  (0.36) (0.36) (0.33) (0.42) (0.44) 
Marital status - Missing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
Region - Northeast 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.14 0.18 
  (0.38) (0.38) (0.39) (0.34) (0.38) 
Region - Midwest 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.20 
  (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.39) (0.4) 
Region - South 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.40 0.36 
  (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.48) 
Region - West 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.26 
  (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.45) (0.44) 
Fair/poor self-reported health in any base 
year round 0.15 0.15 0.30 0.18 0.30 
  (0.36) (0.36) (0.46) (0.39) (0.46) 
Missing self-reported health 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0) (0.04) (0) 
Any report of limitation of daily 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.09 
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  Overall 
Employed 
Insured 
Unemployed 
Insured 
Employed 
Uninsured 
Unemployed 
Uninsured 
activities in base year round 
  (0.17) (0.16) (0.33) (0.17) (0.29) 
Missing reported limitation of daily 
activities 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) 
Non-rural residence 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.86 
  (0.37) (0.37) (0.36) (0.36) (0.35) 
Family income <100% FPL 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.07 
  (0.17) (0.16) (0.29) (0.29) (0.26) 
Family income 100% - <125% FPL 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.04 
  (0.14) (0.13) (0.18) (0.21) (0.19) 
Family income 125% - <200% FPL 0.09 0.09 0.15 0.18 0.16 
  (0.29) (0.28) (0.35) (0.39) (0.36) 
Family income 200% - <400% FPL 0.35 0.34 0.29 0.38 0.44 
  (0.48) (0.47) (0.45) (0.49) (0.5) 
Family income >=400% FPL 0.51 0.52 0.44 0.30 0.30 
  (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.46) (0.46) 
Hours worked 40.61 40.72 33.10 40.11 39.94 
  (11.72) (11.67) (14.55) (11.8) (8.73) 
Hours worked missing 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.08) 
Hourly wage 16.97 17.19 13.39 12.77 14.29 
  (12.83) (12.93) (10.82) (10.3) (8.4) 
Number of employees 150.78 153.14 118.68 98.81 140.12 
  (186.94) (187.85) (177.13) (155.71) (177.56) 
Current smoker 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.31 
  (0.37) (0.36) (0.38) (0.41) (0.46) 
Smoking status missing 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.11) (0.08) 
      
Observations 45,573  43,178 507  1,587 301  
 
Means (SD);  
* All values are from the baseline period (year 1)  
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Table 4-2  Summary statistics of comorbidities and spouse comorbidities by unemployment and 
uninsurance transition group 
  Overall 
Employed 
Insured 
Unemployed 
Insured 
Employed 
Uninsured 
Unemployed 
Uninsured 
            
Cancer 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.04 
  (0.24) (0.24) (0.28) (0.2) (0.2) 
Diabetes 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.05 0.09 
  (0.24) (0.24) (0.31) (0.23) (0.28) 
Disorders of lipid metabolism 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.08 0.11 
  (0.34) (0.34) (0.37) (0.28) (0.31) 
Cardiovascular disease 0.23 0.23 0.33 0.14 0.27 
  (0.42) (0.42) (0.47) (0.35) (0.45) 
COPD 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.04 
  (0.21) (0.21) (0.25) (0.18) (0.19) 
Asthma 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.05 
  (0.2) (0.2) (0.27) (0.2) (0.22) 
Joint disorders 0.22 0.22 0.28 0.17 0.25 
  (0.41) (0.41) (0.45) (0.38) (0.43) 
Anxiety disorders 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.11 
  (0.25) (0.25) (0.31) (0.27) (0.32) 
Mood disorders 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.10 
  (0.21) (0.21) (0.28) (0.22) (0.3) 
Cancer (spouse) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.08) (0.13) 
Diabetes (spouse) 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 
  (0.15) (0.15) (0.21) (0.13) (0.14) 
Disorders of lipid metabolism 
(spouse) 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.04 
  (0.23) (0.23) (0.27) (0.17) (0.19) 
Cardiovascular disease (spouse) 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.05 
  (0.26) (0.26) (0.29) (0.2) (0.22) 
COPD (spouse) 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
  (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.08) (0.11) 
Asthma (spouse) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
  (0.11) (0.12) (0.08) (0.09) (0) 
Joint disorders (spouse) 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.06 
  (0.26) (0.26) (0.29) (0.2) (0.24) 
Anxiety disorders (spouse) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13) (0.11) 
Mood disorders (spouse) 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) 
            
N 45,573  43,178 507  1,587 301  
Means (SD); * All values are from the baseline period (year 1)  
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Table 4-3  Summary statistics of preventive care utilization by unemployment and uninsurance 
transition group 
  Overall 
Employed 
Insured Unemployed Insured Employed Uninsured Unemployed Uninsured 
            
Physical 0.63 0.64 0.69 0.53 0.62 
  (0.48) (0.48) (0.46) (0.5) (0.49) 
BP check 0.83 0.83 0.88 0.76 0.83 
  (0.38) (0.38) (0.32) (0.43) (0.37) 
Cholesterol checked 0.59 0.60 0.66 0.46 0.56 
  (0.49) (0.49) (0.47) (0.5) (0.5) 
Flu shot 0.30 0.31 0.36 0.19 0.25 
  (0.46) (0.46) (0.48) (0.39) (0.43) 
Mammogram 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.38 0.28 
  (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.49) (0.45) 
Pap test 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.61 0.60 
  (0.47) (0.47) (0.48) (0.49) (0.49) 
PSA test 0.34 0.35 0.50 0.22 0.31 
  (0.48) (0.48) (0.5) (0.41) (0.47) 
      
Observations 45,573  43,178 507  1,587 301  
Means (SD) 
* All values are utilization within the past year unless otherwise noted and based on reports from the baseline period (year 1)  
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Table 4-4  Baseline regressions estimates for general preventive care utilization  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Physical in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 0.003 0.005 0.062** 0.053* 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.026) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.030* -0.027* -0.027 -0.011 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 0.025 0.025 -0.029 -0.091 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.038) (0.049) 
     
N 44,721 41,775 30,426 14,191 
 Blood Pressure Checked in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 0.004 -0.001 0.02 0.015 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.019) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.019 -0.019 -0.02 -0.009 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 0.021 0.027 0.007 -0.020 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.030) (0.037) 
     
N 44,871 41,904 30,515 14,229 
 Cholesterol Checked in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 -0.001 -0.003 0.022 0.031 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.021) (0.027) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.043*** -0.041** -0.041* -0.034 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 0.042 0.052 0.027 -0.031 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.039) (0.049) 
     
N 43,348 40,508 29,454 13,774 
 Flu Shot in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 0.044** 0.026 0.021 0.058 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.025) (0.031) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.030** -0.026* -0.026 -0.044** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 -0.022 -0.010 -0.001 -0.017 
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.038) (0.046) 
     
N 44,934 41,983 30,588 14,293 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
(1) Baseline (2) Private insurance entire year 1 (3) Employer provided insurance entire year 1 (4) Not married 
 
All regressions also control for age, age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, income, number of employees 
in firm, region, urban residence, self-reported health status, presence of physical limitations of work, smoking status, 
a series of risk preference measures, and presence of comorbidities both in oneself and in one’s spouse.  
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Table 4-5  Baseline regressions estimates for cancer screening utilization  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Mammogram in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 0.024 0.018 0.051 0.037 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.037) (0.043) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.060* -0.069* -0.051 -0.067 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.040) (0.039) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 -0.081 -0.067 -0.123 -0.113 
 (0.062) (0.064) (0.075) (0.092) 
     
N 14,311 13,296 8,913 5,255 
 Pap Test in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 0.020 -0.005 0.031 0.081* 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.036) (0.038) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.036 -0.044* -0.042 -0.005 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.028) (0.025) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 -0.024 -0.001 -0.048 -0.186** 
 (0.047) (0.050) (0.061) (0.069) 
     
N 21,057 19,481 13,371 8,308 
 PSA Test in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 0.025 0.042 0.03 0.041 
 (0.032) (0.037) (0.045) (0.089) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.044 -0.048 -0.052 -0.127 
 (0.038) (0.040) (0.053) (0.074) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 0.065 0.056 0.040 0.142 
 (0.083) (0.086) (0.099) (0.151) 
     
N 7,794 7,063 5,023 1,523 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
(1) Baseline (2) Private insurance entire year 1 (3) Employer provided insurance entire year 1 (4) Not married 
All regressions also control for age, age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, income, number of employees 
in firm, region, urban residence, self-reported health status, presence of physical limitations of work, smoking status, 
a series of risk preference measures, and presence of comorbidities both in oneself and in one’s spouse.  
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Table 4-6  Baseline regressions estimates including move from private to public health insurance 
for general preventive care utilization  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Physical in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 0.003 0.005 0.061** 0.051 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.026) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.030* -0.027* -0.027 -0.011 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 0.025 0.025 -0.029 -0.090 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.039) (0.049) 
Private (year 1) to public 
health  0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.026 
insurance (year 2) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.016) 
     
N 44,721 41,775 30,426 14,191 
 Blood Pressure Checked in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 0.004 -0.001 0.019 0.015 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.019) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.019 -0.019 -0.02 -0.009 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 0.021 0.026 0.007 -0.020 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.030) (0.037) 
Private (year 1) to public 
health  -0.004 -0.002 0.003 -0.003 
insurance (year 2) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) 
     
N 44,871 41,904 30,515 14,229 
 Cholesterol Checked in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 0.002 0.003 0.027 0.032 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.021) (0.027) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.043*** -0.042** -0.041* -0.034 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 0.040 0.048 0.022 -0.031 
 (0.032) (0.034) (0.039) (0.049) 
Private (year 1) to public 
health  -0.029** -0.039*** -0.032* -0.005 
insurance (year 2) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.016) 
     
N 43,348 40,508 29,454 13,774 
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 Flu Shot in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 0.036* 0.012 0.007 0.051 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.025) (0.031) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.029** -0.026* -0.026 -0.044** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 -0.018 <0.001 0.010 -0.013 
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.038) (0.046) 
Private (year 1) to public 
health  0.080*** 0.096*** 0.078*** 0.077*** 
insurance (year 2) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.019) 
     
N 44,934 41,983 30,588 14,293 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
(1) Baseline (2) Private insurance entire year 1 (3) Employer provided insurance entire year 1 (4) Not married 
All regressions also control for age, age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, income, number of employees 
in firm, region, urban residence, self-reported health status, presence of physical limitations of work, smoking status, 
a series of risk preference measures, and presence of comorbidities both in oneself and in one’s spouse.  
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Table 4-7  Baseline regressions estimates including move from private to public health insurance 
for cancer screening utilization 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Mammogram in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 0.025 0.022 0.053 0.035 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.038) (0.044) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.060* -0.070* -0.052 -0.067 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.040) (0.039) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 -0.081 -0.070 -0.125 -0.112 
 (0.062) (0.064) (0.075) (0.092) 
Private (year 1) to public 
health  -0.007 -0.031 -0.014 0.027 
insurance (year 2) (0.017) (0.018) (0.024) (0.026) 
     
N 14,311 13,296 8,913 5,255 
 Pap Test in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 0.023 0.001 0.038 0.084* 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.036) (0.038) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.036* -0.044* -0.042 -0.006 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.028) (0.025) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 -0.025 -0.005 -0.054 -0.186** 
 (0.047) (0.051) (0.061) (0.070) 
Private (year 1) to public 
health  -0.036* -0.050** -0.035 -0.028 
insurance (year 2) (0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.023) 
     
N 21,057 19,481 13,371 8,308 
 PSA Test in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 0.025 0.042 0.030 0.037 
 (0.032) (0.037) (0.045) (0.089) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.044 -0.049 -0.053 -0.126 
 (0.038) (0.040) (0.053) (0.074) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 0.064 0.056 0.040 0.144 
 (0.083) (0.086) (0.099) (0.151) 
Private (year 1) to public 
health  0.012 -0.005 -0.014 0.030 
insurance (year 2) (0.019) (0.022) (0.028) (0.044) 
     
N 7,794 7,063 5,023 1,523 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
(1) Baseline (2) Private insurance entire year 1 (3) Employer provided insurance entire year 1 (4) Not married 
All regressions also control for age, age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, income, number of employees 
in firm, region, urban residence, self-reported health status, presence of physical limitations of work, smoking status, 
a series of risk preference measures, and presence of comorbidities both in oneself and in one’s spouse.  
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Table 4-8  Regression estimates for general preventive care utilization restricted to the 75th 
percentile of predicted unemployment or uninsurance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Physical in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 -0.006 0.003 0.114** 0.022 
 (0.026) (0.032) (0.044) (0.040) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.028 -0.023 -0.015 -0.02 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 -0.014 -0.022 -0.145* -0.075 
 (0.044) (0.049) (0.061) (0.062) 
     
N 16,745 14,762 10,258 7,750 
 Blood Pressure Checked in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 0.027 0.033 0.060* 0.031 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.030) (0.030) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.010 -0.01 -0.005 -0.026 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.020) (0.019) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 -0.031 -0.036 -0.072 -0.015 
 (0.033) (0.036) (0.046) (0.047) 
     
N 16,832 14,835 10,315 7,779 
 Cholesterol Checked in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 0.019 0.024 0.069 0.031 
 (0.025) (0.031) (0.048) (0.040) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.031* -0.024 -0.032 -0.024 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.022) (0.021) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 -0.020 -0.015 -0.063 -0.045 
 (0.043) (0.049) (0.063) (0.062) 
     
N 16,160 14,250 9,875 7,500 
 Flu Shot in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 0.045 0.009 -0.019 0.035 
 (0.025) (0.031) (0.049) (0.041) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.036** -0.032* -0.026 -0.052** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.016) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 -0.021 0.006 0.039 0.013 
 (0.039) (0.044) (0.060) (0.056) 
     
N 16,909 14,910 10,377 7,832 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
(1) Baseline (2) Private insurance entire year 1 (3) Employer provided insurance entire year 1 (4) Not married 
All regressions also control for age, age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, income, number of employees 
in firm, region, urban residence, self-reported health status, presence of physical limitations of work, smoking status, 
a series of risk preference measures, and presence of comorbidities both in oneself and in one’s spouse.  
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Table 4-9  Regression estimates for general cancer screening utilization restricted to the 75th 
percentile of predicted unemployment or uninsurance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Mammogram in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 <0.001 -0.012 0.091 -0.010 
 (0.043) (0.051) (0.073) (0.069) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.068* -0.086* -0.051 -0.072 
 (0.034) (0.039) (0.057) (0.047) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 -0.104 -0.076 -0.227* -0.078 
 (0.083) (0.091) (0.112) (0.118) 
     
N 5,592 4,875 3,022 2,637 
 Pap Test in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 0.033 -0.020 0.097 0.081 
 (0.033) (0.039) (0.061) (0.051) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.018 -0.024 -0.030 -0.005 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.036) (0.028) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 -0.062 -0.018 -0.146 -0.148 
 (0.059) (0.066) (0.086) (0.081) 
     
N 9,468 8,225 5,378 4,836 
 PSA Test in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 0.080 0.198* 0.045 0.080 
 (0.066) (0.086) (0.164) (0.129) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.110 -0.092 -0.033 -0.021 
 (0.068) (0.079) (0.112) (0.127) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 -0.051 -0.176 -0.133 -0.162 
 (0.143) (0.159) (0.225) (0.222) 
     
N 1,400 1,151 767 462 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
(1) Baseline (2) Private insurance entire year 1 (3) Employer provided insurance entire year 1 (4) Not married 
All regressions also control for age, age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, income, number of employees 
in firm, region, urban residence, self-reported health status, presence of physical limitations of work, smoking status, 
a series of risk preference measures, and presence of comorbidities both in oneself and in one’s spouse.  
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Table 4-10  Regression estimates for general preventive care utilization restricted to the 75th 
percentile of predicted unemployment or uninsurance including move from private to public 
insurance  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Physical in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 -0.007 <0.001 0.107* 0.022 
 (0.026) (0.032) (0.044) (0.040) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.028 -0.023 -0.014 -0.020 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 -0.014 -0.020 -0.141* -0.078 
 (0.044) (0.049) (0.061) (0.062) 
Private (year 1) to public 
health  0.020 0.025 0.045* 0.032 
insurance (year 2) (0.015) (0.016) (0.022) (0.023) 
     
N 16,745 14,762 10,258 7,750 
 Blood Pressure Checked in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 0.028 0.033 0.057 0.031 
 (0.017) (0.020) (0.030) (0.030) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.01 -0.01 -0.005 -0.026 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.020) (0.019) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 -0.031 -0.036 -0.070 -0.014 
 (0.033) (0.036) (0.046) (0.047) 
Private (year 1) to public 
health  -0.006 -0.001 0.021 -0.006 
insurance (year 2) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) 
     
N 16,832 14,835 10,315 7,779 
 Cholesterol Checked in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 0.020 0.027 0.073 0.031 
 (0.025) (0.031) (0.047) (0.040) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.031* -0.024 -0.032 -0.024 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.022) (0.021) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 -0.019 -0.016 -0.066 -0.045 
 (0.044) (0.049) (0.063) (0.062) 
Private (year 1) to public 
health  -0.014 -0.027 -0.027 0.010 
insurance (year 2) (0.016) (0.017) (0.023) (0.023) 
     
N 16,160 14,250 9,875 7,500 
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 Flu Shot in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 0.041 -0.003 -0.027 0.035 
 (0.025) (0.031) (0.049) (0.041) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.035** -0.032* -0.025 -0.052** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.016) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 -0.022 0.011 0.043 0.007 
 (0.039) (0.044) (0.060) (0.056) 
Private (year 1) to public 
health  0.070*** 0.091*** 0.051* 0.079** 
insurance (year 2) (0.017) (0.018) (0.025) (0.026) 
     
N 16,909 14,910 10,377 7,832 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
(1) Baseline (2) Private insurance entire year 1 (3) Employer provided insurance entire year 1 (4) Not married 
All regressions also control for age, age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, income, number of employees 
in firm, region, urban residence, self-reported health status, presence of physical limitations of work, smoking status, 
a series of risk preference measures, and presence of comorbidities both in oneself and in one’s spouse.  
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Table 4-11  Regression estimates for cancer screening utilization restricted to the 75th percentile 
of predicted unemployment or uninsurance including move from private to public insurance  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Mammogram in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 -0.001 -0.012 0.081 -0.008 
 (0.043) (0.051) (0.073) (0.070) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.067* -0.086* -0.049 -0.071 
 (0.034) (0.039) (0.057) (0.047) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 -0.105 -0.076 -0.224* -0.086 
 (0.083) (0.091) (0.113) (0.119) 
Private (year 1) to public 
health  0.020 0.002 0.066 0.045 
insurance (year 2) (0.026) (0.028) (0.040) (0.036) 
     
N 5,592 4,875 3,022 2,637 
 Pap Test in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 0.034 -0.018 0.095 0.081 
 (0.033) (0.039) (0.062) (0.050) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.018 -0.024 -0.030 -0.005 
 (0.022) (0.026) (0.036) (0.028) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 -0.062 -0.018 -0.145 -0.146 
 (0.059) (0.066) (0.086) (0.081) 
Private (year 1) to public 
health  -0.004 -0.016 0.006 -0.022 
insurance (year 2) (0.023) (0.024) (0.034) (0.031) 
     
N 9,468 8,225 5,378 4,836 
 PSA Test in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 0.080 0.203* 0.055 0.077 
 (0.066) (0.087) (0.163) (0.128) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.110 -0.094 -0.036 -0.02 
 (0.068) (0.079) (0.112) (0.127) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 -0.052 -0.176 -0.140 -0.160 
 (0.142) (0.161) (0.226) (0.221) 
Private (year 1) to public 
health  0.006 -0.029 -0.062 0.045 
insurance (year 2) (0.041) (0.055) (0.071) (0.082) 
     
N 1,400 1,151 767 462 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
(1) Baseline (2) Private insurance entire year 1 (3) Employer provided insurance entire year 1 (4) Not married 
All regressions also control for age, age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, income, number of employees 
in firm, region, urban residence, self-reported health status, presence of physical limitations of work, smoking status, 
a series of risk preference measures, and presence of comorbidities both in oneself and in one’s spouse.  
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Table 4-12  Regression estimates for general preventive care utilization by laid off and non-laid 
off unemployment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Physical in Past Year 
Laid off year 2 -0.031 -0.024 0.046 0.021 
 (0.042) (0.047) (0.056) (0.073) 
Uninsured due to lay off year 
2 0.041 0.041 -0.019 -0.065 
 (0.060) (0.064) (0.072) (0.095) 
Unemployed (not laid off) 
year 2 0.008 0.011 0.064** 0.059* 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.022) (0.027) 
Uninsured (not due to lay 
off)  -0.030* -0.027* -0.027 -0.012 
year 2 (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019) 
     
N 44,721 41,775 30,426 14,191 
 Blood Pressure Checked in Past Year 
Laid off year 2 0.010 0.029 0.050 0.003 
 (0.028) (0.030) (0.039) (0.053) 
Uninsured due to lay off year 
2 0.032 0.015 0.002 0.022 
 (0.042) (0.044) (0.051) (0.070) 
Unemployed (not laid off) 
year 2 <0.001 -0.008 0.010 0.013 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.016) (0.020) 
Uninsured (not due to lay 
off)  -0.019 -0.018 -0.02 -0.009 
year 2 (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) 
     
N 44,871 41,904 30,515 14,229 
 Cholesterol Checked in Past Year 
Laid off year 2 -0.002 0.016 0.021 -0.002 
 (0.039) (0.043) (0.056) (0.073) 
Uninsured due to lay off year 
2 0.013 0.019 0.018 -0.012 
 (0.058) (0.062) (0.072) (0.095) 
Unemployed (not laid off) 
year 2 -0.002 -0.007 0.021 0.038 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.023) (0.028) 
Uninsured (not due to lay 
off)  -0.043*** -0.041** -0.041* -0.034 
year 2 (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019) 
     
N 43,348 40,508 29,454 13,774 
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 Flu Shot in Past Year 
Laid off year 2 0.018 -0.029 -0.063 0.069 
 (0.040) (0.043) (0.056) (0.069) 
Uninsured due to lay off year 
2 -0.012 0.036 0.075 -0.057 
 (0.056) (0.059) (0.070) (0.087) 
Unemployed (not laid off) 
year 2 0.049** 0.035 0.039 0.056 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.028) (0.034) 
Uninsured (not due to lay 
off)  -0.030** -0.026* -0.027 -0.044** 
year 2 (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) 
     
N 44,948  41,995  30,590  14,293 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
(1) Baseline (2) Private insurance entire year 1 (3) Employer provided insurance entire year 1 (4) Not married 
All regressions also control for age, age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, income, number of employees 
in firm, region, urban residence, self-reported health status, presence of physical limitations of work, smoking status, 
a series of risk preference measures, and presence of comorbidities both in oneself and in one’s spouse.  
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Table 4-13  Regression estimates for cancer screening utilization by laid off and non-laid off 
unemployment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Mammogram in Past Year 
Laid off year 2 0.022 0.032 0.210* 0.010 
 (0.071) (0.080) (0.085) (0.116) 
Uninsured due to lay off year 
2 -0.159 -0.156 -0.320* -0.204 
 (0.115) (0.123) (0.127) (0.179) 
Unemployed (not laid off) 
year 2 0.026 0.016 0.029 0.045 
 (0.027) (0.030) (0.040) (0.046) 
Uninsured (not due to lay 
off)  -0.059* -0.067* -0.051 -0.067 
year 2 (0.026) (0.028) (0.040) (0.039) 
     
N 14,311 13,296 8,913 5,255 
 Pap Test in Past Year 
Laid off year 2 -0.006 -0.018 0.111 0.077 
 (0.057) (0.063) (0.071) (0.079) 
Uninsured due to lay off year 
2 -0.051 -0.026 -0.169 -0.245 
 (0.090) (0.095) (0.102) (0.127) 
Unemployed (not laid off) 
year 2 0.023 -0.003 0.014 0.081 
 (0.024) (0.027) (0.040) (0.042) 
Uninsured (not due to lay 
off)  -0.036* -0.044* -0.042 -0.005 
year 2 (0.018) (0.020) (0.028) (0.025) 
     
N 21,057 19,481 13,371 8,308 
 PSA Test in Past Year 
Laid off year 2 -0.006 -0.002 -0.017 -0.129 
 (0.079) (0.090) (0.127) (0.189) 
Uninsured due to lay off year 
2 0.176 0.179 0.198 0.163 
 (0.130) (0.136) (0.166) (0.237) 
Unemployed (not laid off) 
year 2 0.030 0.050 0.036 0.084 
 (0.035) (0.040) (0.048) (0.099) 
Uninsured (not due to lay 
off)  -0.044 -0.048 -0.052 -0.128 
year 2 (0.038) (0.040) (0.053) (0.074) 
     
N 7,794 7,063 5,023 1,523 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
(1) Baseline (2) Private insurance entire year 1 (3) Employer provided insurance entire year 1 (4) Not married 
All regressions also control for age, age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, income, number of employees 
in firm, region, urban residence, self-reported health status, presence of physical limitations of work, smoking status, 
a series of risk preference measures, and presence of comorbidities both in oneself and in one’s spouse.  
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Table 4-14  Regression estimates for general preventive care utilization by laid off and non-laid 
off unemployment including move from private to public insurance  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Physical in Past Year 
Laid off year 2 -0.031 -0.024 0.046 0.021 
 (0.042) (0.047) (0.056) (0.073) 
Uninsured due to lay off year 
2 0.041 0.041 -0.019 -0.066 
 (0.060) (0.064) (0.072) (0.095) 
Unemployed (not laid off) 
year 2 0.008 0.011 0.063** 0.056* 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.022) (0.027) 
Uninsured (not due to lay 
off)  -0.030* -0.027* -0.027 -0.011 
year 2 (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019) 
Private (year 1) to public 
health  <0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.026 
insurance (year 2) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.016) 
     
N 44,721 41,775 30,426 14,191 
 Blood Pressure Checked in Past Year 
Laid off year 2 0.010 0.029 0.050 0.003 
 (0.028) (0.030) (0.039) (0.053) 
Uninsured due to lay off year 
2 0.032 0.015 0.002 0.022 
 (0.042) (0.044) (0.051) (0.070) 
Unemployed (not laid off) 
year 2 0.001 -0.008 0.01 0.013 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.020) 
Uninsured (not due to lay 
off)  -0.019 -0.018 -0.02 -0.009 
year 2 (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) 
Private (year 1) to public 
health  -0.003 -0.001 0.004 -0.003 
insurance (year 2) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) 
     
N 44,871 41,904 30,515 14,229 
 Cholesterol Checked in Past Year 
Laid off year 2 -0.002 0.016 0.021 -0.002 
 (0.039) (0.043) (0.055) (0.073) 
Uninsured due to lay off year 
2 0.014 0.019 0.019 -0.012 
 (0.058) (0.062) (0.072) (0.096) 
Unemployed (not laid off) 
year 2 0.001 <0.001 0.028 0.039 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.023) (0.028) 
Uninsured (not due to lay 
off)  -0.043*** -0.042** -0.041* -0.034 
year 2 (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019) 
Private (year 1) to public 
health  -0.029** -0.039*** -0.032* -0.006 
insurance (year 2) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.016) 
N 43,348 40,508 29,454 13,774 
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 Flu Shot in Past Year 
Laid off year 2 0.018 -0.032 -0.063 0.071 
 (0.040) (0.044) (0.056) (0.070) 
Uninsured due to lay off year 
2 -0.015 0.036 0.072 -0.060 
 (0.056) (0.059) (0.070) (0.088) 
Unemployed (not laid off) 
year 2 0.039* 0.019 0.023 0.047 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.028) (0.034) 
Uninsured (not due to lay 
off)  -0.029** -0.026* -0.026 -0.044** 
year 2 (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) 
Private (year 1) to public 
health  0.080*** 0.096*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 
insurance (year 2) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.019) 
     
N 44,934 41,983 30,588 14,293 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
(1) Baseline (2) Private insurance entire year 1 (3) Employer provided insurance entire year 1 (4) Not married 
All regressions also control for age, age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, income, number of employees 
in firm, region, urban residence, self-reported health status, presence of physical limitations of work, smoking status, 
a series of risk preference measures, and presence of comorbidities both in oneself and in one’s spouse.  
  
183 
 
Table 4-15  Regression estimates for cancer screening utilization by laid off and non-laid off 
unemployment including move from private to public insurance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Mammogram in Past Year 
Laid off year 2 0.021 0.031 0.209* 0.013 
 (0.071) (0.079) (0.085) (0.117) 
Uninsured due to lay off year 
2 -0.159 -0.158 -0.319* -0.205 
 (0.115) (0.122) (0.127) (0.180) 
Unemployed (not laid off) 
year 2 0.027 0.020 0.032 0.043 
 (0.027) (0.030) (0.041) (0.047) 
Uninsured (not due to lay 
off)  -0.059* -0.068* -0.052 -0.067 
year 2 (0.026) (0.028) (0.040) (0.039) 
Private (year 1) to public 
health  -0.007 -0.031 -0.012 0.027 
insurance (year 2) (0.017) (0.018) (0.024) (0.026) 
     
N 14,311 13,296 8,913 5,255 
 Pap Test in Past Year 
Laid off year 2 -0.006 -0.018 0.109 0.076 
 (0.057) (0.063) (0.071) (0.079) 
Uninsured due to lay off year 
2 -0.051 -0.027 -0.168 -0.244 
 (0.090) (0.095) (0.102) (0.128) 
Unemployed (not laid off) 
year 2 0.027 0.004 0.022 0.084* 
 (0.024) (0.027) (0.040) (0.042) 
Uninsured (not due to lay 
off)  -0.037* -0.045* -0.042 -0.006 
year 2 (0.018) (0.020) (0.028) (0.025) 
Private (year 1) to public 
health  -0.036* -0.050** -0.034 -0.028 
insurance (year 2) (0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.024) 
     
N 21,057 19,481 13,371 8,308 
 PSA Test in Past Year 
Laid off year 2 -0.006 -0.002 -0.017 -0.126 
 (0.079) (0.090) (0.127) (0.188) 
Uninsured due to lay off year 
2 0.175 0.179 0.198 0.161 
 (0.130) (0.136) (0.166) (0.236) 
Unemployed (not laid off) 
year 2 0.030 0.050 0.037 0.079 
 (0.035) (0.040) (0.048) (0.099) 
Uninsured (not due to lay 
off)  -0.044 -0.049 -0.053 -0.127 
year 2 (0.038) (0.040) (0.053) (0.074) 
Private (year 1) to public 
health  0.012 -0.005 -0.015 0.027 
insurance (year 2) (0.019) (0.022) (0.027) (0.044) 
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N 7,794 7,063 5,023 1,523 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
(1) Baseline (2) Private insurance entire year 1 (3) Employer provided insurance entire year 1 (4) Not married 
All regressions also control for age, age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, income, number of employees 
in firm, region, urban residence, self-reported health status, presence of physical limitations of work, smoking status, 
a series of risk preference measures, and presence of comorbidities both in oneself and in one’s spouse.  
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Table A-4-1 Summary statistics risk preferences by unemployment and uninsurance transition 
group 
  Overall 
Employed 
Insured 
Unemployed 
Insured 
Employed 
Uninsured 
Unemployed 
Uninsured 
            
Risk Preferences - High 
(Strongly believe do not need health 
insurance) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 
  (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) 
Risk Preferences - Moderate 
(Somewhat believe do not need health 
insurance) 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.04 
  (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.28) (0.2) 
Risk Preferences - Low 
(Uncertain or disagree somewhat that do 
not need health insurance) 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.24 0.21 
  (0.39) (0.39) (0.36) (0.43) (0.41) 
Risk Preferences - Minimal 
(Strongly disagree that do not need 
health insurance) 0.65 0.65 0.68 0.55 0.60 
  (0.48) (0.48) (0.47) (0.5) (0.49) 
Risk Preferences - Missing 
(Health insurance) 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.12 
  (0.28) (0.28) (0.27) (0.29) (0.33) 
Risk Preferences - High 
(Strongly believe health insurance not 
worth the cost) 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.07 
  (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.31) (0.26) 
Risk Preferences - Moderate 
(Somewhat agree health insurance not 
worth the cost) 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.18 
  (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.38) (0.39) 
Risk Preferences - Low 
(Uncertain or disagree that health 
insurance not worth the cost) 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.28 
  (0.45) (0.45) (0.44) (0.45) (0.45) 
Risk Preferences - Minimal 
(Strongly disagree that health insurance 
not worth the cost) 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.34 0.34 
  (0.49) (0.49) (0.5) (0.47) (0.48) 
Risk Preferences - Missing 
(Health insurance not worth cost) 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.13 
  (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.3) (0.33) 
Risk Preferences - High 
(Strongly believe can overcome illness 
without medical help) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.03 
  (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.21) (0.18) 
Risk Preferences - Moderate 
(Somewhat agree can overcome illness 
without medical help) 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.19 0.16 
  (0.39) (0.39) (0.35) (0.4) (0.36) 
Risk Preferences - Low 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.31 
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  Overall 
Employed 
Insured 
Unemployed 
Insured 
Employed 
Uninsured 
Unemployed 
Uninsured 
(Uncertain or disagree that can 
overcome illness without medical help) 
  (0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.47) (0.46) 
Risk Preferences - Minimal 
(Strongly disagree that can overcome 
illness without medical help) 0.39 0.39 0.44 0.34 0.38 
  (0.49) (0.49) (0.5) (0.47) (0.49) 
Risk Preferences - Missing 
(Can overcome illness without medical 
help) 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.13 
  (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.3) (0.33) 
Risk Preferences - High 
(Strongly agree more likely to take risks) 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.07 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.21) (0.25) 
Risk Preferences - Moderate 
(Somewhat agree more likely to take 
risks) 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.18 0.15 
  (0.36) (0.36) (0.33) (0.38) (0.36) 
Risk Preferences - Low 
(Uncertain or disagree more likely to 
take risks) 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.33 
  (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) (0.47) 
Risk Preferences - Minimal 
(Strongly disagree more likely to take 
risks) 0.37 0.38 0.41 0.31 0.33 
  (0.48) (0.48) (0.49) (0.46) (0.47) 
Risk Preferences - Missing 
(More likely to take risks) 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.12 
  (0.29) (0.28) (0.28) (0.3) (0.33) 
            
N 45,573 43178 507 1,587 301 
Means (SD) 
* All values are from the baseline period (year 1)  
 
  
  
187 
 
Table A-4-2 Rates of infrequent preventive care utilization by unemployment and uninsurance 
transition group 
  N 
Employed 
Insured 
Unemployed 
Insured 
Employed 
Uninsured 
Unemployed 
Uninsured 
            
Physical 5+ years ago 44,293 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.18 
   (0.33) (0.32) (0.27) (0.39) 
Blood pressure last checked 5+ 
years ago 44,442 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.05 
   (0.17) (0.17) (0.11) (0.22) 
Cholesterol last Checked 5+ 
years ago 42,297 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.30 
   (0.38) (0.37) (0.34) (0.46) 
Flu shot 5+ Years 44,507 0.55 0.55 0.49 0.67 
   (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.47) 
Mammogram 5+ Years  10,982 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.16 
   (0.29) (0.29) (0.33) (0.37) 
Pap test 5+ years ago 21,861 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 
   (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) 
PSA test 5+ years ago 4,675 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.30 
   (0.43) (0.43) (0.41) (0.46) 
Means (SD) 
* All values are from the baseline period (year 1)  
The sample sizes vary depending on both availability of responses as well as different age- and sex-based eligibility. In addition, 
to the usual age restrictions I limit the mammogram sample to women 45 years of age and old, and the PSA sample to men 55 
years of age and older to allow 5 years from the original lower age bound. 
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Table A-4-3 Summary statistics restricted to 75th percentile of predicted unemployment or 
uninsurance 
  Overall 
Employed 
Insured 
Unemployed 
Insured 
Employed 
Uninsured 
Unemployed 
Uninsured 
       
Age 42.16 42.38 48.16 37.49 39.84 
  (12.41) (12.46) (14.57) (9.55) (10.71) 
Female 0.57 0.57 0.71 0.51 0.60 
  (0.49) (0.49) (0.45) (0.5) (0.49) 
White 0.73 0.73 0.76 0.74 0.65 
  (0.45) (0.45) (0.43) (0.44) (0.48) 
Black 0.20 0.20 0.16 0.21 0.27 
  (0.4) (0.4) (0.37) (0.41) (0.45) 
Other race 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.08 
  (0.27) (0.27) (0.26) (0.23) (0.27) 
Hispanic 0.25 0.25 0.21 0.30 0.31 
  (0.43) (0.43) (0.41) (0.46) (0.46) 
Education - No degree 0.19 0.19 0.27 0.23 0.22 
  (0.39) (0.39) (0.44) (0.42) (0.42) 
Education - High School 0.56 0.56 0.51 0.59 0.55 
  (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.49) (0.5) 
Education - Bachelor's degree 0.15 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.12 
  (0.35) (0.36) (0.32) (0.3) (0.32) 
Education - Advanced degree 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.01 
  (0.17) (0.18) (0.22) (0.13) (0.12) 
Education - Other 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.07 
  (0.24) (0.24) (0.21) (0.21) (0.26) 
Education - Missing 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.1) (0.09) (0.15) 
Marital status - Married 0.54 0.54 0.60 0.47 0.39 
  (0.5) (0.5) (0.49) (0.5) (0.49) 
Marital status - Widowed 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.03 
  (0.2) (0.2) (0.27) (0.14) (0.16) 
Marital status - Separated/Divorced 0.20 0.20 0.16 0.23 0.27 
  (0.4) (0.4) (0.37) (0.42) (0.45) 
Marital status - Never married 0.23 0.22 0.17 0.27 0.31 
  (0.42) (0.42) (0.37) (0.45) (0.46) 
Marital status - Missing - - - - - 
  - - - - - 
Region - Northeast 0.16 0.17 0.20 0.14 0.16 
  (0.37) (0.37) (0.4) (0.35) (0.37) 
Region - Midwest 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.16 0.19 
  (0.39) (0.39) (0.4) (0.37) (0.39) 
Region - South 0.39 0.38 0.34 0.42 0.38 
  (0.49) (0.49) (0.47) (0.49) (0.49) 
Region - West 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.27 
  (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.45) (0.44) 
Fair/poor self-reported health in any 
base year round 0.27 0.26 0.42 0.23 0.39 
  (0.44) (0.44) (0.49) (0.42) (0.49) 
Missing self-reported health 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 - 
  (0.03) (0.03) - (0.04) - 
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  Overall 
Employed 
Insured 
Unemployed 
Insured 
Employed 
Uninsured 
Unemployed 
Uninsured 
Any report of limitation of daily 
activities in base year round 0.07 0.07 0.19 0.04 0.13 
  (0.26) (0.25) (0.39) (0.2) (0.33) 
Missing reported limitation of daily 
activities 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Non-rural residence 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.86 0.89 
  (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.35) (0.31) 
Family income <100% FPL 0.08 0.07 0.15 0.14 0.10 
  (0.26) (0.25) (0.36) (0.35) (0.3) 
Family income 100% - <125% FPL 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 
  (0.21) (0.2) (0.21) (0.25) (0.22) 
Family income 125% - <200% FPL 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.26 0.20 
  (0.4) (0.39) (0.40) (0.44) (0.40) 
Family income 200% - <400% FPL 0.42 0.42 0.28 0.39 0.46 
  (0.49) (0.49) (0.45) (0.49) (0.50) 
Family income >=400% FPL 0.27 0.28 0.32 0.15 0.20 
  (0.44) (0.45) (0.47) (0.36) (0.4) 
Hours worked 37.19 37.22 29.14 38.79 39.11 
  (12.44) (12.39) (14.19) (12.33) (9.17) 
Hours worked missing 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
  (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.09) (0.10) 
Hourly wage 11.85 11.99 10.03 10.04 12.85 
  (8.53) (8.61) (8.1) (7.35) (7.28) 
Number of employees 100.4 102.0 89.5 75.8 118.0 
  (152.6) (153.3) (159.1) (133.3) (165.6) 
Current smoker 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.26 0.37 
  (0.43) (0.43) (0.42) (0.44) (0.48) 
Smoking status missing 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 - 
  (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.11) - 
      
Observations 17,339 15,763 322 1035 219 
Means (SD) 
* All values are from the baseline period (year 1)  
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Table A-4-4 Regression estimates for general preventive care utilization restricted to the 90th 
percentile of predicted unemployment or uninsurance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Physical in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 0.011 0.028 0.127* 0.039 
 (0.033) (0.044) (0.061) (0.047) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.023 -0.016 -0.002 -0.042 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.030) (0.026) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 -0.026 -0.040 -0.163* -0.089 
 (0.056) (0.066) (0.082) (0.074) 
     
N 7,288 5,883 4,043 3,906 
 Blood Pressure Checked in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 0.036 0.045 0.049 0.053 
 (0.021) (0.026) (0.043) (0.031) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.017 -0.015 -0.009 -0.038 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.028) (0.023) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 -0.012 -0.018 -0.033 -0.003 
 (0.041) (0.047) (0.063) (0.053) 
     
N 7,321 5,904 4,055 3,925 
 Cholesterol Checked in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 0.036 0.040 0.071 0.072 
 (0.031) (0.042) (0.063) (0.045) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.034 -0.029 -0.029 -0.035 
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.029) (0.026) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 -0.034 -0.018 -0.073 -0.112 
 (0.055) (0.065) (0.083) (0.074) 
     
N 7,023 5,673 3,879 3,769 
 Flu Shot in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 0.064* 0.007 0.012 0.071 
 (0.032) (0.042) (0.063) (0.048) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.022 -0.016 -0.007 -0.027 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.023) (0.021) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 -0.031 0.013 0.012 -0.018 
 (0.050) (0.059) (0.079) (0.068) 
     
N 7,340 5,923 4,074 3,942 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
(1) Baseline (2) Private insurance entire year 1 (3) Employer provided insurance entire year 1 (4) Not married 
All regressions also control for age, age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, income, number of employees 
in firm, region, urban residence, self-reported health status, presence of physical limitations of work, smoking status, 
a series of risk preference measures, and presence of comorbidities both in oneself and in one’s spouse. 
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Table A-4-5 Regression estimates for general cancer screening utilization restricted to the 90th 
percentile of predicted unemployment or uninsurance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Mammogram in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 -0.022 -0.035 0.183* 0.032 
 (0.055) (0.069) (0.083) (0.080) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.024 -0.004 -0.022 -0.128* 
 (0.046) (0.053) (0.079) (0.057) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 -0.206 -0.223 -0.454** -0.072 
 (0.107) (0.119) (0.143) (0.143) 
     
N 2,475 1,995 1,192 1,344 
 Pap Test in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 0.035 -0.048 0.132* 0.131* 
 (0.040) (0.051) (0.066) (0.058) 
Uninsured year 2 -0.017 -0.015 -0.034 -0.016 
 (0.029) (0.034) (0.047) (0.034) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 -0.058 0.001 -0.192 -0.156 
 (0.075) (0.087) (0.105) (0.096) 
     
N 4,341 3,415 2,203 2,585 
 PSA Test in Past Year 
Unemployed year 2 0.072 0.238 -0.061 0.185 
 (0.098) (0.143) (0.226) (0.150) 
Uninsured year 2 0.039 0.233 0.498** 0.259 
 (0.122) (0.166) (0.190) (0.274) 
Unemployed x Uninsured 
year 2 -0.241 -0.606* -0.589 -0.358 
 (0.209) (0.242) (0.325) (0.366) 
     
N 486 363 239 186 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
(1) Baseline (2) Private insurance entire year 1 (3) Employer provided insurance entire year 1 (4) Not married 
All regressions also control for age, age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, income, number of employees 
in firm, region, urban residence, self-reported health status, presence of physical limitations of work, smoking status, 
a series of risk preference measures, and presence of comorbidities both in oneself and in one’s spouse.  
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Table A-4-6 Regression estimates of predicted future unemployment or uninsurance for general 
preventive care utilization 
 (1) (3) 
 Physical in Past Year 
Log (Predicted unemployed year 
2) -0.007 -0.010 
 (0.006) (0.008) 
Log (Predicted uninsured year 2) -0.020* -0.018 
 (0.009) (0.011) 
   
N 44,293  30,166  
 Blood Pressure Checked in Past Year 
Log (Predicted unemployed year 
2) -0.010* -0.015* 
 (0.005) (0.007) 
Log (Predicted uninsured year 2) -0.023** -0.029** 
 (0.007) (0.009) 
   
N 44,442  30,253  
 Cholesterol Checked in Past Year 
Log (Predicted unemployed year 
2) -0.015* -0.009 
 (0.006) (0.008) 
Log (Predicted uninsured year 2) -0.024** -0.018 
 (0.008) (0.010) 
   
N 42,927 29,198 
 Flu Shot in Past Year 
Log (Predicted unemployed year 
2) -0.004 -0.026* 
 (0.010) (0.012) 
Log (Predicted uninsured year 2) -0.080*** -0.057** 
 (0.016) (0.017) 
   
N 44,507 30,326  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
(1) Baseline  (3) Employer provided insurance entire year 1  
All regressions also control for age, age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, income, number of employees 
in firm, region, urban residence, self-reported health status, presence of physical limitations of work, smoking status, 
a series of risk preference measures, and presence of comorbidities both in oneself and in one’s spouse.  
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Table A-4-7 Regression estimates of predicted future unemployment or uninsurance for cancer 
screening utilization 
 (1) (3) 
 Mammogram in Past Year 
Log (Predicted unemployed year 
2) 0.017 0.022 
 (0.011) (0.014) 
Log (Predicted uninsured year 2) -0.070*** -0.058** 
 (0.017) (0.020) 
   
N 14,177  8,792 
 Pap Test in Past Year 
Log (Predicted unemployed year 
2) -0.006 -0.001 
 (0.009) (0.013) 
Log (Predicted uninsured year 2) -0.049** -0.045* 
 (0.015) (0.019) 
   
N 20,951  13,306  
 PSA Test in Past Year 
Log (Predicted unemployed year 
2) -0.001 -0.019 
 (0.011) (0.016) 
Log (Predicted uninsured year 2) -0.001 0.008 
 (0.015) (0.020) 
   
N 7,594 4,909 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
(1) Baseline (3) Employer provided insurance entire year 1  
All regressions also control for age, age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, income, number of employees 
in firm, region, urban residence, self-reported health status, presence of physical limitations of work, smoking status, 
a series of risk preference measures, and presence of comorbidities both in oneself and in one’s spouse. 
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Table A-4-8 Regression estimates of predicted 75th percentile of future unemployment or 
uninsurance for general preventive care utilization 
 (1) (3) 
 Physical in Past Year 
≥75th Percentile of predicted 
unemployment -0.037*** -0.036** 
 (0.010) (0.013) 
≥75th Percentile of predicted 
uninsurance -0.016 -0.017 
 (0.011) (0.013) 
≥75th Percentile of predicted 
unemployment and uninsurance 0.065*** 0.067*** 
 (0.015) (0.018) 
   
N 44,293  30,166  
 Blood Pressure Checked in Past Year 
≥75th Percentile of predicted 
unemployment -0.023** -0.030** 
 (0.007) (0.010) 
≥75th Percentile of predicted 
uninsurance -0.041*** -0.042*** 
 (0.009) (0.011) 
≥75th Percentile of predicted 
unemployment and uninsurance 0.054*** 0.058*** 
 (0.012) (0.015) 
   
N 44,442  30,253  
 Cholesterol Checked in Past Year 
≥75th Percentile of predicted 
unemployment -0.038*** -0.032* 
 (0.010) (0.013) 
≥75th Percentile of predicted 
uninsurance -0.034** -0.030* 
 (0.010) (0.013) 
≥75th Percentile of predicted 
unemployment and uninsurance 0.060*** 0.060** 
 (0.014) (0.018) 
   
N 42,927 29,198 
 Flu Shot in Past Year 
≥75th Percentile of predicted 
unemployment -0.005 -0.014 
 (0.011) (0.014) 
≥75th Percentile of predicted 
uninsurance 0.010 0.009 
 (0.010) (0.012) 
≥75th Percentile of predicted 
unemployment and uninsurance <0.001 0.004 
 (0.014) (0.017) 
   
N 44,507 30,326  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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(1) Baseline (3) Employer provided insurance entire year 1  
All regressions also control for age, age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, income, number of employees 
in firm, region, urban residence, self-reported health status, presence of physical limitations of work, smoking status, 
a series of risk preference measures, and presence of comorbidities both in oneself and in one’s spouse.  
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Table A-4-9 Regression estimates of predicted 75th percentile of future unemployment or 
uninsurance for cancer screening utilization 
 (1) (3) 
 Mammogram in Past Year 
≥75th Percentile of predicted 
unemployment -0.023 -0.035 
 (0.015) (0.020) 
≥75th Percentile of predicted 
uninsurance -0.029 -0.027 
 (0.031) (0.037) 
≥75th Percentile of predicted 
unemployment and uninsurance 0.068* 0.071 
 (0.034) (0.043) 
   
N 14,177  8,792 
 Pap Test in Past Year 
≥75th Percentile of predicted 
unemployment -0.024 -0.037* 
 (0.013) (0.018) 
≥75th Percentile of predicted 
uninsurance 0.007 0.016 
 (0.018) (0.021) 
≥75th Percentile of predicted 
unemployment and uninsurance 0.038 0.038 
 (0.020) (0.026) 
   
N 20,951  13,306  
 PSA Test in Past Year 
≥75th Percentile of predicted 
unemployment 0.040 0.075* 
 (0.026) (0.036) 
≥75th Percentile of predicted 
uninsurance 0.023 0.012 
 (0.040) (0.050) 
≥75th Percentile of predicted 
unemployment and uninsurance -0.033 -0.061 
 (0.056) (0.072) 
   
N 7,594 4,909 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
(1) Baseline (3) Employer provided insurance entire year 1  
All regressions also control for age, age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, income, number of employees 
in firm, region, urban residence, self-reported health status, presence of physical limitations of work, smoking status, 
a series of risk preference measures, and presence of comorbidities both in oneself and in one’s spouse.  
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Table A-4-10 Regression estimates restricted to 75th percentile or greater of predicted 
unemployment or uninsurance for individuals with employer provided health insurance in year 1 
for years 2007-2010 
 Physical 
in Past 
Year 
Blood 
Pressure 
Checked in 
Past Year 
Cholesterol 
Checked in 
Past Year 
Flu Shot 
in Past 
Year 
Mammogram 
in Past Year 
Pap Test 
in Past 
Year 
PSA Test 
in Past 
Year 
Unemployed 
year 2 0.111 0.052 0.062 -0.035 0.040 0.081 0.11 
 (0.076) (0.047) (0.079) (0.084) (0.116) (0.114) (0.305) 
Uninsured 
year 2 -0.051 <0.001 -0.017 -0.029 -0.124 -0.151* 0.176 
 (0.039) (0.035) (0.040) (0.033) (0.094) (0.069) (0.181) 
Unemployed 
x Uninsured 
year 2 -0.064 -0.008 -0.032 0.046 -0.072 0.092 -0.351 
 (0.101) (0.072) (0.105) (0.102) (0.204) (0.155) (0.392) 
N 3,361 3,396 3,245 3,385 924 1,593 341 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
All regressions also control for age, age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, income, number of employees 
in firm, region, urban residence, self-reported health status, presence of physical limitations of work, smoking status, 
a series of risk preference measures, and presence of comorbidities both in oneself and in one’s spouse. 
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Table A-4-11 Regression estimates by laid off and non-laid off unemployment for individuals 
with employer provided health insurance in year 1 in years 2007-2010 
 Physical 
in Past 
Year 
Blood 
Pressure 
Checked in 
Past Year 
Cholesterol 
Checked in 
Past Year 
Flu Shot 
in Past 
Year 
Mammogram 
in Past Year 
Pap Test 
in Past 
Year 
PSA Test 
in Past 
Year 
Laid off 
year 2 0.165* 0.117** 0.051 -0.063 0.205 0.198 0.095 
 (0.077) (0.041) (0.079) (0.088) (0.126) (0.113) (0.190) 
Uninsured 
due to lay 
off year 2 -0.108 -0.019 -0.003 0.10 -0.236 -0.187 -0.03 
 (0.097) (0.056) (0.098) (0.105) (0.174) (0.144) (0.230) 
Unemployed 
(not laid off) 
year 2 0.133 0.047 0.001 -0.010 0.055 0.136 0.089 
 (0.069) (0.049) (0.088) (0.085) (0.120) (0.110) (0.303) 
Uninsured 
(not due to 
lay off)  -0.064* -0.037 -0.034 -0.050 -0.114 -0.125* 0.106 
year 2 (0.033) (0.029) (0.033) (0.029) (0.082) (0.058) (0.119) 
        
N 9,596 9,660 9,284 9,628 2,881 4,284 1,642 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
All regressions also control for age, age, sex, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, income, number of employees 
in firm, region, urban residence, self-reported health status, presence of physical limitations of work, smoking status, 
a series of risk preference measures, and presence of comorbidities both in oneself and in one’s spouse.
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Chapter 5. 
Conclusion
 
This dissertation examines how various factors affect preventive health utilization 
decisions, including factors not directly related to the specific type of preventive health care 
itself. These include complex interactions between different types of care and macroeconomic 
variations in the likelihood of future unemployment or uninsurance. 
In the first paper, I analyze how a false-positive mammogram can have significant 
spillover effects onto medication adherence, finding that a false-positive mammogram leads to 
improved cholesterol medication adherence for the Medicaid insured population but reduced 
adherence for the commercially insured. I further provide some suggestive evidence that the 
improvement in the Medicaid population may be due to increased interaction with the health care 
system. This suggests policies to encourage providers to check on all aspects of a patient care 
may be important in improving medication adherence. In addition, policies to provide low cost 
providers to ensure that populations that may have access problems are able to interact with the 
health care system may also help improve medication adherence.  
On the other hand, the worsening of cholesterol medication adherence in the commercially 
insured population demonstrates that the negative experience of a false-positive mammogram 
can have wide ranging negative effects. Particularly in combination with the results from the 
second paper, which shows significant increases in depression and anxiety medication initiation 
following a false-positive mammogram, health policies providing additional follow-up care for 
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women experiencing a false-positive may be important both to help women deal with increased 
anxiety as well as ensure that they continue to utilize appropriate preventive care. The negative 
effects also further indicate that there are serious adverse effects of false-positive mammograms 
that need to be considered when determining recommended rates of mammography screening. 
 Finally, in the third paper I show that anticipated unemployment and uninsurance may 
have significant, but opposing effects on preventive care utilization. I find evidence of stocking 
up for future unemployment, but even stronger evidence for delaying as a result of future 
uninsurance. The results suggest that efforts to ensure appropriate preventive care utilization 
during economic downturns may be best targeted on the insurance side. In particular, policies to 
help individuals find and obtain affordable coverage, whether it’s marketplace coverage, 
Medicaid, or some other type of additional coverage, for both preventive and curable care are 
important.  
 
